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ABSTRACT
southeastern
North America
was
the
scene
of
international, intercultural, and interethnic frontiers during
the first two-thirds of the eighteenth century. Europeans and
Indians existed there in greater relative concentrations than
anywhere else in North America, and each European colony and
Indian nation constituted a different locus of trade,
diplomacy, and war. Because of the relatively high population
density and national and ethnic complexity of the region,
commercial, diplomatic, and military relations there exhibited
a different character than in earlier-colonized regions from
virginia northward and in the Caribbean.
The southeastern Indians existed in a state of dependency
in the eighteenth century which grew as the century wore on.
The Indians• position relative to the Europeans was mitigated
by the competition of three imperial powers for their trade
and alliance. All major Indian powers in the region had a
choice of at least two Europeans as trading partners and
allies, and the Creeks bordered all three.
The creeks
followed a conscious policy of balance-of-power after 1715
which helped maintain the political and diplomatic status quo
on the frontier for half a century.
Europeans tried to alter the imperial status guo several
times before 1763 but were unsuccessful each time. This was
partly due to their own status of dependency on Europe; their
policies were not always their own to devise.
Economic,
political, and military dependence on European capitals,
intercolonial disputes, and internal politics made each colony
less than effective in carrying out policies designed to
better their position relative to other European and Indian
powers.
This study first analyses southeastern Indian culture
and the region°s history to 1732 to establish the cultural,
economic, ethnic, political and imperial background against
which Indians and Europeans interacted in the Southeast.
Subsequent chapters focus on specific episodes and events to
1763 that illustrate how a precarious balance between and
among Indian and European powers operated, and why no power
was able to upset that balance. Finally it shows that when
the balance was upset after 1760 it was the result of
intervention by outside forces.

vi
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Introduction

The struggle among European imperial powers for hegemony
in North America is the history of that continent for nearly
two-thirds of the eighteenth century.
European capitals

and tactics

Strategies devised in

employed on

the American

frontier were executed solely for ridding the continent of
unwanted rivals.

Moreover, European imperial machinations

never failed to consider native American involvement as an
expendable means to an end in achieving the spoils of empire.
Regardless of the location--Quebec, New England, Louisiana,
or Florida--imperial ambitions were fueled by individual
greed, corporate manipulation, and official intrigue.
As was the case throughout the continent, these European
forces and the native American response to them were clearly
evidenced in the borderlands empire that composed North
America's

eighteenth-century

southeastern

frontier.

Nevertheless, much of what occurred in that region at that
time has been repeatedly cast in a lesser light by colonial
historians.

The probable reason for that benign neglect is

that, when France and England engaged in the decisive contest
for North America, that drama unfolded on the northeastern
frontier, and those events have traditionally been spotlighted

2
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by

historians.

Events

on

the

southeastern

frontier,

nevertheless, demonstrate that in the half century or so
before the Conquest England, France, an.d Spain engaged in a
heated rivalry for the purpose of bringing the region and its
native population into their respective political and economic
orbits.

France, Spain, and England all had their colonial

marches in the Southeast, and each had its plan for the
region.

The success of these strategies, however, depended

in some measure on the response of the region's native
inhabitants.

The five major Indian nations or confederacies

and countless smaller tribes and bands, on the other hand, had
goals of their own.

on occasion,

disparate groups of

Europeans and Indians were able to trade and work together to
accomplish mutually beneficial goals; at other times, no
accommodation was possible and conflict ensued.
Trade, diplomacy, and war preoccupied almost everyone on
the southeastern frontier from the beginning of European
settlement until the end of the Seven Years' War in 1763.
For Europeans, trade with the natives was conducted for many
reasons,

from acquiring the basic necessities of life to

amassing wealth and the accompanying prestige.

Similarly,

for Indian leaders, the patronage of Europeans could mean not
only the acquisition of more and better trade goods for their
own people, but also the means of building a secure power base
within their nation.

Thus, for both groups, commerce was

regarded not only as a means to an economic end, but as a
powerful political tool.

The decision therefore to trade or
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not trade, be it taken by European or Indian, involved the
most basic issues of politics,

and war.

diplo~acy,

Trade and alliance between Europeans aiid native Americans
was

always

pressures.
planters,

subject

to

internal

and

external

political

Within European colonies, merchants vied with
assemblies challenged governors,

and government

officials at all levels fought with each other over the
establishment, financing, and conduct of Indian relations.
Within Indian nations and confederacies,

factions favored

competing European powers, "white" and "redn chiefs contested
issues of war and peace, and parties of young warriors upset
the best-laid plans of everyone.

While each group tried to

reconcile internal differences, it simultaneously sought to
present a unified position to its friends and enemies.

The

establishment of alliances between Europeans and Indians in
the Southeast was a complex undertaking.
Trade and diplomacy wera the two principle activities of
the southeastern economy, and neither could take place without
the other.

Contrary to the opinion of contemporary European

commentators, trade goods and presents were not enough in
themselves to secure the alliance of an Indian nation.

Each

nation had its own agenda and chose its allies to further its
ambitions.

These alliances, however, were fragile creations

which could be imperiled by the ignorance,
dishonesty of either side.

neglect,

or

Constant attention in the form of

frontier diplomacy was necessary to initiate and maintain
friendly alliances, and to disrupt those of competitors.
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might be expected, not all European and Indian players in the
game of alliances possessed the same skill; some ran circles
around their competitors.
Conflict and peace in the Southeast,

as elsewhere,

depended upon the ebb and flow of politics and diplomacy.
Combat between Europeans was usually confined to periodic
AngJ.o-Spanish border clashes.

Europeans, however, did not

hesitate to instigate, lead, or participate in Indian raids
on fellow Indians or Europeans.

More often, Indians fought

Indians, for their own reasons or as proxies of their European
"allies."

Sometimes, as in the case of the Choctaws, the

tribe turned in on itself as the result of the pull of rival
Europeans powers and civil war ensued.

Nevertheless, in

warfare, as in every other aspect of life in the Southeast,
after 1763 things would never be the same.
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CHAPTER I

THE SOUTHEASTERN FRONTIER TO 1699

The southeast is bounded on the north by the coastal
plain of the carolinas, the Appalachian Mountains, the Ohio
River, and the Ozark Mountains, and extends south to the Gulf
of Mexico, east to the Atlantic Ocean, and west to the plains
of East Texas.

The region is blessed with a mild climate,

good soil over most of its range, abundant rainfall, and easy
communication over its vast distances by land and water. This
environment produced a regional culture which was "socially
diverse but culturally similar. 111
Whatever the Indians of the Southeast lacked in science
and technology vis-a-vis the Europeans they made up in sheer
numbers.

Although European populations were increasing in

the first two-thirds of the eighteenth century and Indian
populations were decreasing, over the region as a whole the
Indians outnumbered the subjects of the three European powers
combined.

Indian population figures are hard to establish

with certainty, but all available indicators point to a fact
that

the

colonists

outnumbered.

faced

every day:

they

were

greatly

According to the most recent figures, at the
6
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beginning of the eighteenth century the southeast contained
approximately 130,600 Indians,
Blacks.

By

1760,

significantly.

however,

70,900 Whites,
those

figures

and 8,700
had

changed

Near the end of the Seven Years• War, the

Southeast contained 53,000

Indians,

333,700 Whites,

and

226,700 Blacks. 2
An

important tie between

thes~

diverse peoples and

regions was Mobilian jargon, the trade language of the Lower
Mississippi Valley. Though its origins are obscure, Mobilian,
so named by the French for the Indians from whom they learned

it, seems to have evolved from the western Muskogean Choctaw
and Chickasaw languages.
and

grammar,

and

Mobilian evolved its own phonology

borrowed

words

from

other

Muskogean

languages, as well as from such diverse sources as Algonkian,
French,

and Spanish.

Mobilian functioned as a contact

language, allowing communication between Muskogeans speaking
different languages and later between Indians and Europeans.
The status of Mobilian before the arrival of theFrench remains
uncertain, but it is clear that the French helped to spread
the jargon and increase its use.

Mobilian remained a true

contact language; rather than becoming creolized,

it was

always a second language, and never adopted by any people as
their first or only tongue. 3
Large and often densely settled native populations were
possible because southeastern flora and fauna provided the
Indians with a wide variety of excellent food sources. Indian
subsistence

was

based

upon

gathering,

hunting,
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agriculture.

Because of the relatively short, mild winters,

some varieties of fruits, nuts, roots, berries, and tubers
were available in almost every season.

Gathering was a year-

round activity of the women, children, and old people. Acorns
were an important food source, because they could be eaten or
used to produce oil.

Certain seeds were also collected, such

as sunflower seeds, which could either be eaten directly or
ground into meal. 4
Hunting and fishing provided the southeastern Indians
with much of their yearly food supply.

The forests, rivers,

lakes, and ocean shores provided an abundant harvest for the
natives.

Among large game animals deer, bear, and in the

western areas buffalo provided the Indians with ample supplies
of meat, leather, and oil. Small reptiles, mammals, and birds
were available year-round. Along the Mississippi and Atlantic
flyways every year migrated millions of birds, providing fall
and spring food sources.

Hunting was usually done with the

bow and arrow, blow gun, or spear.
throughout the region.

Fish were abundant

Fishing methods included hook and

line, nets, weirs, traps, bow and arrow, and even roping of
certa.in species. 5
Agriculture was practiced by all native peoples in the
Southeast, and for most it was the major subsistence activity.
Corn, beans, and squash were the major crops, in that order.
These

three

crops

grow

well

together,

and

they

are

particularly well suited to the river-bottom, highly acidic
soils so characteristic of the Southeast.

Sunflower, bottle
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gourd, and other useful species were also planted.

Because ..

of the long growing season, some plants were harvested twice
a year. 6
Most southeastern Indians were not strictly gatherers or
agriculturalists, but practiced both in a mixed economy.

By

combining hunting and agriculture the Indians were able to
maximize potential food sources and respond to temporary
climatic conditions that might limit one or more of the usual
food sources. Rainfall was usually abundant, but droughts did
occur,

and would affect hunting and fishing as well as

agriculture.

Thus in good years, tribes lived in compact

villages and depended on hunting for only one-third of their
food supply.

In bad years they dispersed into the woods and

relied on hunting and gathering of secondary food sources for
one-half or more of their subsistence. 7
The cement that held Indian society together was the
kinship system.

Indian culture was organized by clans, with

membership determined through the female line.

A complex

system had evolved to classify relationships, and this system
determined how individual Indians were related.

Even the

clans themselves were ranked in a hierarchy that determined
relationships between members of different clans. Thus, the
rules governing kinship also influenced relationships between
groups, towns, nations, and even societies and cultures.

The

division of the larger nations into "red" and "white" towns
is

one example

of this,

because it prescribed social,

ceremonial, and military relationships among the towns. 8
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Politically the majority of southeastern Indians were
organized into chiefdoms.

A chiefdom stood between a highly

decentralized tribal society and a formal, centralized state.
Chiefdoms were subject to varying degrees of control by the
chief or chiefs.

In some chiefdoms the leader enjoyed wide

discretionary power over his "subjects," while in others he
had no power to compel and led through his oratorical ability,
prowess in war, and ability to redistribute his own and the
nation' s wealth.

Within the chiefdom each individual was

ranked according to age, clan, wealth, and war honors from the
highest to the lowest.
and any

individual

These rankings were fluid, however,

warrior with the proper martial or

oratorical skills could become leader of a chiefdom. 9
Early explorers gave evidence of great power possessed
by some chiefs and great devotion on the part of their
subjects.

De Soto even encountered female rule in at least

one chiefdom.

But the nature of chiefly authority changed

significantly due to contact with Europeans.

Though there

are few historical sources to document the decline of chiefly
authority during the seventeenth century, the scant historical
record points to this development; archaeological evidence
from village sites of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
also indicate the disintegration of the chiefdoms.

By the

late seventeenth century, when the historical record largely
resumes, only the Natchez still had an all-powerful chief 1 the
Great Sun, and nowhere was female rule practiced. 10
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one aspect of Indian life that did not change by the
early eighteenth century was the importamce of war, which
affected practically every other aspect of life.

The hunt

was conducted in many ways like war and was viewed as practice
for war.

More important, however, without war honors a young

male could not become recognized as a warrior. Once the young
man had killed an enemy he w·as given a new name and accepted
as a full member of his tribe. So important did horses become
to the southeastern Indians that the capture or killing of an
enemy horse was considered the equivalent of taking a scalp,
and could earn a young man the coveted warrior status. 11
Indian warfare was very different from contemporary
European conceptions.

War was seldom undertaken for the

acquisition of territory or even for the destruction of the
enemy; usually retaliation, the desire to win war honors, or
the need to replace lost members of the tribe were reason
enough.

Warfare was undertaken by small parties, killing or

capturing as many of the enemy as they could supervise, and
then retreating swiftly home.
of surprise,
striking

a

If a war party lost the element

the warriors usually returned home without
blow,

no

matter how

great

their

numerical

superiority over the enemy. 12
The complex rituals and taboos that governed warfare were
reflections of the moral and religious belief system on which
native life was based.

The collateral requirements of

separation and purity were an important part of this system.
The physical world was divided into opposites, and strict
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rules

governed contact between opposites.

These

rules

governed every area of life, from relationships between males
and females to preparation of food and, of course, observance
of

religious

and

social

ceremonies.

Thus,

much

of

southeastern religious ce:r.emony and practice was aimed at
enforcing separation to achieve balance and avoid pollution.
When pollution occurred, ceremony and practice were aimed at
wiping it away to restore purity and balance. 13
Purity and balance were important to the southeastern
Indians

because

supernatural

they

lived

beings and

punished evil.

in

forces

a

universe

peopled

by

which rewarded good and

Like most oral peoples, the Indians believed

in both white or good magic, which was practiced by conjurE\rs,
and harmful black magic, practiced by witches.

Dreams were

especially powerful omens and exerted powerful influence over
the actions of individuals and tribes.

An

omen-filled dream

by any member of a war party, from the leader to the youngest
warrior, could send the entire party back to the village.

Not

even the greatest warrior would ignore such an omen, secure
in the knowledge he would have the sanction of the entire
nation. 14
European powers came to the Southeast for varied reasons,
as reflected in the nature of their colonial establishments.
Spain was first.

Conquistadors from Havana and Mexico City

explored the interior in an ultimately vain search for another
Aztec or Inca empire to conquer.
d~

Ponce de Leon, Lucas Vasquez

Ayllon, Hernando de Soto, and Panfillo de Narvaez all died
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attempting to establish a Spanish toehold in the Southeast,
which they christened the land of "Florida. 11

Though their

expeditions collected vaJ.uabJ.e knowledge about the region and
its inhabitants, they found nothing to propel Spain into the
Southeast in a meaningful way.

Thus, throughout the early

sixteenth century, Spain concentrated on colonizing elsewhere
in the New world. 15
It was not until the 1560s that Spain undertook a
permanent settlement in Florida.

st. Augustine, established

in September 1565,

first

became the

settlement in the Southeast.

permanent European

The Florida peninsula was

strategically important to Spain because it lay beside the
Bahama Channel, a major communications link between Old and
New Spain through which the bullion fleet regularly sailed.
Since occupation of the Florida coast by rival European powers
could wreck the orderly administration of Spain's New World
empire, Spanish settlement there was essential. But with or
without a foreign threat, the establishment of a Spanish
province

in

Florida was

a

natural

and

long-anticipated

extension of Spain's New World empire. 16
As elsewhere in New Spain, with Spanish government came
Spanish missionaries.

In 1572 the ,Jesuits established a

mission on the Chesapeake Bay which lasted only two years
before being destroyed by Indians. 17

A year later the

Franciscans took charge of the Florida missions.
would labor for almost two hundred years.

There they

During the next

one hundred years they established thirty-four missions from
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14
st. Augustine north to st. catherine's Island and west to the
modern site of Tallahassee, Florida, all part of the vast
field which the

Spanish called the province

of Guale.

Marauding pirates compounded the misery of harsh living
conditions;

neophytes and co:.iV'erts occasionally revolted

against the rigorous regime imposed by the moral austerity of
Spanish catholicism and the physical demands of mission
agriculture.

Guale was not a peaceful place, frcm within or

without. 18
By the 1560s, France and England were beginning to show
interest in the region.

France was the first to challenge

Spain's title to Florida.

Jean Ribault established the

Huguenot settlement of Port Royal and its Fort Caroline on
the Broad River, near modern Beaufort, south Carolina in 1562.
By the time the Spaniards learned of the colony and sent an
expedition to destroy it, the settlement had already been
abandoned.

Then, in 1564, Rene de Laudonniere returned to the

Florida coast, attempting to plant a colony just north of the
mouth of st. John's River.

Spain's response to this effort

was founded upon both imperial considerations and religious
fanaticism.

Pedro de Menendez de Aviles not only destroyed

the colony, killing most of its settlers, but heeven went so
far as to continue up the coast to locate and capture the few
Protestant survivors of the earlier French colony who were
still living among the Indians. 19
Except for the activities of coastal explorers and
pirates,

English efforts in the Southeast were confined
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Both the

initially to its extreme northeastern parts.

unsuccessful "lost" colony of Roanoke in North caroli-na and
the successful settlement of Jamestown in 1607 proved to be
English colonizing efforts too remote from st. Augustine to
unduly concern Spain.

Moreover 1 Spain was really in no

position to confront the English.

Still recovering from the

defeat of the Armada and seeking more and more dynastic
control of Europe, Spain did not have the time or resources
to expend on the remote northern marches of New Spain. 20
With the establishment of south carolina

in

1670,

however, the English were positioned to challenge the safety
of one of Spain's most important sea lanes.

No outpost, the

new colony was intended to be a major settlement center. South
Carolina

was

the

child

of

Barbados,

and

organized

by

proprietors experienced in colonial ventures; they would not
need decades to consolidate their position before turning
their

attentions

outward.

These

Barbado-Carolinians,

moreover, had a long history of conflict with Spain, and they
would not wait to launch a new phase of that old rivalry. 21
The South Carolinians moved quickly to consolidate their
position

as

a vi.able

colony and did this

through the

establishment of a profitable trade with the Indians. Indeed,
it was soon apparent that the colony was particularly wellsuited to develop a wide-ranging trade with the Indians of the
southeast. Inhibiting mountains extended only to the colony's
northern fringes, and the overland routes,

th~)ugh

long and

tiring to man and horse, provided near-direct access to the
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natives.

These trade contacts went far to speed the colony's

expansion west and south.

Not only did the English carry more

and often better goods to the Indians, but they were usually
willing to sell them rum, which the French preferred not to
do, and guns, which the Spanish were loath to put into Indian
hands. The English willingness to trade in Indian slaves also
expanded their commercial sphere and enhanced their contacts
with the natives. 22
As English interests spread across South carolina there
was little doubt that they would soon encounter thair Spanish
counterparts in northern Florida.

The Carolinians began

almost immediately to plan for the expulsion of the Spaniards
from their borderland province.

In 1674 an alliance was

concluded with the Westos, who lived near modern-day Augusta,
Georgia. Trade with the Westos was mainly in deerskins, furs,
and Indian slaves.

More important, the Westos were armed and

served to "protect" South Carolina from Spanish and Indian
enemies. Soon the English began to encourage Westo raids into
Spanish mission country, and by 1680 the Westos were making
direct attacks on the missions.

Ironically, that same year

the Westos became troublesome and were themselves destroyed
by the Carolinians.

By then, however, South Carolina had

developed other trading partners and proxies. 23
France, like England, concentrated its colonizing efforts
in the northeastern parts of North America during.most of the
seventeenth century.

It was not until New France was more

than six decades old and firmly under royal control that
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Frenchmen began to move into the interior of the continent in
large numbers.

But once they had penetrated to the Great

Lakes and the Upper Mississippi Valley, the continent itself
seemed to drive them towards the southeast.

Minister of the

Marine Louis Phelypeaux, comte de Pontchartrain was opposed
to the expansion of New France in·i:o the Great Lakes and
beyond, but the pursuit of fur-trade profits drove all before
it. When Governor-General Louis de Buade, comte de Frontenac,
and his lieutenant, Robert-Rene cavalier de La Salle, moved
their sphere of influence westward by establishing forts and
trading

posts

without

ministerial

permission,

the

fait

accompli was accepted at Versailles. 24
The French government 1 s displeasure with Frontenac's
western expansion was somewhat tempered when rumors began to
fly that a great river flowed from near the Great Lakes
westward to the "sea."

The possible discovery of the long-

sought "Northwest Passage" to the Pacific and the fabled
wealth of the Orient gave a new impetus to French exploration
of North America.

Thus in 1672 Frontenac dispatched fur

trader Louis Jolliet and Jesuit Jacques Marquette to determine
the course of the great river.

Upon Jolliet•s return to

Quebec in August 1674, he was able to state definitely that
the Mississippi emptied into the Gulf of Mexico.

This was

disappointing for Frontenac and La Salle, but they sought to
make the best of it. 25
La Salle would die in his attempt at empire building,

but his scheme left its mark on the history of the entire
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Frontenac helped La Salle obtain a fur trade

continent.

monopoly in the Mississippi Valley and the right to establish
posts along the river and its tributaries.
re~~red

La Salle was

to pay for all costs of exploration and development,

but through his scheme he planned to make himself the virtual
king of the North American interior.
required

to

penetrate

the

Seven years were

mid-continent,

descend

the

Mississippi to its mouth, and claim the entire valley for
France.

His ruthless attempts to monopolize the interior fur

trade pushed his own operations and those of his rivals
constantly westward in search of the furs on which their
fortunes depended.

In the process, he helped spawn a new

breed of men, Canada's legendary coureurs de bois. 26
Having discovered the mouth of the Mississippi, La Salle
next sought to establish a colony there.

But when the

explorer returned to the Gulf Coast, instead of stopping at
the mouth of the Mississippi, he sailed on and landed on the
gulf coast of Texas.

La Salle probably knew exactly where he

was, and hoped from there to obtain some of the fabled wealth
of the 11 mines of Mexico. 11 As soon as the Spaniards of Mexico
heard

rumors

about

the

determined to crush it.

colony

from

the

Indians,

they

Before the Spanish could find the

mysterious white men, however, La Salle's colony had fallen
apart from lack of adequate planning and the hostility of the
local natives.

La Salle was killed by his own men while

attempting to go overland to the Illinois country for help. 27
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If La Salle's explorations seem less epic than De Soto•s
marches, their results set the stage for much of the next
century's struggles among Europeans and between Europeans and
Indians.

The Frenchman's claim to the Mississippi Valley and

his failed Texas colony helped to set in motion the final
settlement of Louisiana and western Florida, even though this
development was delayed a decade due to the demands of war in
Europe and America. Acco·unts of La Salle's exploits and their
aftermath not only gave Europeans their first detailed look
at the interior of North America, but also helped convince
Spain, England, and France of the importance of planting
colonies there. 28

La Salle, his lieutenants, and the books

written about Louisiana contributed significantly to expanding
the cartographic frontiers of North America, though in this
as in other things La Salle's contribution was not wholly
positive. 29
The southeastern frontier was settled significantly later
than other parts of Spanish,
America.

English,

and French North

For all three European powers, moreover, the region

stayed on the marches of empire through the imperial contest
which

ended

in

1763.

No

sparkling

flourished there; no major centers

~f

great wars were fought in the region.

colonial

capitals

wealth emerged; and no
The slower development

of the southeastern colonies was not due to lack of human
motivation on the part of the Europeans, but rather because
of their relations with one another and with the numerically
superior Indians of the Southeast.
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The arrival of Europeans in the early sixteenth century
began a long train of events that would eventually transform
nearly every aspect of southeastern life.

Contact with

Europeans introduced new microbes into the environment that
caused massive depopulation.

Loss of population led to great

changes in Indians' socio-political systems.
time,

moreover,

Europeans

introduced

At the same

merchandise

and

technology which brought the Indians suddenly from a "Stone
Age" material culture to that of porcelain, glass, cloth, and
iron.

Natives adopted and adapted

~uch

from the Europeans,

though not always in ways intended by the newcomers.

The

adoption

the

of

European

technology

did

not

lead

to

abandonment of 'lative culture, but that culture would not
emerge from the exchange unchanged.
With the discovery and settlement of the Americas, the
natives of the Southeast, like their brethren elsewhere, were
gradually incorporated into the expanding world market of
European mercantilism, a development which would eventually
result in native "dependency" on their European trading
partners and allies.

In early contacts the Indians often

dealt with Europeans from a position of relative strength, but
as time wore on the Indians were placed increasingly in an
inferior numerical, economic, and military position to the
Europeans.

Although this trend did not culminate by 1763, it

exerted much influence on Indians and Europeans alike. 30
European explorers brought not only their technology and
goods to the New World but also their way of doing things.
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European ideas about commerce, international relations, and
warfare were greatly different from those of the Indians.
Whether they came to America as conquistadors, missionaries,
traders, or settlers, the Europeans who came in contact with
the Indians of the southeastern woodlands were driven by a
world view that placed their own philosophy above that of all
others and fueled their determination to accomplish their
goals at almost any cost.
The European in colonial America was the product of a
culture and a movement that made him peculiarly well suited
to

the

task of

exploring and

subduing the New World.

Scientific and technical advances in navigation, cartography,
and military sciences that grew out of the Renaissance allowed
Europeans not only to reach the Americas,

but also to

establish their domination over cultures far less technically
advanced.
material

Evangelistic Christianity reinforced the obvious
superiority over the Indians with

a

religious

imperative to "reduce" the pagan savages to a state of grace.
Conquest as well as conversion required that the Indians be
acculturated to European notions of religion, government, and
material culture.

Europeans had the means and the will to

force change upon the Indians if they would not be led
willingly.
If Indian material culture was far simpler than that of
the Europeans, the natives were more than a match for the
Europeans as traders

and diplomats.

Within

their own

understanding of the value of things, which at times differed
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greatly from that of Europeans, they were hard bargainers who
knew how to get the most from their trade goods.

When Indians

were bested in trade it was usually the result of unscrupulous
European traders, or, more frequently, a combination of bad
traders and worse rum.

If Europeans thought they were taking

advantage of their trading partners with some of their deals,
the Indians probably thought the same thing of the same
transactions.
As diplomats, the Indians were the equals of Europeans.
Because of their own traditions and practices, they were well
versed in the diplomatic arts and knew how to maximize the
benefits of an alliance while minimizing its costs. Moreover,
some of their practices, such as their avoidance of saying
11

no 11 directly and their strong desire not to offend anyone,

made

them

difficult

to

understand

and

predictable from a European perspective.

therefore

less

The existence of

native factionalism and the need for unanimity of policy also
unwittingly played into the hands of the Indians.

The plea

that one more convoy of trade goods, one more post or fort in
the nation, or some other such boon might just bring over the
rest of the nation was a powerful inducement for a governor,
commandant, or Indian agent to sweeten what was probably
already a large pot for the Indians.
During

the

first

third

of

the

eighteenth

century

Europeans and Indians variously expanded, contracted, lost,
or consolidated their positions on the southeastern marches.
By 1733 basic spheres of influence, alliances, and enmities
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were formed.

The second third of the century would be spent

in a many-sided contest for supremacy and survival within
those parameters. The southeastern frontier may have seemed
of little consequence in England, France, and Spain, or even
New England, New France, and New Spain.

But for the Europeans

and Indians who lived there, the Southeast was at the center
of a universe witnessing the most basic struggle of life and
death.
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Chapter II

The Indians on an Evolving Frontier, 1699-1732

Quite willingly, the southeastern Indians increasingly
became part of the world-wide trade and imperial struggles of
the Europeans after 1699.

Trade and alliance with the

Europeans had much to recommend themselves to southeastern
natives at the turn of the century.

The Europeans were on

the whole settled on lands unoccupied by the natives and were
mostly confined to the coast, far from the most populous
tribes.

The Europeans had goods to trade, including copper

kettles,

guns, beads,

cloth, and host of items far more

desirable than their native counterparts of bone, stone, and
leather.

And above all this, as military allies

a~d

arms

merchants the Europeans could be useful auxiliaries against
traditional native enemies.

By 1732, those tribes that

survived would know what the Westoes learned before them: the
Europeans could be valuable trading partners and allies, but
they could also be dangerous, and required careful handling.
With the establishment of permanent colonial settlements
in the Southeast, its native population was drawn into a new
political and economic order which bore little resemblance to
27
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indigenous culture. Gradually surrounded by European imperial
powers, the Indians had to choose sides in a struggle they
could not understand initially because it arose from a
political system so radically different from their own.
their own numbers

dwindled and those of

As

the Europeans

increased, their position on the frontier became increasingly
precarious and their freedom to choose their own policies
lessened.

Native chiefdoms were at a distinct disadvantage

in any long-range contest with European kingdoms. 1
Economically,

the

disadvantage as well.

southeastern

Indians

were

at

a

Native peoples who knew no marketplace

in the European sense were confronted by traders and settlers
who bought and sold according to far different
unacquainted with the
suddenly

confronted

rules~

a people

concept of private property were
by

strangers

who

acquisitiveness one of the cardinal virtues.

considered
If they lived

far enough away from the Europeans and had commodities to
exchange which the Europeans prized, the natives could benefit
and even prosper from their European trade.

Once they

outlived their economic usefulness or European settlement drew
too near,

they were either destroyed or forced further

inland. 2
The mainspring of trade and diplomacy in the Southeast
was the deerskin trade.

Of little importance to Florida

except locally, the deerskin trade was counted on heavily by
the organizers of both South Carolina and Louisiana as the
underpinning of their economies. South Carol ina •s proprietors
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saw the deerskin, or "leather r 11 trade as a source of immediate
profits to insure the success of the entire project.

They

employed the active and experienced Henry Woodward as their
agent and he pushed the trade deep into the interior.
only

the

economy

but

the

growth

of

South

Not

carolina's

settlements would be profoundly influenced by the leather
trade. 3

Pontchartrain saw this same expansion as a grave

threat to French North America and ordered the establishment
of Louisiana precisely to counter it.

Once in Louisiana,

Pierre Le Moyne d'Iberville sought to engross the trade for
France by allowing free trade for the coureurs de bois,
establishing tanneries throughout the region, and drawing all
the Indians of the Southeast into an alliance with France. 4
Leather was the largest renewable resource available to
the southeastern Indians, and the deerskin trade fit perfectly
into the mercantilist needs of the Europeans.

Leather was

needed in the tanneries of Europe and could be traded for the
mother country's manufactured goods.

In the case of England,

goods made from American leather were exported, helping to
maintain

a

favorable

balance-of-trade

with

foreigners.

Although leather was not as profitable for the natives as
northern furs, for many nations it sufficed to purchase all
their European needs. 5
At the end of the eighteenth century another powerful
economic influence at work was the slave trade.

The English

began trading in slaves from the beginning of Carolina's
settlement, mainly from the south at the expense of Spain's
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allies.

By 1698 Carolinians had begun to make regular trips

to the Chickasaws for leather and slaves.

In the early years

slaves were an important factor in the Anglo-Chickasaw trade,
a source of great profits for both sides. 6

Slave-taking in

war was an established part of traditional Indian culture, but
to obtain enough slaves to satisfy the Carolina traders the
Chickasaws increased war parties to all nations in the region
dramatically.

Chickasaws raided traditional enemies such as

the Choctaws, Colapissas, Chawashas, and Yazoos of the Lower
Mississippi River and Gulf Coast and expanded their attacks
on the Indians of the Illinois country and the lower Red and
Arkansas rivers. 7
Slave raiding had political consequences as great as its
economic and demographic impact.

The destruction of the

Spanish missions and the continuing Anglo-Spanish contest was
not caused by the slave trade, but the profit in Indian slaves
was a factor in much of the fighting.
enfeebled by the
strengthened by it.

slave trade,

But if Florida was

Louisiana

ironically was

The Chickasaws became South Carolina's

strongest ally on the strength of the slave trade, and that
slave trade drove the Choctaws inexorably into an alliance
with France that would last for over six decades and survive
even a Choctaw civil war.

As feeble as Louisiana was, its

survival to 1763, which was due partly to the Choctaws, kept
England out of the trans-Mississippi West at the settlement
of the Great War for Empire, possibly cheating England of her
best chance to become master of North America. 8
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Leather and slaves traded for export were an important
part of the southeastern economy, but they were only the tip
of a large iceberg. Although government officials and traders
attempted to regulate or even monopolize the Indian trade
within narrow boundaries, almost all Indians, Europeans, and
Negroes participated in the regional economy to varying
degrees.

The extent to which European settlers and soldiers

and African slaves participated in the local interethnic
economy varied according to time and place, but it was always
an important fact of life. 9
In

Louisiana,

this

face-to-face

practically everyone in the colony.

exchange

involved

In the early years

settlers used skins acquired from the local natives to pay
for manufactured goods in the royal warehouses, with skins
serving as the universal medium of exchange.

Some were

involved in such exchanges only occasionally, but others made
a lifetime practice of trading with the local natives.

Some

of the "petit nations" near Mobile and New Orleans relied on
this small-scale personal trade for almost all their European
goods. 10

In South carolina the relatively small Indian

populations near the settlements operated in a similar fashion
and correspondingly accounted for a much smaller percentage
of the regional economy.

But Indians 1 participation in

agriculture, day labor, and even the skilled trades made them
an

important part

of the

local and

provincial

economy

nonetheless. 11

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

32

With the establishment of south carolina in 1670 and
Louisiana in 1699, the southeastern Indians had two competing
European-based regional economies superimposed upon their own
indigenous trading networks.

Although there were powerful

attractions for the Indians in these new systems, there were
powerful disadvantages as well.

Most important in the short

run, natives were placing not only their economy, but their
very security, at the mercy of the Europeans.

The Indians

could not manufacture the goods they purchased from the
Europeans and, in the case of the all-important gun, they
could not repair them or supply ammunition as well.

But they

needed guns not only to protect themselves from nations that
had them, but also to kill the deer needed to trade for
everything else they wanted. 12
The addition of English and French spheres to the Spanish
presence in the Southeast afforded most of the Indian nations
a choice among European allies.

Geography, economics, and

diplomacy were considerations for all nations, and each nation
weighted them in importance according to their own thinking.
Ease of communication along natural water or land routes and
good prices were important considerations, but they could be
offset by European-Indian conflict or by the enmity of the
European's other native trading partners.

A less attractive

trade might be acceptable with a more reliable military ally
and arms supplier. 13
Each

of

the

European

colonies

attractions to the southeastern Indians.

offered

different

Spain, feeblest of
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the Europeans, offered the most but delivered the least.
Spanish missionaries offered the Ir1dians eternal salvation
New Spain had few

and membership in the Spanish empire.

missionaries or soldiers to post on her extreme northern
frontier,

however,

and

could

not

prevent

the

virtual

extermination of the missions by the English in the War of
the Spanish succession.

Spain was a viable ally after this

time only along the Gulf coast and among the Lower Creeks,
where there was always at least a small, but influential,
Spanish party. 14
South carolina, the most populous of the southeastern
colonies, offered the southeastern Indians all or nothing,
plenty or death.

Those Indians who lived on lands sought by

Englishmen or adjacent to the English settlements could either
sell their land to the English and move further inland, or be
killed or sold as slaves by Carolina's native allies.

Those

nations who lived beyond the frontier of settlement and who
had goods to trade could profit handsomely through an alliance
with South Carolina, trading for all the European goods they
could possibly afford.

Indians who were not careful, however,

sometimes traded for more than they could ever afford to
repay.

As the British would discover to their regret, the

Indians found ways to avoid paying legally or illegally
acquired debts. 15
France arrived last in the Southeast, offering much and
seemingly asking for little in return.

Governor Iberville

proposed to all the nations of the Southeast that they join
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in a pan-Indian peace under French auspices, and asked only
for a few small parcels of land on which to establish forts
and small settlements. There were, however, two problems with
this plan.

Firstly, it required the Indians to renounce

warfare against each other, or at least among Louisiana's
native allies, which was contrary to some of the Indians' most
basic cultural institutions.

But secondly, France was never

able to supply adequately the Choctaws, much less all the
large and small nations of the Southeast. ·:Sut France did have
guns and ammunition to trade, and she did offer at least some
defense against South Carolina's slaver allies.

France did

not always have enough goods to go around, but she always knew
what to say and how to say it, and oratory was a powerful
force on the square ground and in the council house. 16
The Chickasaws' alliance with England was the result of
both economic and security considerations.

The English

reached the Chickasaws before Iberville did and offered them
a lucrative and dependable trade, despite the hundreds of
overland leagues that lay between Charles Town and the
Chickasaws.

Beyond ·that, however, south carolina was the

perfect ally for diplomatic and security considerations.
south carolina's settlements were far from the Chickasaws, so
there was no chance for friction between the allies over such
common incidents between neighboring allies as unauthorized
English squatters, l:ndian killing of cattle, or even the
occasional murders committed on both sides of the frontier.
south carolina was not the least bit hesitant to sell the
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Chickasaws

guns

and

Relations

ammunition.

were

also

strengthened in the traditional Indian fashion when traders
took Chickasaw wives, cementing commercial relations with
kinship ties.

The South Carolina-Chickasaw alliance was one

of the firmest in the s,:.::atheast. 17
The Choctaws 1 alliance with France was influenced by
geography but mandated by diplomacy.

The settlements of

French Louisiana were linked to the Choctaw villages by the
natural water routes of the Mobile River and its branches.
As a commercial partner, France left much to be desired.
supplies were

always

Her

insufficient and sometimes totally

lacking, her prices for deerskins too low, and her European
manufactures too expensive. But the French armed the Choctaws
against the Chickasaws, and without those arms the Choctaws•
very existence was threatened.
Louisiana 1 s

In the early years of

settlement the Choctaws,

cut off from South

Carolina by traditional Creek enemies, had nowhere else to
turn for trade goods but toward the south.

But as they became

increasingly aware of their importance to Louisiana, they
would considerably raise the cost of their friendship. 18
The Creeks inhabited the geographical center of the
Southeast and their land bordered all three European powers.
As a large, heterogeneous confederation of various tribal and
even linguistic groups, it was natural for various units of
the Creeks to form alliances with different European powers.
Although there would always be a pro-Spanish party among the
Lower Creeks, the lucrative trade offered by South Carolina
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was too good for many Creeks to resist.
highly profitable trade in slaves with

In addition to the
th~

English, at the

expense of traditional creek enemies the Apalachees, there was
also a

lively trade to be had in horses.

The South

Carolinians were short of horses in the early years and the
missions were full of them.

Far enough away from South

Carolina's frontier of settlement in 1699, the creeks were in
a perfect position to draw the maximum possible benefits from
an alliance with the English. 19
The Cherokees, northernmost Indians of the Southeast,
had few options in 1699 but to ally themselves with South
Carolina.

The Cherokees were separated from Florida by

Carolina, which had furthermore armed traditional Cherokee
enemies, the Creeks.

Louisiana was far away, and a French

sphere of influence would not be able to reach the Cherokee
villages for several decades.

The journey from Charles Town

to the Cherokees mountain villages was not an easy one, but
the British traders made it nonetheless.

British goods were

desirable, plentiful, and affordable. Cherokee deerskins were
the thickest and therefore the most valuable in the entire
Southeast,

making

an

profitable to both sides.

Anglo-Carolina

alliance

highly

But over and above this, with their

traditional enemies armed, the Cherokees could not afford to
fall behind in the eighteenth-century Southeastern arms race. 20
At the other end of the southeast was another nation with
little practical choice in allies, the Natchez.

Because of

the nation's size, location, and agricultural surpluses, its

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

37

friendship was of vital importance to France. In the early
years of the eighteenth century the Natchez were well supplied
by the French.

Iberville and his successors courted the

Natchez with ample presents, trade goods, priests, and, in
1716, the establishment of Fort Rosalie de Natchez.

The site

was even for a time considered the best place for the colony's
capital.

The Natchez were the only large nation in the

Southeast to have a European settlement on their doorstep, and
their experience would show that such mixed settlements
containing large numbers of Europeans was not a viable
arrangement. 21
Although the largest nations and confederacies of the
Southeast had some choice in their allies, most of the smaller
nations had none.

Whether they

lived

near

Frenchmen,

Spaniards, or Britons, they had only two choices: accommodate
or die. Those who accommodated usually lived in small villages
that lay close to European farms and settlements.

In

peacetime they contributed their labor, produce, and the
fruits of their hunt to the local interethnic economy.

In

wartime they either went on the warpath with the Europeans or
remained behind to guard the settlements while the Europeans
used larger Indian allies to do their fighting.
11

Many of these

peaceful 11 Indians converted to Christianity and adopted

European styles of dress and ev-en language, although this
process varied greatly in tribes and with individuals. 2?.
As politicians and diplomats, the southeastern l:'.;.Uans
were at no disadvantage to their European counterparts.
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the Indians learned more about the Europeans and realized
their economic and imperial importance, they adjusted their
diplomacy accordingly. Europeans who expected naive innocents
or mindless savages were at a disadvantage when negotiating
with native headmen who were experienced at clan, village,
According to the Chickasaw

tribal and national politics.

trader James Adair, who knew them well, "they are possessed
of

a

strong

comprehensive

judgement,

[and]

can

form

surprisingly crafty schemes. 1123
The "craftiness" of Indian diplomacy was due partly to
the

differences

practices,

which

between

European

strengthened

and

the

native
natives

political
in

their

negotiations with the Europeans by making them unpredictable
to their adversaries.

To a large

~egree

this was due to the

lack of coercive authority on the part of headmen.

No Indian

had the authority or power to commit any other Indian to any
particular policy or action.

Agreements between a headman or

group of headmen and a European government were in reality
promises to try to get the nation to adopt the policy or
course of action in question.

There were many ways to

convince the nation, and oratory was only one of them; bold
individual action, especially involving the murder of enemies,
could often commit a nation to a particular course despite its
majority inclination otherwise. But in the end such decisions
were usually made by the nation in council.

When allied

headmen could not deliver their nation, Europeans usually
ascribed the failure to negative character traits such as
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treachery, inconstancy, venality, or simple mendacity.~
Because of this government by consensus, Southeastern
Indians prized harmony highly and would go to great lengths
to avoid situations that created disharmony, contention, or
loss of face.

While this was understandable in light of

native culture, Europeans misunderstood the Indians on many
occasions to have agreed to a proposition or course of action,
when actually the Indian had either only expressed a hope that
the nation would go along with it, or had rejected it as
politely as he knew how.

Thus when events proved other than

the European expected through his misunderstanding, he again
rationalized the situation by ascribing it to native character
faults.

When Europeans did not understand the art of native

diplomacy, they found the Indians unpredictable and therefore
dangerous.

The

inability of most Europeans

to devise

strategies that anticipated Indian actions gave the natives
an important edge in their dealings with the Europeans. 25
The labyrinth of Indian politics was further complicated
for the Europeans by the existence of minority parties in each
nation that did not favor the majority's choice of European
etllies. Because they genuinely hoped to change the majority• s
choice, this native "loyal opposition" often acted either in
open or in secret against the wishes of the majority party,
and felt no shame or

di~honor

in doing so.

When the minority

failed to "deliver" the nation to their favored European,
despite good-faith efforts, the Europeans often accused them
of faithlessness. But they were too valuable to be discarded,
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which the Indians soon learned all too well.

Thus,

in

addition to the well-known division of the Creeks into
Spanish,
Chickasaws

French,

British

and

sustained

a

factions,

pro-French

over

party ,26

the

time

the

Choctaws

developed a British faction that almost succeeded in weaning
their nation away from the French, 27 and the Cherokees harbored
a French party that brought the nation into war with South
Carolina at the end of the Seven Years• War.~
Individual

hea~en

and

national

councils

concluded

alliances with Europeans for traditional reasons: to obtain
desirable goods and security.

In the creation or the

continual operation of alliances, Indians attempted to gain
the most advantages from their alliance by resorting to
strategies and tactics traditionally used with native allies.
No less than the Europeans, southeastern natives conducted
their affairs within the constructs of their own traditions.
Whatever Europeans may have thought, native Americans had
their own reasons for acting as they did.~
Southeastern Indians provided useful and even necessary
service as military reserves for their respective allies.
The

Indians provided these services,

not out of blind

submission to European superpowers, but for both general and
specific, short-term and long-term benefits.

In a general

way, warfare in alliance with the Europeans provided the
traditional means for their young men to become recognized
warriors by winning war honors.

But there were immediate

rewards as well to be had in plunder, payment for scalps, and
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a booming slave trade. 30

The slave trade itself was a

traditional institution that was transformed by Europeans,
but remained for the Indians a familiar exercise. constituting
only one aspect

of warfare before the

arrival

of

the

Europeans, the Indians suddenly began to make war expressly
in order to obtain slaves, to take advantage of the new
economic incentives offered by Europeans.

31

Service as military allies could even be used as a
bargaining tool with which to obtain better trading conditions
from the Europeans.

One Alabama chief told Bienville that

some of his nation's warriors had taken part in Oglethorpe's
unsuccessful expedition against st. Augustine in 1742 on the
promise of a one-third reduction in prices from Carolina
traders.

But the Indian confessed that even with such

incentives, not many of his nation took advantage of the
offer.

Contrary to the opinion of many contemporary European

observers, economic inducements alone, in the absence of a
traditional rationale or some perceived personal or national
benefit, were seldom enough to "buy" a southeastern Indian. 32
In the Southeast, European settlements usually began on
lands uninhabited by Indians.

Nearby Indians either became

friends with the Europeans and established mutually beneficial
alliances, or became enemies and suffered gradual or sudden
depopulation through disease or the slaving wars of the
Europeans and their native allies.

But European-Indian

alliances l1ere fragile creations and susceptible to many
pressures.

Colonial settlements expanded closer and closer
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to the more populous tribes of the interior, and imperial
military, diplomatic, and commercial rivalries increased as
the eighteenth century wore on.

Those same forces made

European-Indian relations evermore susceptible to conflict. 33
Given the exploratory nature of European-Indian alliances
in the first decades of the eighteenth century it should not
be surprising that the two great interracial wars that took
place before 1733 were not between long-time enemies but
erstwhile allies.

In both cases, moreover,

each of the

European participants was drawn into a costly war, in lives
and money, due not to the machinations of its European rivals,
but the actions and policies of its own subjects.

Though the

causes of the wars were different from the European side, the
responses of the Indians were the same. When they were pushed
too far by Europeans and found themselves

in a

no-win

situation, they struck back in traditional fashion, through
war.
The

war

that

broke

out

unexpectedly

between

the

southeastern Indians and South Carolina was not caused by the
machinations of Frenchmen or Spaniards, but by problems in
the

Indian trade.

One problem was

regulation of traders.

lack

of

effective

Traders cheated and abused Indians

economically, physically, and sexually, often after getting
them drunk on rum first.

The Indians accumulated great debt,

much of it fraudulently contracted.

Coupled with this,

however, was a more impersonal factor.

Overhunting reduced

the deer population drastically, practically eliminating it
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in some areas, so that by the middle 1710s many Indians found
it impossible to acquire enough deerskins to pay their debts. 34
The war erupted on Good Friday, April 15, 1715 and
quickly spread death

and destruction across the entire

frontier of South Carolina.

Among the cowetas, Talapoosas,

Abihkas, Alabamas, and Choctaws, some British traders were
killed, while others were protected by their Indian friends
but lost their goods and warehouses. The Yuchees, Apalachees,
savannahs, and smaller tribes took part in the war in varying
degrees.

The Chickasaws protected their traders and did not

become involved in the war at all.

Hundreds of settlers lost

their lives in the initial attacks and hundreds more fled
their farms,
Charles Town.

ranches,

and plantations for the safety of

Many desired to flee the colony entirely, but

were prevented by Governor Charles Craven. 35
The Carolinians put up the best defense they could and
eventually received help from their fellow colonists to the
north.

But the most crucial factor in the preservation of

the colony was South Carolina 1 s success in preserving Cherokee
neutrality in the war.

On their own, the Creeks nearly

destroyed the colony; with the Cherokees against them as well,
the Carolinians could not have survived except by flight.

But

during the fall of 1715 the traders Eleazar Wigan and Robert
Gilcrest made a diplomatic foray into Cherokee country that
saved the colony.

They returned to Charles

To~~

in October

with 8 headmen, 12 head warriors, and 100 attendants.

In the

relieved capital the Indians solemnly promised to meet with
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the English in force and to march with them against the
creeks.

Many planters were so heartened that they returned

to their plantations.~
The colony was not yet out of danger, however.

When the

Cherokees did not make the planned rendezvous, a force of
three hundred Carolinians marched into the heart of Cherokee
country under Colonel Maurice Moore to resolve all doubts
about Cherokee inte'1tions.

In council at Tugaloo on December

20, they learned that the Cherokees were divided into two
parties over the war.

One party from the lower towns, led by

the Conjuror, was for peace with the English but rlid not want
to attack any of England's enemies except the Yuchees,
Savannahs, and Apalachees.

The overhill towns, led by Caesar

of Chota, favored an all-out attack on England's enemies. The
Cherokees had agreed to make peace with the Creeks, and Caesar
held his warriors in check while they waited for a delegation
of Creek headmen to deliver up English prisoners and arrange
a peace.

The Creeks arrived late, however, and their talk at

Tugaloo was not of peace with England but of a Creek-Cherokee
alliance to drive the English off the land.

Instead of being

won over by this talk, the Conjuror's "peace" party killed all
of the Creek diplomats,
Carolina coalition.

effectively preventing an anti-

After this the Yamasee war entered into

its mopping-up phase.

Although sporadic fighting continued

and peace was not concluded with the Creeks until 1717, the
war had been effectively won, more by Indian diplomacy than
by force of arms. 37
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The Yamasees, who, among the larger tribes, lived closest
to Charles Town, suffered most from the abuses of the traders,
and they lost most in the war which bears their name.

Many

of their people were killed in the fighting, but many were
taken captive and sold into slavery in the West Indies.
Drastically reduced in number and driven from their homes, the
remaining Yamasees were welcomed in Florida and settled in
three villages near St. Augustine.

There they remained a

thorn in the side of Carolina and served as a diplomatic link
between Florida and the Lower Creeks, to whom many of the
Yamasees were related.~
The most important legacy of the Yamasee War for the
Indians was a major realignment of the Creek confederacy into
a position of neutrality in the imperial struggles of the
Europeans.

In 1712 the abuses of the English traders prompted

the Alabamas to make peace with Louisiana, despite eight years
of bitter intermittent warfare with the colony.
also included the Choctaws, Mobilians,

This peace

and other French

allies. When the Yamasee War broke out, t:.he Upper Creeks were
able to secure a peace between the Lower Creeks and Louisiana
as well.
against

In order permanently to use Louisiana as a defense
Carolina,

the

Alabamas

offered

Louisiana

opportunity to establish a fort near their villages.

the
There

they would have a ready supply of European goods on their
doorstep, a

bla~ksmith

to repair their guns, knives and hoes,

and other practical advantages.

But more importantly, they

would have a check on Carolina and an ally if the English once
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more became so troublesome. Fort Toulouse des Alibamons would
serve the Indians as well as, and perhaps better than, it did
\:he French. 39
The Natchez Indians also allowed the French to place a
fort and settlement on their doorstep, although it was more
for commercial than strategic purposes.

The Natchez were

receptive to an English trade, but by 1713, when Frenchmen
invested the area, English traders could not yet make regular
trips to their villages.
concession of the

La

By 1715 the nearby trading post and

Loire brothers was the site of regular

trading and expanding agricultural operations.

In 1716

Bienville established Fort Rosalie de Natchez on the high
bluff overlooking the Mississippi River.
strategic location,

fortifications,

Considering its

and agricultural and

commercial potential, the site looked to be the success story
Louisiana had been waiting for. 40
By this time, however, there was already trouble between
Natchez and Frenchmen.

On a visit to the nation, Governor

Antoine La Mathe Cadillac: who generally hated and always
mistrusted the Indians, refused to smoke the calumet of peace
with the Natchgez at a visit to their nation.

At least some

of the Natchez chiefs considered this an act of war, which it
clearly was in native terms, an interpretation reportedly
supported by several English traders then in the nation.
a result four French traders were killed.

As

The incident

precipitated a power struggle within the Natchez ruling
council that lieutenant-governor Jean-Baptiste Le Moyne de
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Bienville was able to turn to his advantage,

but which

undoubtedly created ill-will toward the French among some
influential Natchez leaders. 41
Debt caused problems in Louisiana as well as carolina.
In the fall of 1722 an altercation began between a soldier
and an elderly Indian who owed the soldier some corn.
Indian was killed in the ensuing melee.

An

When the soldier was

not punished, the Natchez raided several concessions. A peace
was patched together, but the Natchez,

feeling slighted,

boycotted the French trade entirely and continued sporadic
attacks.

Almost one year after this "second Natchez war"

began, Bienville went to the nation personally to resolve the
matter.

Feeling that the Natchez had been wronged, Bienville

concluded what he considered a fair peace, but what many
habitants considered capitulation to the Indians. Bienville 1 s
terms, however, included the execution of twelve Indians,
including several chiefs.

Peace and trade were restored to

their former footing, but many Natchez were now disillusioned
with the French. 42
The Natchez had even more room for disillusionment after
considering

the

quality

and

conduct

of

Fort

Rosalie's

commandants after Etienne Perier became governor in 1'125.
Charles du Tisne, the first, mistreated soldiers and settlers
alike,

and

his

administration

precipitated

gradually

deteriorating relations with the Natchez as well.

Commandant

De Chepart, Du Tisne•s successor: was even worse.

Although

he was officially rebuked several times by Perier, he and the
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governor became partners in a concession at Natchez.

During

the summer of 1729 De Chepart decided that the best place for
the concession was the site of the Natchez Grand Village.
When the Great Sun gently tried to convince the commandant to
choose another site, he could see that the Frenchman would not
listen to reason.

To stall for time, the sun asked De Chepart

if they could delay leaving the village for three months, as
opposed to the three days demanded by the commandant, in order
that they might harvest their corn crop, which they would give
to the commandant in ar.>preciation for the extra time. To this
De Chepart graciously assented.~
In

the

meantime,

the

destruction of the French.
of De Chepart,

Natchez

made

plans

for

the

Because of the apparent cupidity

who failed to heed several warnings of

impending trouble, the Natchez had several months to prepare
unmolested their destruction of the French.

The plan was

simple and carried out with ruthless efficiency.

on the

morning of November 29, 1729, the Natchez entered Fort Rosalie
under guise of a friendly visit and killed the garrison;
simultaneous attacks on the many nearby plantations resulted
in the deaths of over 250 French men, women, children and the
capture of over 150 French women and children and 100 Negro
slaves.

In the immediate aftermath of the revolt, while the

French dithered in terror and doubt, the Natchez celebrated
their great victory untroubled for almost two months.
their victory was short-lived. 44
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On January 27, 1730, a party of French and Choctaw under
Jean-Paul

Le

Sueur surprised the Natchez at their village on

st. Catherine's Creek.

They killed or captured almost 100

Natchez, and rescued 54 French and 100 Negro captives.

The

Natchez took refuge in two forts they had on either side of
the creek.

In February another French and Choctaw party

reached Natchez, this one with an artillery train, and the two
forces together laid siege to the fort.

The siege was lifted

two weeks later when the Natchez agreed to release their
remaining French captives and Negro slaves if the French would
withdraw their artillery.

The transfer was completed on

February 27, but the French, not feeling bound by a promise
made to such "barbarians, " planned to resume the attack in
full the next morning.

The Indians did not trust the French,

however, and stole away from their forts in the middle of the
night. 45
The Natchez retreated across the Mississippi and took
refuge in the swamps along the Ouachita River in present-day
central Louisiana.
bayous,

and

The country was so dense with swamps,

canebrakes

that,

despite

numerous

Indian

reconnaissance expeditions, the Natchez fort was not located
until a Franco-Choctaw army practically
January 1731.

stUF~led

upon it in

There, once again, despite the bad faith of

the French, a large number of Natchez men, women, and children
managed to escape a

fort under siege by Frenchmen and

Choctaws. The Natchez fled further westward, and in October
1731 were decisively defeated by a band of Frenchmen and
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Natchitoches Indians under Louis Juchereau de st. Denis.

The

remaining Natchez dispersed into three bands, one of which
found refuge among the Chickasaws immediately, while the other
two remained for some time west of the Mississippi.~
During the first three decades of the eighteenth century
the southeastern Indians increasingly accommodated themselves
to the world-wide trade and conflicts of the three European
powers who established themselves on these marches of empire.
Far from powerless pawns, the southeastern Indians variously
accepted or rejected the European program for the region and
did so according to their own plans and devices.

The success

achieved by tribes, nations, and confederacies in adjusting
to the European presence varied.

Different factors such as

their size relative to nearby Europeans, their strategic and
economic relationship with other Indians and Europeans, and
their ability to understand and anticipate the actions of the
Europeans all influenced the fate of the Indians. Despite
their best efforts,
progressed

the

however,

southeastern

as the eighteenth century
Indians

found

themselves

increasingly imperiled in their own land.
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CHAPTER III
IMPERIAL CONFLICTS ON AN EVOLVING FRONTIER,
1699-1733
Important

changes

occurred

in

the

composition

and

strength of the European colonies on the southeastern frontier
during the first three decades of the eighteenth century. The
English expanded their sphere of influence westward and
southward,

though their advance was not without serious

obstacles.

The French established permanent settlements in

the vast country they called Louisiana, but struggled to
maintain control of the Mississippi River, the lifeline of the
colony.

The Spaniards extended control of Florida westward

to Pensacola, but nearly lost that vital harbor to France.
Thus,

during the first third of the eighteenth century

Europeans established the zones of influence in which they
would seek to extend their empires for another three decades.
Nevertheless, in the many-sided imperial contest of the day
the Southeast was on the geographical and political periphery.
During the half-decade from 1697 to 1702 Europe and North
America enjoyed a brief respite from what must have seemed to
most observers the interminable wars between Louis XIV and the
rest of the world.

But whereas many regions saw at least a

few calm seasons during this peace, the southeastern part of
55
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North America experienced a frenzy of activity on the part of
England, France, and Spain to establish, strengthen, or expand
colonies.

Thus, when the next round of intercolonial wars

began in 1702, the southeast was the scene of renewed colonial
activity.

The expansion of English and Spanish spheres and

the creation of a new French sphere meant that Europeans and
natives had to adjust their strategy and tactics accoringly.
1. Carolana
The cessation of hostilities brought about by the Treaty
of Ryswick meant that long-delayed colonial ventures of
England, France, and Spain could now go forward.

In England

the principle agent of the new wave of imperialism was Dr.
Daniel Coxe.

A man of many interests, Coxe was a physician,

scientist, author, and member of the Royal Society.
as 1684 coxe bought land in

West Jer·sey; eventually he

acquired land in East Jersey and the
the colony.

As early

proprietary right to

In the aftermath of the Glorious Revolution, he

sold these lands and rights to William Penn and others.
did

not,

however,

abandon

interest

in

He

colonization.

Unsuccessful in obtaining a grant in the northern latitudes,
he acquired title to

11

Carolana 11 some time before 1698.

This

grant, originally made in 1629, included everything between
Albermarle Sound in Virginia and the mouth of the st. John's
River in Florida, and west to the "South Sea".

Although

Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina occupied the
eastern limits of this grant by 1698, the remaining lands
still amounted to the largest grant ever made by the British
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crown to an individual in North

America. 1

During the next several years, Coxe planned to transform
his grant into a great English commonwealth.

A plan of

government

and

was

devised,

a

company

planned,

lands

transferred to the name of would-be settlement promoters.
Coxe was never reticent about his schemes.

He published a

one-page pamphlet entitled "Proposals for Settling a Colony
in Florida" which beckoned Protestants from northern Europe
and England to settle there.

In October 1698 two brigs

carrying French Huguenots left England for Carolana.

When

the would-be colonists stopped in Charles Town for supplies,
they

decided

to

Mississippi River.

winter

there

before

going

on

to

the

One ship remained behind, but in May 1699

the other ship's replacement, the 12-gun corvette carolina
Galley, Captain William Bond commanding, sailed for Carolana. 2
Bond sailed westward along the gulf 1 s northern shore
seeking the Mississippi's mouth.

Somehow he missed sighting

the recently established settlements of Pensacola and Biloxi
and sailed past the Mississippi well into Spanish waters.
Doubling back, Bond found the mouth of the Mississippi on
August 29, 1699.

After ascending the river some twenty-three

leagues, he encountered a French scouting party under command
of Jean Baptiste Le Moyne de Bienville3 taking soundings of
the river.

Bienville informed the Englishmen of France's

claim to Louisiana, and added that the English captain was
mistaken to believe that he was on the Mississippi, which
flowed some distance away.

Whether or not Bond believed
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Bienville's story, he turned back, promising to return with
a larger force to settle the country. 4
carol ana died with Bond •s retreat,

but even in its

stillbirth the project would have far-reaching consequences.
Bond 1 s entry into the Mississippi marked the first AngloFrench confrontation in the Mississippi Valley, and it was
Coxe•s plan for Carolana that prompted Spain and France to
take possession of the Gulf coast at the time and in the
manner which they did.

Moreover, while Coxe as program of

western expansion proved impractical in his own day,

it

nevertheless gathered strength as the eighteenth century
unfolded.

The Carolana probe set off alarm signals in the

French and Spanish colonial ministries, which soon renewed
their.efforts to dominate the Southeast.

Thus the stage was

set for a decades-long contest in the region among the
Europeans and their Indian allies. 5
2. Florida
If English plans for settling the Gulf Coast were limited
to private efforts, the French and Spanish governments on the
other hand had developed strategies and had already sent their
agents abroad.
threat.

Neither court underestimated the English

Spain viewed the Gulf of Mexico as a Spanish lake,

and claimed

its entire continental

territory.

The news that France,

littoral
too,

as Spanish

was planning to

establish a colony on the Gulf Coast under the intrepid Pierre
Le Moyne d 1 Iberville spurred the usually lethargic Spanish

bureaucracy to decisive action.

Although an outpost had been
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decreed for Florida's Bahia Santa Maria de Galve as early as
1694, it had not been established. 6

Spain correctly feared

that the French were bound for this spot rather than the
Mississippi River, since it had the best natural harbor on the
northern Gulf Coast.

Spanish occupation of the bay was now

of immediate concern.
Andres de Arriola hurried from vera Cruz with a small
contingent of Spanish troops and arrived in the bay only weeks
before Iberville.

Arriola threw up an earthwork fort as

quickly as he could,

and through a desperate and bold

performance managed to convince Iberville that his presidio
was much stronger and better manned than it was in fact.
Pensacola is the oldest settlement on the coast, but for many
years it was one of the weakest. 7
The fortification at Pensacola was a strategic necessity
that was kept barely functional by the Madrid government.

Far

from Havana and remote even from St. Augustine, Pensacola
de~eloped

a symbiotic relationship with the French outpost of

Mobile that helped to keep both viable.

Pensacola attracted

few settlers and agriculture was practically nonexistent.
Because the supply ships from Havana were perennially short
on foodstuffs, Pensacola depended upon Mobile for much--and
often all--of its food supply.

But the Spaniards paid for

their supplies with Mexican gold and silver,
generally the only specie

which was

circulating in Louisiana.

Trade

goods occasionally passed between the two colonial outposts,
in contravention of the laws of both crowns.

Officials on
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both sides of the frontier realized it was often the only way
to survive. 8
The relationship between Florida and Louisiana extended
far beyond food and finance, however.

In the colonial contest

for the Southeast the two colonies traded intelligence freely
and worked together in their relationships with the Indians.
Amity was temporarily interrupted during the Franco-Spanish
war of 1719-1721.

Although the fighting was limited mostly

to Europe, Bienville saw the war as an opportunity to fulfill
his long-held dream of seizing Pensacola for France and
thereby gain a better position from which to oppose the
British.

French forces captured Pensacola twice and were

holding it when the war ended.

Bienville urged French

retention of Pensacola, but France, desperately needing the
Spanish alliance, returned Pensacola to Spain.

For Bienville

it was no doubt a bitter pill. 9
Although Florida exerted far less influence on the
southeastern

fron~ier

than South Carolina or Louisiana, its

role was by no means insignificant.

The Spanish party among

the Creeks was always a factor to concern South Carolina, and
later Georgia, and Spanish pirates preyed upon Carolina's
coastal shipping and plantations. More importantly, however,
British preoccupation with Florida gave the French time to
consolidate their.hold on the

Mississippi Valley.

If even

a fraction of the resources expended on the conquest of
Florida, first against the missions in the early 1700s and
then against st. Augustine in the 1740s, had been directed
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against Louisiana--as was several times proposed--Louisiana
probably would have become British territory,

causing a

significant shift in the balance of power in North America.
France could hardly have had a better, or cheaper, buffer for
Louisiana than Florida.
3. Louisiana, 1699-li32
France, like Spain, was spurred to action by Coxe•s
activities.

Out of geopolitical necessity Minister of Marine

Louis Phelypeux, comte de Pontchartrain, dusted off La Salle's
old plan for a colony in Louisiana.

But to the argument that

Louisiana was the place from which to gain access to Mexico's
fabled silver mines,

La

Salle's former lieutenant Henri de

Tonti added a new and more compelling argument.

If the

English occupied Carolina/Louisiana, as they were preparing
to do, Canada would be ruined.

From the Mississippi River the

English could engross the fur trade first of the Miamis,
Illinois, and Ottawas, then all the

nations of the north.

Tonti assured the French court in a series of memorials that
the English were already established on branches of the Ohio,
an arm of the Mississippi.

Thus French occupation of

Louisiana was vi tal in protecting the back door to New
France. 10
To effect this check on English and Spanish plans for
the Gulf Coast, Pontchartrain enlisted the services of Pierre
Le

Moyne d'Iberville.

Iberville had taken part in several

hard-fought campaigns against the Iroquois and their New
England allies, and had made a name for himself as the hero
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of Hudson's Bay, where he won a decisive victory in September
1697 over a mobile and more heavily armed three-ship English
flotilla.

A Canadian, able to command at sea, who possessed

an intimate knowledge of the Indians and their ways, Iberville
was the natural choice to establish France's presence on the
Gulf coast.

With him came Canadians who, along with their

offspring, would play a major part in the colony's affairs for
many decades to come. 11
Even though the occupation of the Mississippi was deemed
vital to France, it did not necessarily follow that Louis XIV
was prepared to spend much money on the project.

Rather than

a full-fledged settlement colony, Louisiana was projected to
be no more than a garrison of 280 men. 12

Iberville's initial

voyage to the colony was undertaken in only four light-draft
vessels, with a total

cc;:~:uk>7i.~,,~~<:.<l.lt

of less than 300 men.

'I'he

flotilla reached Santa Rosa Island, near Pensacola, on January
23, 1699.

Iberville hoped to make his base there, but the

recently arrived Arriola persuaded him that the harbor was
firmly held Spanish territory.

on January 31 Iberville

anchored off Mobile Bay, and on March 2 he began to explore
the lower reaches of the Mississippi. 13
Iberville knew that the only firm foundation for a French
presence in Louisiana was the friendship of the natives.

As

the French made contact with the Indians along the Mississippi
Gulf

Coast,

and

then

along

the

lower

reaches

of

the

Mississippi River, they were careful to make friends and
conclude alliances with everyone . they met.

Iberville's
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strategy was to construct a system of alliances whereby all
the Indians of the Southeast would serve as the bulwarks of
the colony.

As military allies, the Indians would serve as

Louisiana's front-line troops and defenders against all foes.
As trading partners the Indians would provide France with raw
materials, such as furs, which were not available in Europe,
and a market for French goods, which Iberville was sure they
would readily adopt.
short term,

Additionally and most important in the

the Indians would protect and provision the

pitifully small garrisons entrusted with the implementation
of this grandiose scheme. 14
From the beginning Iberville

faced several serious

obstacles in the implementation of his plan.
Carolina.

one was South

Carolina traders were already active among the

Chickasaws, who were important to both empires because of
their location near the Mississippi River.

Indian culture

also worked against Iberville's pan-Indian peace.

War was

such an integral part of Indian life that it would have been
difficult for any nation to forgo, even for plentiful European
trade goods.

More than that, however, the

Chickasaws were

doing a brisk business with carolina in Choctaw slaves, and
a Choctaw-Chickasaw peace was at the center of Iberville's
grand alliance. 15
Fortunately for Iberville, he had the best possible help
in concluding alliances with the Chickasaws, Natchez, and
other

Indian

nations.

While

Iberville

directed

the

construction of the first camps and forts along the gulf coast
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and Lower Mississippi River he was joined by Henri de Tonti
and Pierre Le Sueur, veteran traders who had spent almost two
decades in the region.

Tonti brought with him nearly two

dozen Canadians, knowledge of the Indians and their languages,
and the respect of all the nations along the river.

La

Salle's project was at last completed. 16
In the fall of 1700 a revolution erupted in Europe that
was to

influence greatly the development of Louisiana.

When

Charles II of Spain died in November 1700, he left his throne
to Philip D'Anjou, a great-grandson of Louis XIV.
acceptance of this inheritance of course meant war.

France's
A union

between France and Spain would create the most powerful
alliance in the world at the time, and would automatically be
opposed by England, Austria, the United Provinces, and other
European powers.

Iberville saw in the

shifting balance of

power an opportunity to end the English threat in North
America once and for all.
Iberville was convinced that if left unchecked,

the

English would soon move west of the Appalachians and extend
their domination to the Mississippi and beyond.

Since the

Spanish in Florida and along the northern Gulf of Mexico were
too weak to prevent this, Iberville proposed to Louis XIV that
France assume a more active role in the region.

He reiterated

his proposal to draw all the southeastern Indians into a
French alliance, and even suggested that Spain be persuaded
to cede Pensacola so that he might make the entire northern
gulf shore an effective barrier to English aggression.

Then
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Iberville introduced a bold plan to seize Boston and New York.
i.'''l~: :'i'-·and schemes do not easily translate into reality. 17
:.'lith Tonti 1 s help, Iberville laid the groundwork for his

pan-Indian peace, beginning in 1702 by making peace between
the Choctaws and Chickasaws.

Simply getting the Chickasaws

to Mobile to meet with Iberville and the Choctaws was a feat,
and would probably have been impossible without the boldness
and experience of Tonti. 18
only the first step.

But concluding a peace treaty was

The terms of the treaty required the

Chickasaws to renounce all commerce with the English, but at
the same time it stipulated that Louisiana was obligated to
supply the Chickasaws with a trade of the same quality,
quantity, and price as Carolina.

This

Louisiana was never

be able to do. 19
The outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession in 1702
plunged Louisiana into a decade of isolation, privation, and
danger.

The English navy was very successful in establishing

a blockade of the Gulf of Mexico, and the

Louisiana colony

went for years at a time without any contact with

France.

Because they could not grow their own food, the few French
settlers living along the coast from Biloxi to Mobile were
often without food and were forced to live with the Indians
as the only alternative to starvation. 2°

France's virtual

abandonment of Louisiana during the War of the Spanish
Succession

killed

all

hopes

Iberville

had

of

fully

implementing his Indian peace and aggressive anti-British
schemes.

Without presents and merchandise for the Indians,
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a strong garrison, and a vibrant export trade to finance this
bold initiative it was out of the question. 21
The Indians 1 importance to Louisiana made it doubly
necessary that all

aspects of

Franco-Indian contact be

strictly controlled by the government.

Internal order, which

was so easily and often fatally upset, required that traders
and settlers as well as Indians understand clearly the rules
governing the trade.

A tariff, agreed upon by the government

and

determined

the

natives,

prices

and

was

revised

periodically to compensate for rising European prices.
Superior

Council

of

Louisiana

often

had

to

The

decide

controversies about prices, quality, or quantity brought by
colonists and Indians alike. 22
The need for internal order notwithstanding, Louisiana
could

not fulfill its strategic purpose in the absence of

good relations with the Indians.

Bad relations with the

Indians could spell the death of the colony, so trade and
diplomacy were strictly controlled by colonial officials.
Diplomatic relations were always carried out by the governor
or his subordinates, and most of the trade was controlled by
these individuals as well.

At sensitive interior posts

commandants were given monopolies on the trade of their
nation, not only to provide for their income but to ensure an
orderly trade as well.~
Bienville,

who

succeeded

his

brother

as

governor,

recognized early that he would not be given the proper tools
to carry out the Herculean tasks assigned him and his colony,
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and used everything he knew about the Indians to keep his

He learned as much as

colony not only viable but effective.

possible about every nation in the region and their possible
usefulness or danger to Louisiana.

He placed young French

noblemen in the villages, both to learn Indian languages and
to collect intelligence.

Although he could not match English

merchandise or presents, either in quantity or quality, he
spoke to the Indians in native languages, showed them great
friendship, and treated them as equals.

He also took care to

serve as a peace-keeper among them and never to be discovered
lying to them. Although he did not hesitate to use subterfuge
against his friends or his enemies, it was always done to put
France in the most favorable light possible.

In such a way

Bienville and his successors were able to keep Louisiana alive
in the face of overwhelming odds. 24
Unable and unwilling to develop Louisiana, the French

-

.

crown qave
the monoDol
- v on the colonv to a succession of
individuals and companies who did little better than keep the
colony alive.
Crozat.

The first proprietor was the financier Antoine

Despite his worldwide trading empire and experience

in colonial affairs, Crozat held the colony for less than five
years before handing it back to the crown as an unprofitable
burden. 25

In 1717 John Law took Louisiana under the wings of

the Compagnie des Indes Occidentales, and for a few seasons
Louisiana was the scene of frenzied colonial activity.

When

the "Mississippi Bubble" burst, however, Louisiana once again
became the neglected stepchild of French North America.
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Compagnie des Indes was reorganized, but Louisiana was all but
forgotten by the company and the crown.u
Not all of Bienville • s successors as governor appreciated
the importance of the Indians to Louisiana.

Antoine La Mothe

Cadillac, Jean-Michel de Lepinay, and Etienne Perier all
looked on the Indians with distaste and gave the natives
little time or thought in their governance of the colony.
Cadillac grossly insulted the Indians on several occasions,
and the colony was saved from disaster only by the adroit
maneuvering

of

Bienville,

lieutenant-governor.

at

the

time

demoted

to

Perier, who had replaced Bienville as

governor a few years later, had no one to compensate for his
bad judgment, and as a result the colony

almost perished in

the Natchez Revolt. 27
Economic policies of the proprietary companies were not
always designed to cultivate native friendship.

Crozat was

determined to profit from his monopoly, but in the end his
economic policies were self-defeating. Rather than investing
sufficient capital and patiently developing the colony, Crozat
hoped to make maximum profits from minimum investment.

Crozat

forbade all commerce going to Louisiana from Illinois or
France other than his own, he raised the prices on his goods
sold in the colony 100 to 300 percent, and he correspondingly
lowered prices he paid for the few products coming out of
Louisiana.

This affected the Indians almost as much as the

French; French prices paid for deerskins were so low that the
Indians

were

practically

forced

to

trade

with
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Carolinians. 28
Because

of

Crozat•s

pricing

policy

and

Cadillac's

offensiveness, when the Carolina entrepreneur Price Hughes
arrived among the Choctaws in 1715 offering a plentiful trade
at good prices, the Choctaws were naturally ready to talk.
In a great stroke of luck for Louisiana, however, this English
initiative occurred just when Cadillac set out on an extended
search for mines in the upper country.

Bienville convinced

the Indians that Cadillac had left the colony for good and he
promised to make everything right.

When Bienville persuaded

the Choctaws to hand over Price Hughes as his prisoner, he
effected a powerful check on the carolina traders 1 whole
western program.

Potential profits in the Choctaw

tra~e

were

simply not worth the risk of being betrayed to the French.
Because this check coincided with the beginning of the Yamasee
Revolt,

the English were not able to repair the damage

quickly, and it would be two decades before Carolina would
again gain a significant party among the Choctaws.~
The proprietary period in Louisiana was not without its
successes, one of the more significant of which was the
establishment of Fort Toulouse des Alibamons.

The

Alaba~a

Indians, because of the central geographical position and the
eminence they enjoyed among the Creek tribes, were one of the
most influential tribes in the Southeast, and both Louisiana
and south Carolina had long sought to establish a permanent
presence among them.

For Louisiana the .post was crucial.

From there the French could monitor English activities among

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

70

the Creeks and bar Carolina's path to the Choctaws.

Bienville

wanted to place a fort there from the earliest days of the
colony, but the project was not approved until 1715, when the
Yamasee War seemingly prodded the French bureaucracy to
action.

Cadillac's hed.tation to move into this volatile but

necessary position almost fatally doomed its implementation. 30
Cadillac's successor arrived in Louisiana in March 1717
and four months later sent a force of twenty men and an
officer to establish a post and construct a fort.

The

Frenchmen arrived not a moment too soon; an English force with
identical intentions arrived less than a month later.

Unlike

the French, the Carolina traders carried presents with them,
and but for the diplomatic savvy of the French commandant the
French

would

have

been

dislodged,

a

potential

bonanza

squandered. 31
Fort Toulouse, like Louisiana itself, was a tactical
necessity which served its purpose simply by its existence,
not its strength.

A fort was decreed and therefore built,

but support for its ongoing maintenance was niggardly at best.
It was manned by an officer and twenty men, too few to do
anything but serve as a point of contact with the Indians and
to

threaten

the

occasional

Englishman.

Chronically

ill-supplied, the garrison could not supply the numerous
Alabamas their needs, let alone those of all their neighbors.
The Indians respected strength and had only contempt for
weakness, and Fort Toulouse was nct:hing if not weak.

But the

fort would be as useful to the Alabamas as it was to the
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French, so it was allowed to exist. 32
some progress was made in developing Louisiana between
1717 and 1723, but the collapse and reorganization of Law's
company ended the dream of a strong settlement colony.

No

longer the focus of attention in French North America,
Louisiana once more became the neglected stepchild.

In order

to strengthen the commerce of the French West Indies, which
gave the company the fastest return on its investment, the
directors slashed expenses in Louisiana. The posts of Dauphin
Island and Biloxi, which guarded the coast, and Arkansas and
Yazoo, which kept watch on the Mississippi River, were ordered
Bienville was able to save the Yazoo post,

abandoned.

however, since it was the only possible means to prevent the
English from making inroads among the Choctaws. 33
By any objective measure,
undermanned.

the colony was

severely

In all Louisiana there were only eight companies

of fifty men each.
Mobile by only 85.

New Orleans was garrisoned by 130 men,
When all

th~

sick, lame, and elderly

soldiers--of which there were always many in Louisiana--were
accounted for, the colony was protected by only a handful of
men.

Jesuit missionaries were sent in their place.

The

missionaries were supposed to bring the nations from the Ohio
to the Natchez country into the French alliance, thus blocking
the path to the Mississippi to the British.

The Jesuits were

expected

influencing

to

prove

as

efficacious

in

and

controlling the Indians in Louisiana as they haci been in
Canada.

In canada, however, the Jesuits worked along with a
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strong military presence, not in place of one.~
To make matters worse, between 1723 and 1727 Louisiana
suffered

from

an

almost

total

administrative

collapse.

Louisiana was administered by two bodies, the conseil de
commerce, which was charged with civil administration, and
the conseil superieur, which administered justice.

The head

of the conseil de commerce was thus put in opposition to the
governor, Bienville, and his military authority.

Constant

fighting between the two officials was not ended until 1725
with the recall of Bienville, head of one of the factions and
one of the chief combatants. 35
Bienville's recall was to have a dramatic impact on
French relations with the natives.

For all his shortcomings,

Bienville knew the Indians, and his ability to influence
native policies and actions kept the French position in the
Mississippi Valley viable despite
problems.

internal and external

Bienville was replaced by a Etienne de Perier, a

sea captain who did not appreciate the importance of the
Indians to Louisiana.

Because of Perier's mismanagement of

Indian relations, the colony was brought to the very brink of
destruction by the Natchez Uprising.
Perier' s explanation of the uprising as a carolinainspired conjuration qenerale des sauvaqes was not endorsed
by many of his contemporaries, either in Louisiana or France.
He needed a conspiracy to mask his own weaknesses as governor,
and probably hoped that bringing the English into it would
distract metropolitan officials.

Unfortunately for Perier,
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there was never any proof offered to validate his charges.
The misguided policies which precipitated the revolt and the
inept manner of the French response were both rejected by his
superiors and he was recalled.~
The Natchez Uprising was the watershed event of the
French experience in Louisiana and set into motion fundamental
changes in policy, personnel, and practice which were to colo::
the next thirty years.·
incipient

settlements

The abandonment of Natchez and
on

the

Yazoo

were

of

immediate

consequence. Although Natchez was resettled within few years,
other potential sites in present-day Mississippi had to wait
for Spanish and even American settlers.

More important, by

late 1730 the Company of the Indies had incurred so many
losses as the result of the uprising that in January 1731 the
company returned title to Louisiana to the crown.
had never been profitable to the company.
country,

problems

with

the

Sac

and

Louisiana

In the upper

Fox

Indians

and

disenchantment even among the Illinois, had been vexing to
company officials;

with new losses

and the

expense of

destroying the Natchez, now even the lower colony had become
an insupportable burden. 37
After the retrocession of the colony, the most important
immediate political consequence of the Natchez Uprising was
the reappointment of Bienville to his third term as governor
of Louisiana.

"The Father of Louisiana" had been recalled in

1726 because of the ruinous political battles raging in the
colony, but after the disastrous half-decade of Perier •s
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maladministration, colonists and natives in Louisiana and
royal officials in France saw him as the one man who could
restore order and peace in the troubled colony.

He was

reappointed on September 2, 1732 and took the reins of power
at New Orleans in early 1733.~
Almost immediately Bienville embarked on an ambitious
program designed to check English expansion, gain effective
control over the Indians of the region, and establish a
lasting peace in the region which would permit Louisiana to
fulfill its long-and much-heralded potential for the first
time.

Although this program had its tr .i.umphs, equivocal

successes, and disastrous failures, it shaped the contours of
Louisiana's British program and Indian diplomacy for the next
three decades.
4. SOUTH CAROLINA
For South Carolina the period from 1699 to 1732 was also
a watershed; and, as in Louisiana, a war with the Indians
ushered in basic changes in the colony's constitution.

In

South Carolina, too, Indian troubles sprang not from foreign
intrigues but from the actions of colonists, in this case
Indian traders.

A well-regulated Indian trade was the sine

qua non of the colony's existence in the early years, both for
the money thus made for individual traders and the proprietors
and for the security

provided by good relations between

Carolina and the Indian nations.

But colonists, traders, and

proprietors had different interests relative to trade with the
natives and related issues.

over the years,

efforts to
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regulate Indian trade, and thus in some ways the Indians
themselves, became enmeshed in general colonial politics.
In South Carolina, unlike Louisiana, the War of the
Spanish succession was more an opportunity than a curse.
Carolinians had long viewed the missions of Spanish Guale with
revulsion, and war between England and Spain was excuse enough
to strike at them.

In May 1702 Governor James Moore led a

force of Englishmen and Lower Creeks which destroyed the
Timucuan mission of Santa Fe. The following fall Moore failed
in an attempt to take the fort of Saint Augustine, but he
succeeded in leveling the town and destroying all the missions
north of the st. Johns River. 39
longer governor,

In January 1704 Moore, no

led fifty colonists and over a thousand

Indians in a campaign that destroyed the Apalachee mission of
Ayubale.

By 1706 Timucua was in ruins, although in that same

year a combined force of French privateers and Spanish troops
managed to make a half-hearted attack near Charles Town.
south Carolina pushed her southern marchlands almost all the
way to Saint Augustine. 40
The war was devastating for the missions built with such
difficulty by the Franciscans.

Moore claimed that in the

attack on Ayubale he either killed or captured as slaves 325
men, and took 4,000 women and children slaves, and all with
the loss of only 4 colonists and 15 Indians.

The Apalachee

population bore the brunt of the war and shrank from 8,000
Indians in fourteen villages at the war's beginning to just
200 souls remaining in four towns.

In 1708 the governor of
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Florida estimated that 10, 000 to 20, 000 Indians had been
carried into slavery by the English during the war. 41
The destruction of the Guale missions and the contraction
of Spanish influence expanded the area open to carolina
traders, but it did not come as an unmixed blessing.

The

inability of South Carolinians to reach a bipartisan consensus
on regulating the Indian trade resulted in a pattern of abuses
by traders.

In 1707 some of the worst abuses were outlawed,

including the

extortion of presents

for governors,

the

enslaving of Indian allies, the sale of rum to the Indians,
and the selling of arms and ammunition to hostile Indians.
At the same time, the colony's board of Indian commissioners
attempted to prevent the amassing of Indian debts, which gave
the traders great influence over large groups of Indians.
This debt was usually

incu~red

after the traders had met the

Indians returning from hunting or war parties and plied them
with rum.

The traders then "purchased" the Indians' slaves

or skins for little or nothing, which very much chagrined the
natives when they sobered up.

But even when sober, the Indian

would go into great debt, on the shaky collateral of the skins
of future hunts, to obtain rum.
licenses,

By 1714 the system of

through which colonial officials

attempted to

control trade and traders, was so ineffective that almost no
bothered to obtain the certificate. 42
In addition to the problems caused by traders, the
Indians

also

settlement.

felt

the

pressure

of

expanding

English

By the 1690s, cattle-ranching was becoming an
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important and widespread activity near the Yamasee lands in
the southern parts of the colony.
provincial

legislature,

In 1707 an act of the

attempting

to

minimize

the

disturbances caused by intrusions on Indian lands, created a
Yamasee reservation which consisted basically of Grenville
County minus its sea islands. In 1711 the Yamasees complained
that several colonists had moved onto the reservation, and the
offenders were legally prosecuted and removed.

Indian fears

that they would lose their lands were also raised by rumors
that hinted that Port Royal, at the coastal boundary of the
reserve, would be made into a major settlement. 43
In 1715 the Yamasee War resulted from the complete
breakdown of diplomatic and economic relations between Indians
and Carolinians.

As in Louisiana, this major Indian war led

to the transfer of title to the colony passing from the
proprietors to the crown. In South Carolina it was fifteen
years before the proprietors formally surrendered the charter
to the colony, a
control.

dF~,de

Colonists

after the crown had assumed effgctive
had

long

been

dissatisfied

with

proprietary rule; the effort to prosecute and pay for the
Yamasee War cost Carolinians dearly.

In addition to over four

hundred deaths, agriculture had been abandoned for a time, and
many who fled to Charles Town for safety went hungry.

War

costs had to be paid for by increased taxes, the Indian trade
had to be brought under control, and new settlers had to be
attracted to the colony.

During the war the proprietors did

almost nothing to aid the colony, sending over less than £1000
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sterling to prosecute a war that the assembly in 1717
estimated had cost the colony £116,000 sterling.

As early as

1715, one prominent Carolinian was writing to England that
many in the colony wished for royal control.~
The proprietors 1 standing was not enhanced by their
mishandling of the colony's reconstruction.

In the summer of

1718 pirates occupied Charles Town Harbor for five weeks.
The proprietors did nothing about this grave menace, so South
Carolinians, with the assistance of Virginia, destroyed the
pirates on their own.

During the following summer the

proprietors made even more enemies when they reorganized the
council to exclude anti-proprietary

forces,

struck down

popular laws, and forced Governor Robert Johnson to dissolve
the assembly.

The final straw, however, proved to be an

apparently well-founded rumor circulating in November 1719
that a Spanish fleet outfitting at Vera cruz planned to attack
first Mobile, then Charles Town.
again

be

left

to

their

own

Fearing they would once
devices,

leaders

of

the

anti-proprietary faction used the occasion of elections for
a new assembly to call on Governor Johnson to take over the
government in the name of the king.

Johnson declined to

accept the mandate of the rebels, and the provisional rebel
government never did gain complete control of the colony.

But

the damage done to proprietary government was enough to cause
the crown to accept responsibility for administering the
colony.

A royal governor subsequently arrived in South

carolina in May 1721. 45
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For the next ten years the governments of South Carolina
concentrated on the military and diplomatic organization of
the colony's southern frontier.

Although France and Spain

fought a Gulf Coast war over the possession of Pensacola, the
fear that they would soon reconcile their differences, which
they did, raised an unwelcome specter over the long, exposed
frontier.

So, too, did the attitude of the Creeks.

Although

there was always a pro-carolina faction centered in the
Abihka-Talapoosa villages, the prospect of a triumph of the
French party always appeared present.

Thus, the governors•

program centered on a system of frontier forts and the militia
to utilize them in emergencies, and the regulation of Indian
traders and Indian nations through trade laws and diplomacy.
Until the Yamasee War there were no forts on the southern
frontier of South Carolina; fortified trader storehouses
served as rallying points and supply depots when necessary.
But the war prompted the establishment of Fort Moore on the
Savannah

River

(1718-1722).

(1715)

and

the

fort

at

the

Congarees

During the next few years small forts or

fortified posts were erected at strategic points with an eye
toward defending the province from the Indians, as well as
from the Indians• European friends, on the southern marches.
Fort King George was built on the banks of the Altamaha in
1721, the Palachacolas fort was erected at the mouth of the
savannah in 1723, and the old Beaufort fort at Port Royal was
overhauled that same year.

Along with this new defensive

system of forts, South Carolina began to employ a corps of
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rangers.

Recruited from the militia, they patrolled three

areas along the southern Indian line and were augmented by the
Port Royal scout boats.~
Men and forts were only half the solution to the Indian
problem: diplomacy was the other crucial element.

South

carolina's program for creating a barrier of friendly Indians
on its southern flank had failed; in the aftermath of the
Yamasee War the only Indians who could be settled in the old
Spanish province of Guale were a few bands of Chickasaws
fleeing problems in their own country. Neither the Creeks nor
the Yamasees could be persuaded to return to the lands Letween
the Altamaha and Savannah Rivers. England's temporary eclipse
in the region allowed the French to gain a permanent advantage
there with the establishment of Fort Toulouse des Alibamons
among the Upper Creeks, which permitted them to influence the
Lower Creeks as well.

In 1717 the Creeks finally signed a

peace treaty with the English, but as they would not make
peace with the Cherokees, whom the English armel'i against them,
the diplomatic maneuvering of the Carolinians remained complex
and fraught with peril. 47
With the universal acknowledgment that trader abuses
brought on the Yamasee War, the merchants on the council were
now powerless to prevent a full-scale reform of Indian trade
regulation.

In June 1716 an act of the assembly created a

public monopoly on the Indian trade, subject to the control
of the commons and administered by five commissioners.

In

order to keep traders out of the villages, where they could
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not be controlled and where most of the abuses occured, the
assembly attempted to implement a system of frontier factories
at which all Indian
supervision.

trade would be conducted under close

This innovation failed, however, because the

Indians demanded that the goods go to them, not vice-versa.
Attempts to favor certain nations by offering them lower
prices than those quoted to their neighbors also failed.
Undercapitalized from the start by the cost.:.conscious commons,
the public monopoly began to disintegrate as early as 1719
when the law creating it was struck down by the proprietors,
one of several actions which helped hasten the overthrow of
the proprietary regime.~
After two years of a mixed public and private system, in
1723 a fully private trade was reintroduced in South Carolina.
Although

newly-arrived

royal

governor

Francis

Nichnlson

assumed full control of the Indian trade upon his arrival in
May 1721, he soon realized that without the help of the
assembly he could not reconcile the competing interests of
planter and merchant, coast and frontier.

By act of the

assembly in 1724 South carolina reorganized the Indian trade
under a single commissioner appointed by and under the control
of the commons.

The commissioner

issued

licenses and

instructions to the traders, and was required to visit the
frontier garrisons on an annual basis.

In 1727 he was further

required to make annual visits to the Creek and Cherokee towns
as well.

Although the commissioner was responsible to the

commons and the governor, in emergencies he was expected to
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use his own discretion and to appoint special commissioners
with authority over certain tribes, a practice regularized
after 1731. 49
In 1731 South carolina adopted the system which lasted
virtually

unchanged

until

the

creation

superintendencies a generation later.

of

the

Indian

This system required

traders to take licenses, which were good only for one or more
specific villages and, except for the largest towns, amounted
to a monopoly on the trade of that village.

Each trader was

allowed only two assistants in each town, for whose good
behavior a bond was required, and who could r&ot be slaves or
These provisions were mainly designed to

free Negroes.

eliminate ruinous competition and provocative behavior.

This

act was copied almost verbatim by Georgia in 1735. 50
Like Iberville in Louisiana before them, the Carolinians
found that their program of establishing peace between all
allied Indians did not work and some blamed the policy for the
Yamasee War.
in

But the alternate policy, which was also pursued

Louisiana,

of

promoting

just

enough

strife between

fellow-allies of South Carolina to keep them from combining
against the colony, was not an easy one to maintain. Tensions
had to be kept high enough to prevent combinations, but low
enough

to

prevent

ruinous

conflicts

from

developing.

Informing one ally of another ally's plans for attacks in
order to avert wars, blaming duplicitous-looking actions on
Frenchmen, Spaniards, or traders, or simply offering to act
as conciliators between mutual friends were only a few of the
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tools used by Carolinians i.n Indian diplomacy. 51
By the late 1720s, South Carolina had reestablished her
regional trading network and looked forward to moving beyond
her pre-Yamasee War sphere of influence.

The Chickasaws drew

ever closer to the English as the result of Louisiana 1 s
policies and, despite their long history of enmity, threatened
to draw the Choctaws into the English orbit with them.

It was

fear that the Choctaws might open trade with the English, by
way of the Chickasaws, that induced Bienville to have the
Choctaws make an all-out attack on the Chickasaws in January
1723.

The attack was successful in alienating the Choctaws

from the Chickasaws and the English, but it also confirmed the
majority of the Chickasaws in their attachment to England and
their enmity to France.

But after the recall of Bienville in

1725, Choctaws once again began to appear in the Chickasaw
villages looking for the trade goods and presents that
Louisiana was seemingly never able to deliver as promised.
South Carolina's aggressive pursuit of the Choctaw trade and
alliance was the main preoccupation of Louis ian • s Indian
policy for decades to come. 52
Just as these constitutional changes and diplomatic
understandings were taking shape, the establishment of Georgia
added a new dimension to European-Indian relations on the
marchlands.

This last of the North American colonies was

established for two equally valid purposes, one humanitarian
and philanthropic, another coldly imperial and military. Both
purposes would influence its development and its relations
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with its neighbors.

As a colony on the marches of England's

North American empire,

Georgia would ha·:e to deal with

Frenchmen,

and

Spaniards,

Indians

both

friendly

and

unfriendly: as a competitor for the trade and allegiance of
the Indians it would become a rival of South Carolina as well.
With the establishment of Georgia all the players were in
place

to

begin

a

new

round

in

the

diplomacy

of

southeastern frontier.
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Chapter IV

Philanthropists, Peddlers, And Pikemen:
The

Establishment

of

Georgia,

1733-1743

The establishment of Georgia meant different things to
different people.

To the Trustees for Establishing the

Colony of Georgia in North America, it was a chance to realize
some of the best impulses of the Anglican gospel and the
British

Enlightenment.

To

British

and

continental

Protestants, it was a new home in which to make a better life
in the strc>ng light of the gospels.

To South Carolina, it was

a march colony, a buffer against the incursions of native,
French, and Spanish enemies. To Louisiana and Florida, it was
one more outpost of British imperialism, an advance post which
threatened France's and Spain's control of their respective
spheres of influence.

To the Indians of the Southeast,

Georgia was one more European locus of trade, alliance, and
political or military advantage.
The creation of Georgia and the determination of its
location was the result of the convergence of two separate
developments in England and North America, one visionary and
humanitarian, the other military and strategic.

On the one

89
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hand, the colony was conceived by a group of high-minded
Anglican reformers as a place of refuge for the debt-ridden
poor of England and oppressed Protestants from the continent.
In Georgia, free from unjust laws and religious persecution,
they could develop as individuals and Christians.

Like the

colonizers of New England a century earlier, they hoped to
create a Protestant body politic,

free of non-Christian

infl ue:nces • ,

on the other hand, South Carolina had been unable to
settle her southern flank, partly because of opposition from
Florida,

but more because of problems with the Indians.

Although the colony's relations with neighboring tribes were
generally pacific, the Yamasse War severely inhibited the
growth of South Carolina, which took many years to reestablish
the security of its southern and western frontiers.

One of

the most important means by which it did this was to promote
the establishment of a colony on its southern flank. 2
several projects had been advanced over the years to
colonize the lands south of the Savannah River.
the

Scots

baronet

Sir

Robert

Montgomery

establishment of the Margravate of Azilia. 3
public propaganda emphasized the trade,
prosperity of the new colony.

In June 1717
proposed

the

Montgomery 1 s
agriculture,

and

But to the Board of Trade,

which supported the Azilia project, Montgomery emphasized the
colony's strategic value relative to Louisiana and Florida.
While both the Yamasee war and the bursting of the South Sea
Bubble ruined the chances of the Margravate of Azilia, the
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need for a colony south of South Carolina remained. 4
In June 1730 the first steps were taken tcward the
establishment of the long hoped-for march colony.

on June 10

the Board of Trade instructed South Carolina • s governor,
Robert Johnson, to extend that colony's settlements as far
south as the Altamaha River.

At almost the same time, James

Edward Oglethorpe and John Percival, the future earl of
Eqmont, were looking for a place to establish a charitable
colony in which to settle poor Englishmen

~nd

oppressed

Among the circle that

Protestants from the Continent.

included Oglethorpe and Eqmont were at least two members of
the Board of Trade, who undoubtedly had spoken to their
colleagues

concerning the

decision to push forward

southern settlement of Carolina.

the

Thus did the "long-maturing

policy of the colonial administration to occupy and protect
the exposed southern border" of British North America became
enmeshed with the humanitarian and reformist concerns of
Oglethorpe,
After

Percival,

two-and-a-half

and

their

fellow

years

of

planning,

philanthropists. 5
in

June

1732

Oglethorpe, Eqmont, and nineteen others created the "Trustees
for Establishing the Colony of Georgia in America. 116
The Georgia trustees were sincere in their desire to
build a colony that would develop into a true Christian
commonwealth.

The best way to do that, they reasoned, was to

build a society, government, and economy based on the small
farm.

To ensure that the colony developed along these lines,

very specific regulations were promulgated in England and
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enforced in America.

Individuals immigrating at the expense

of the trust were granted only fifty acres of land, while even
the wealthiest of private immigrants were awarded only five
hundred acres.

Land was held in tail-male in favor of the

trust, so that females could not inherit land in Georgia, and
no property could be alienated without the trustees• consent.
In addition to the adoption of other regulations which
consciously limited the amount of land any one colonist could
acquire, the prohibition against the use of slave labor in
Georgia was part of a determined effort to prohibit the
development of plantation agriculture. 7
The Georgia trustees planned a colony based on small
farms, but their first immigrants were chosen for their need
for charity, not their experience with a hoe or a plow.
Although

fe~

debtors actually made it to Georgia, the bulk of

early British immigrants were from the "worthy" urban poor,
most of whom had no experience with agriculture; many of them
were tradesmen and artisans and looked down on agricultural
labor as beneath their dignity.

Those that might

be

considered most appropriate for life in an agricultural march
colony--farmers, soldiers, and sailors--were considered too
valuable to rob from the homeland for employment in the
colonies. 8
The trustees were more fortunate in attracting foreign
immigrants.

German-speaking Protestants from the c:ontinent

arrived in several waves from 1733 to 1742.

Most numerous

were the Salzburgers, the first to arrive and to suffer
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through most of the trust 1 s ill-advised policies on settlement
and land tenure.

Despite having to settle first on land

inappropriate for the small farms they were expected to make
flourish, and having to move from their original settlement
at

Ebenezer,

the

Salzburgers

and

other

German-speaking

immigrants were important to the survival of Georgia. 9
But others came as well.

A large number of Highland

Scots came to Georgia as soldiers between 1735 and 1741.
Although they suffered many casual ties in Oglethorpe •s Florida
wars, they made significant contributions to the colony's
commercial

and

agricultural

development. 10

Despite

equivocation among the trustees concerning the propriety of
allowing Jews to settle in Georgia, several Jewish families
were among the earliest settlers.

In addition to providing

several sorely needed professionals and artisans to the
colony, one of the Jews became the first militia officer
appointed by Oglethorpe. 11
For all of their effort, however, the Trustees never
attracted more than 5,000 European immigrants to Georgia, and
of those less than half were transported as charity cases by
the trust.

Because of Oglethorpe's continuing conflict with

Florida, many of Georgia's surviving settlers left the colony
in the early 1740s rather than risk invasion by Spanish
catholics.

Because of this, when the crown acquired title to

Georgia in 1754, there were only 2,000 Europeans and 1,000
slaves, who had developed only 153,000 acres of land.

Much

of that population growth and development, moreover, had
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occurred after 1752, when the restrictions on land-holding and
slavery had been relaxed. 12
Although the colony owed its origins to humanitarianism,
its early layout was determined not by its agricultural
potential or the salubrity of its lands, but by military and
strategic considerations.

Each of the early settlements was

planned with an eye toward defense from Indians, Spaniards,
and Frenchmen, and communication with South carolina by land
or by sea.
Ogeechee

Located principally along the Savannah and

Rivers

and

their

tributaries,

these

early

settlements, with their accompanying fortifications,
located on well-worn Indian trails.

were

Some were meant to

facilitate communication with Georgia's allies, while others
kept watch on the Yamasee invasion route out of Florida. 13
Georgia • s settlements were also planned to encourage
the development of the Indian trade.
referred to as
brought

to

11

leather 11 or

11

Deerskins, which were

skins 11 by the British, were

Charles Town by traders

from

the

Catawbas,

Cherokees,

Creeks,

Chickasaws and other nations of

the

Southeast.

The skin trade made up a substantial part of South

Carolina's economy, but the Georgians hoped to attract the
skins to their infant colony instead. 14
There were several good reasons to think that they might
succeed.

savanriah, the capital of Georgia, was located at the

mouth of the Savannah River, which was not only closer to the
Indians than Charles Town but served as the Indians• major
highway as well. Moreover, Georgia and South Carolina traders

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

95

both made their headquarters up the Savannah at Augusta, so
that all of the traders sent their trade goods through
savannah to Augusta, and the skins returned the same way. All
the skins had to be sent to Europe from Charles Town, however,
and the coastal transshipment was long and dangerous due to
shallow

waters,

pirates,

and

often

overloaded

boats.

Shipments directly to England from savannah would have been
much cheaper. 15
Despite its natural advantages, Savannah would never
garner the bulk of the trade or shipping away from the Charles
Town merchants.

Georgia was by far the poorer colony and

Jacked the capital to build the infrastructure of boatyards,
docks, and harbors necessary to compete with Charles Town.
Moreover, the Trustees of Georgia looked toward agriculture
for the colony's prosperity and from the beginning placed
restrictions on the Indian trade to prevent Georgia traders
from winning the lion's share of the trade.
external constraints as well.

But there were

Georgia 1 s proximity to the

Florida inhibited growth and the expansion of trade, as did
the active opposition of the Charles Town merchants and their
allies on the Board of Trade to Georgia's ascendancy in the
Indian trade. 16
Savannah did not become the center of the export trade,
but the

gro~~h

of Augusta as the center of the Indian trade

was a substantial factor in Georgia's growth.

Augusta, with

south Carol ina ' s Fort Moore across the Savannah River, quickly
became the major entrepot for merchant warehouses.

Traders
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and their packhorsemen collected their merchandise at Augusta
and sent the skins downriver to savannah for transshipment to
Charles Town.

Augusta was the crossroads of the Anglo-Indian

Southeast; paths radiated south to the Spanish, southeast to
Savannah,

west to

the Upper and

Lower Creeks and the

Chickasaws, and north to the Cherokees and Catawbas. 17
Oglethorpe, who represented the trustees in Georgia
during the colony's early years, could have been appointed
governor of Georgia and was offered the governorship of south
Carolina, but to accept either he would have had to give up
his seat in parliament, which he did not want to do; while
applying for a charter some of the future trustees thought
even this position might disqualify them for their seats. 18
Oglethorpe realized that his infant settlements could not
survive without a lot of help from their friends.
important of these, of course, was South Carolina.

The most
Georgia

was tied to her northern neighbor not only by proximity but
by its very raison d'etre, and South Carolina had far from
disinterested motives in seeing Georgia solidly established.
When Oglethorpe visited the Carolina capital on his way to
Georgia,

Governor Robert Johnson and the leaders of the

assembly all assured him of their desire to see Georgia
succeed and their willingness to cooperate in any way possible
to help the colony along. 19
After South Carolina, Georgia's most important friendly
neighbors were the Creek Indians.

After choosing a site for

and laying out his capital city, which he named Savannah for
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the river on which it was situated, 20 Oglethorpe quickly won
the

friendship

of the

local

natives.

Within

a

month,

Oglethorpe had cemented ties with the Lower Creeks, Upper
Creeks, and Yuchees, which he estimated to contain 1, 000,
1,100, and 200 w·arriors respectively.

Not only that, he

proudly informed his fellow trustees that he had already been
accepted as a peacemaker among them. 21
Oglethorpe 1 s

friendship with the nearby Lower Creek

Yamacraw Indians paid immediate dividends.

A few of the

natives grumbled about the coming of the Georgians, but their
mica Tomochichi, his "queen," and their warriors met the
arriving Oglethorpe and with appropriate colorful ceremony
welcomed him.

The following day the general

presents, the first of many.

gave them

The Indians thereafter began

selling venison to the colonists at what one colonist called
"a very moderate rate. 1122
On May 18, 1733 Oglethorpe met with many of the "micas,"
(whom the English styled "kings") and head warriors of the
Lower Creek towns.

Oueekachumpa, Long King of the Oconees,

spoke for all the Creeks in giving up all the lands they did
not use themselves to the English, but reserving all land
south of the savannah River to their nation.
asked for

The mico also

instruction in the Christian religion for his

people, and offered to help Oglethorpe take revenge against
the Cherokees for some insults lately committed against the
English. 23

On May 21, Oglethorpe and the Indians signed a

treaty of peace and alliance. 24
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Oglethorpe politely refused the proffered war party, but
he did accept Oueekachmpa•s advice that the general should
establish

a

Tomochichi.

close

friendship

with

the

Yamacraw

mico

The Yamacraw village was apparently a collection

of outcasts, which like Tomochichi himself was a mixture of
Creek and Yamasee.

Tomochichi's band seems to have wandered

for some years and to have settled the Yamacraw Bluff, near
the future site of Savannah, only shortly before Oglethorpe
arrived.

Oglethorpe's decision to allow the Yamacraws to

remain there was matched by Mico Yahoo Lakee of coweta, home
of the Creek "emperorship," who invited the Yamacraws to call
all their relatives together in one town. 25
Far from wanting to evict the Yaroacraw mico, Oglethorpe
did everything he could to enhance Tomochichi 's standing among
the creeks.

More like his French counterparts than fellow

British officers, Oglethorpe realized that treaties were not
enough to hold Indian loyalty; he wanted ties that were
personal as well as political.

To elevate 'l'omochichi above

other micos, Oglethorpe took him and his nephew Tooanabey to
England in 1734, where the mico concluded a treaty of alliance
on behalf of all Creeks with George II himself.

Having met

the king-over-the-water was powerful medicine for an Indian
leader; Little Carpenter of the Cherokees would invoke his
1730 audience with the English king many times over in the
next three-and-a-half decades.

on his return to Georgia,

Oglethorpe instructed Georgia's Indian agent Patrick Mackay
to favor Tomochichi in all things, and always to give him
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presents for redistribution to the other Creeks.

When

Tomochichi died in october 1739 he was buried with full honors
in the square at savannah, with Oglethorpe himself and other
chief officers of the colony as pall bearers.

While many

Europeans might have scoffed at such ostentation, the pomp and
circumstance appealed to the ceremonial instincts of the
Indians, who were undoubtedly impressed by the Englishmen's
attachment to this native chief. 26
Oglethorpe enlisted some of Tomochichi 's men in the
service of Georgia.

He created two twenty-man companies, and

gave each of their lead9rs a commission as captain of the
"Militia Company of the Indian allies." Each man was paid one
bushel of corn per month while they were employed in war or
hunting.

Each warrior was given a gun on enlistment and a

blanket every year. 27
The general also made another important friend among the
Creeks, the metis Coosaponakeesa, known in English as Mary,
"the queen of the Creeks."

Her mother was Creek and her

father English, but in the Muskogean matrilineal kinship
system this made her creek; more importantly, her mother's
brother, her closest male relative, was the Emperor Brims.
Mary and her husband John Musgrove operated a trading post
near the Yamacraw Bluff and Tomochichi 's village,

where

because of their location and Mary's connections among the
Creeks they built a business that was by 1733 handling 12,000
deerskins annually, almost one-sixth of the total Charles Town
annual business. 28
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Oglet!lorpe saw the Musgroves, especially Mary, as good
friends for Georgia to have.

As he did with Tomochichi,

Oglethorpe built up Mary's position with the Creeks, using
her as an interpreter and emissary and favoring her husband's
access to the skins coming to the Yamacraw Bluff. Though many
Georgia commentators, looking toward the later "Bosomworth
Claims, 11

emphasize the "troubles" Mary caused Georgia/9

Oglethorpe realized her importance; without her he might not
have been able to cement ties with the Creeks so quickly or
so firmly. 30
Oglethorpe's taking Creek chiefs to London went a long
way toward reinforcing those ties,

but more was needed.

Oglethorpe realized the importance of a well-regulated trade
in maintaining the Indians in friendship and alliance with
the English colonies, and more specifically Georgia.

An ill-

managed trade might cause war, while a well-managed trade
would not only produce income for the colony but secure the
Indians to England's, and Georgia's, interests as well.

But

at present the trade seemed nothing if not ill-managed. 31
In Georgia and England the Creeks

registered many

complaints concerning unfair trading practices with English
officials.

The Indians wanted the price, quality, and weight

of trade goods fixed; wild fluctuations in all three were the
cause of many conflicts between Indians and Europeans.

They

also want:ed all traders licensed, with one trader in each
town, that they might know who was responsible when problems
arose. 32
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Acknowledging the importance of a smoothly-run trade to
the growth of the colony, the common Council on January 9,
1734 passed two important pieces of legislation aimed at
solving the trade problem.

"An Act for maintaining the Peace

with the Indians" required licenses for anyone having regular
The act

trade or contact of any kind with the Indians.

provided for a commissioner to grant licenses, a secretary to
keep

records,

necessary.

and

such

agents

as

might

be

considered

Fees and fines were also provided for, from which

the colony would pay for this regulatory apparatus. 33
The Indian tr.ade act was specific concerning the duties
of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the responsibilities
incumbent upon traders.

The commissioner was empowered to

hear and resolve complaints from the Indians and could use the
local militia to enforce his decisions.

Traders were closely

regulated as to their behavior toward the Indians, where and
with whom they could trade, how much credit they could extend
to the Indians, and whom they could employ to assist them in
Indian country.~
Along with the Indian Trade Act was passed another piece
of legislation considered crucial by Oglethorpe and the
Trustees: the Rum Act.

Oglethorpe felt deeply that the use

of rum (and brandy) was as much a threat to Georgia as foreign
enemies aild the· institution of slavery. 35

The act forbid the

use of rum, brandy, and hard spirits of any kind in Georgia
and the Creek nation, and required all of it found in the
colony to be staved and split and its owner fined.

After June
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1735 it would be illegal to sell strong spirits to either
Europeans or Indians, and licenses would be required to sell
wine, beer, ale or other liquors. 36 At the same time, however,
officials tried to supply stores with strong beer, molasses
for brewing beer, and Madeira wine, all at reasonable rates.
Magistrates were also empowered to license retailers. 37
The administrative structure necessary to enforce these
laws was soon created.

Oglethorpe, not surprisingly, was

appointed commissioner in charge of implementing th·r:: act for
Indian affairs.
savannah,

was

Thomas Causton, the trustees' storekeeper at
commissioned

to

implement

the

rum

act. 38

Oglethorpe in turn appointed Captain Patrick Mackay as his
agent to the Creeks.

This particular agency was crucial to

the colony because of the preponderant influence of the Creeks
on the Georgia trade.

Governor Johnson underscored the

importance of this office by appointing Mackay as South
Carolina's agent to the Creeks.

Johnson was so committed to

intercolonial unity on this issue that when South Carolina
Indian Commissioner Tobias Fitch refused to cooperate with
Mackay, he suspended the recalcitrant official from his post. 39
He also made it clear to Fitch's successor that he was to
follow the same orders. 40
The Indians may have been happy with Georgia's new trade
regulations, but South Carolina merchants were not.

The

Georgia act was copied almost verbatim from the South Carolina
law, which had been designed to keep Virginia out of the
Cherokee trade.

Now that the tables were turned and their own
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device was being used to freeze them out of the Creek trade,
the Carolinians were fighting mad.

Governor Johnson was a

good friend of Georgia, but in south Carolina his political
base was among the planters rather than the merchants.

He

died in July 1735 and was replaced by Thomas Broughton, a
difficult man who represented Georgia 1 s antagonists,
merchants.

the

Broughton's handling of the trade dispute with

Georgia proved to be "the worst blunder" of a man

11

who erred

frequently as governor. 11 41
The stage was set in November 1734 when South Carolina
passed a new Indian Act.

In addition to placing a duty of

six pence on every skin exported from the colony, the act also
required a £51 license fee.

The skin trade from the Cherokees

had dried up and the purpose of the act was to ruin it
entirely so that it might be reconstructed under the aegis of
a single company controlled by the Charles Town merchants.
Samuel Ever leigh,

a leading trader and one of Georgia 1 s

warmest friends in South Carolina, lobbied against this bill
as actively as he knew how, but he knew that the act was aimed
against himself and a few others thought too "pro-Georgia" by
some Carol ina merchants. 42
At the same time they were passing the new Indian Act,
South carolina authorities relaxed control over their own
traders.

Licenses were granted to all who requested them,

and great quantities of rum were traded in Indian country.
Mackay tried to prevent rum being brought to the Indians, but
his admonitions fell on deaf ears.

Because Mackay was not
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officially appointed the South Carolina Indian agent, as had
been promised, he could exercise no authority or influence
over the traders. 43
With Georgians and South Carolinians jealous of each
other's trade with the Indians, it only needed a spark to set
off an inter-colonial feud, and Mackay provided that spark.
As Oglethorpe prepared to leave Georgia for England in April
1734, he instructed Mackay to make a tour of the Creek country
with his regiment.

There he could reinforce the Creek

alliance, collect intelligence on Louisiana and Florida, and
obtain permission to build a fort among the Upper Creeks.
Mackay was to visit all the major towns,

then hold a

conference with their headmen concerning the proposed fort and
garrison.

As agent and constable, Mackay was expected to

redress Indian grievances, to punish traders for infractions
of the law, and to compel acquiescence with the new trade laws
of Georgia if necessary.«
Mackay's journey was long and beset by many difficulties,
but he accomplished the main purpose of his visit.

In March

1735 he reported to the Trustees that the Indians were more
civil and respectful than ever before, which he imputed to
Oglethorpe's taking the Creeks to England.

Mackay also felt

hopeful about garnering the Choctaw trade.

He noted that a

few Choctaws who lived on the frontiers of their country
traded with the Englishman Thomas Jones, and Mackay clearly
expected to increase their numbers. 45
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But not all Indians looked on expanding British influence
with favor.

Some Creek headmen feared that Mackay 1 s foray

into their country with many soldiers presaged many forts and
large numbers of cattle, which would put severe pressure on
Indian lands and would lead to their destruction.

Part of the

problem resulted from the red ensign Mackay carried with his
troops.

Red symbolized war to the Indians; Mackay's sporting

it raised their suspicion, and gave credence to some of the
rumors circulating which hinted at sinister English designs. 46
It took the combined efforts of Causton, Tomochichi, the
mico of coweta, and five gallons of wine to ease doubts about
English intentions.

When Causton sent the newly-arrived

regiment of Scots Highlanders to take possession of Barnwell's
Bluff, the mico sent advance ·word of their arrival and purpose
and provided them with an Indian escort of six warriors to
show them the country and to hunt for them.

To further

facilitate a smooth operation, Tomochichi this time sent along
a hogshead of beer. 47
But if Mackay at times was offensive to the Indians, to
the South Carolinians he provided a real causus belli.
Neither Oglethorpe nor Mackay made any secret of their
intentions to control all Indian trade from Georgia by 1735.
It was this publicly-professed plan that engendered the
opposition of South Carolina Indian Commissioner Tobias Fitch
and led to his firing by Governor Robert Johnson.~

On the

grounds that there were too many traders' licenses to support
a decent

l~vel

of income for all of them, which might lead to
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abuses, Mackay decided to revoke the licenses of some traders
so as to reduce the total number of traders among the Creeks.
Traders were summarily notified by Mackay that their licenses
were revoked and that they must remove from their assigned
towns. 49
South Carolina 1 s reaction was predictable. The merchants
were determined to do whatever was necessary to support free
trade with the Indians on the customary basis, including
sending militia forces into Indian country to protect the
trade. 50

By summer 1735 the controversy with Georgia was the

chief topic of conversation in south Carolina taverns.

In

addition to Mackay, Oglethorpe and Everleigh were particularly
singled out as villains in the affair. 51

Lieutenant-Governor

Brouqhton was doubly angry with Mackay.

Broughton warned

Mackay that south Carolina was prepared to protect its traders
against any interference.

At the same time, however, the

governor demanded to know what Mackay had been doing relative
to Louisiana and Florida. 52
Broughton's fears were not entirely groundless because
Mackay's talks to the Indians were severely prejudicial to
France and Spain.

Commandant Martin Diron D'Artaguiette of

Mobile sent a formal protest to Oglethorpe complaining that
Mackay's harangues against the French were so violent that at
first he assumed that war had been declared.

Mackay not only

spoke disparagingly of the French nation, but prodded the
Creeks to demolish the Alabama fort and kill all the French
there. other traders similarly tried to reduce French stature
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by saying that the French had to buy their trade goods from
the English.

D'Artaguiette warned that if such discourses

were not stopped, he would be forced to send additional troops
to Creek country to suppress such belligerence and to seize
the worst offenders. 53
When Mackay learned that Spaniards planned to reoccupy
the Apalachee Old Fields, he decided to prevent that by
sending a creek named Lika tc St. AUg'tlstina tc kill SpaniaLds.

One Spaniard was killed, which raised a threat of war that
frightened everyone on the frontier.

Spanish-allied Indians

even threatened Mackay for his provocations. 54 Lika 1 s presence
at a meeting of the Upper and Lower Creek headmen with Georgia
officials only aggravated an already tense situation. 55
Because he did not expect Georgia officials to settle
the dispute fairly, Broughton

sent commissioners into the

Creek country to regulate the trade and protect traders and
their property.

Broughton ordered the commissioners not to

disturb any Georgia-licensed traders, but he also notified
Georgia officials that South Carolina would withhold funds
raised for the construction of the proposed fort in the Creek
country and the duty placed on skins if he received any more
news of interference with the traders.

Broughton also

demanded that Mackay send him a copy of his journal for the
Creek expedition. 56
In addition to everyone else, Mackay and Causton even
managed to offend the trustees.

Mackay did not trust

Tomochichi and questioned giving him all the presents to be
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redist=ibuted to the rest of the Creeks.

He suspected that

Tomochichi would give the royal and trustee presents to
private friends rather than headmen.

He forbade Tomochichi

to invite anyone down without his knowledge and cautioned
causton against Tomochichi distributing the presents before
the headmen arrived. 57

Though his orders specified that

the presents be given to Tomochichi to distribute to the Creek
headmen, Causton agreed with Mackay that they should be given
to those with the most political clout.

Because of Mackay's

dealings with the headmen, Causton sent Mackay a list of
headmen

to

receive

presents

that

he

might

verify

the

worthiness of the recipients. 58
This policy of by-passing Tomochichi to reach other Creek
headmen was

e~actly

the opposite of the trustees' intention

to use all of their political and economic power to elevate
Tomochichi above his fellow Creek headmen.

When they found

out about the irregularities in distributing the presents,
they quickly fired off letters to Causton and Mackay. Causton
was reminded that the presents came not only from themselves
but

from

goods

were

specifically intended for Tomochichi to distribute.

The

trustees

the

king

as

well,

and

that

the

even expressed surprise "how you dare

to put

Constructions on their Orders," and informed causton that it
was his job to execute their orders, not to interpret them. 59
Mackay was warned that it was his task to support and assist
the interest of Tomochichi, and that he was not supposed to
be concerned with the distribution of presents at all.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The

109

hapless official was informed that Oglethorpe was returning
to the colony, with specific orders concerning Indian affairs.
Mackay was to wait for the general if he was in Savannah, or
to return there if he was found in the creek nation.~
Oglethorpe 1 s tardy return to Georgia did not help to
settle the affair.

He arrived in Savannah on February 6,

1736, but he did not take up the dispute with South Carolina
for five months.

Although he sent Broughton a conciliatory

letter on the affair, Oglethorpe spent the next five months
building his southern defenses and preoccupied with imperial
concerns, ignoring the dispute with South carolina. This only
made Broughton more implacable. 61
The inter-colonial feud did not escape the attention of
the English public.

On June 8, 1736 the London Gazette

published a letter from a supporter of Georgia which charged
south Carolina with purposefully trying to alienate the
Indians from Georgia by "aspersing" Oglethorpe's character,
as well as Georgia's.

On June 24, the Gazette ran an answer

by "Philo-Americus," a former resident and a partisan of south
carolina. He defended south Carolina's financial, logistical,
and moral support of Georgia, then profiled the upstart
colony 1 s efforts to ruin south carolina •s trade wi·th the
natives. 62
Despite an ostensibly conciliatory manner, Oglethorpe
seemed determined to carry out his program despite South
carolina's violent opposition.

In Mackay's place Oglethorpe

appointed two agents to enforce the Georgia Indian trade laws.
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Ranger Captain Roger Lacy was named agent to the Cherokees,
and John Tanner, Jr. , was named aqent to the Creeks.

In early

June 1736 they were ordered into their respective nations with
instructions to enforce Georgia laws by seizing the goods and
property of those traders who had not taken out Georgia
licenses.

Noble Jones, one of Georgia's most prominent early

citizens, was sent to Fort Moore as Oglethorpe's personal
representative to notify all traders that they would be
required

to

obey the

Georgia

law.

Lacy did his

job

efficiently and both confused and angered the Cherokees by
seizing the goods of their long-time and often well-liked
traders. Tanner was not allowed to do much mischief among the
Creeks, some of whom threatened to do him violence, and was
forced to beat a diplomatic retreat to Savannah.~
Far

from helping to establish a

Georgia monopoly,

Tanner's journey into the Creek nation pushed the Indians ever
closer to South Carolina.
of the Upper Creeks,

On July 3, 1736, King Opayhatchoo

along with representatives of the

Abihkas, Cussitaws, and Lower Creeks, held a talk with the
governor and council of South Carolina.

The Indians were

confused by events, the king said, and did not understand the
differences between Georgia and South Carolina, "for the white
people were all one to him, he not having nor expecting any
difference betwixt them."

He declared his desire to treat

with the "chief" of South Carolina rather than Georgia and
stressed that he did not want the Savannah River blocked to
rum.

The Indian also reiterated that the land south of the
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river belonged to the Indians. Although Mackay had been given
permission to build a fort there, no more forts would be
allowed. 64
The South Carolinians, of course, were determined to
protect their share of the trade. Broughton, like Oglethorpe,
felt that his was the aggrieved party.

To foster the

resentment of the merchants, he forced through both houses of
the assembly a bill that would indemnify any trader victimized
by the Georgians for losses up to £2000 current money.

He

also prevailed upon a reluctant assembly to agree to refer the
whole dispute to the Board of Trade.

The adoption of these

extreme measures even before the beginning of the long-delayed
conference between Oglethorpe and the joint committee of the
South Carolina
Broughton

assembly doomed any possible compromise.

probably

wanted

the

negotiations

to

fail.

Oglethorpe and Georgia had many friends in South Carolina,
several among the colony's most influential citizens.

The

governor and the merchants probably felt that they could get
a better deal from the Board of Trade than from their fellowSouth Carolinians. 65
With the failure of the August talks, feelings hardened
on both sides.

Georgia reintensified its efforts to enforce

its Indian trade and rum laws, and South Carolina elected an
assembly which did not contain many of Georgia's friends.
The conflict was temporarily put aside for most of 1737,
however, because of the threat of war with Spain on the
southern frontier.

Broughton died soon after the eclipse of
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that crisis, and the trade dispute was not revived.

Georgia

learned to live with its share of the trade, and South
Carolina resumed her natural role as the recognized locus of
British

political

and

economic

power

on

the

southern

frontier. 66
In imperial affairs, however, Oglethorpe was determined
to make Georgia a major factor in the Southeast.

Oglethorpe

was an unabashed imperial expansionist who devoted much of
the time he spent in America to driving the Spanish from
Florida.

The time seemed ripe for a British thrust across

the marches of empire.

By 1736 Oglethorpe had secured the

friendship of the Indians, and saw his infant colony solidly
established in several districts.

War clouds were already

forming on the horizon of Anglo-Spanish relations in the mid1730s.

Both Spain and England were unhappy with the asiento,

the privilege England exercised of supplying slaves to the
Spanish Indies, and Britian 1 s privilege of sending one legal
cargo per year to trade at Cartagena and Vera Cruz.

Spain was

unhappy with the very existence of England 1 s legal and illegal
trade in Spanish America: British politicians and merchants
wanted to see it increase. Oglethorpe, whose expansion toward
st. Augustine precipitated a few clouds of its own, was
determined to profit from the storm. 67
Long-simmering

discontent

with

the

commercial

and

imperial status quo between Spain and England was increased
by

the

establishment

of

Georgia,

then

intensified

by

Oglethorpe 1 s undisguised intention to expand to the southward.
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In particular, the May 1736 establishment of Fort st. George
at the mouth of the st. John's River was more than annoying
to the Spaniards.

Located barely fifty miles from st.

Augustine, Fort St. George was ostensibly placed there to
prevent the Creeks from annoying Florida.

Its real purpose,

as the Spaniards rightly feared, was to serve as an advance
base for the conquest of Florida.~
Florida was totally unprepared for an attack.

Governor

Moral bolstered Florida 1 s northern defenses, but requested
funds from Spain to significantly increase his manpower and
fortifications

and more presents

for

the

Indians.

In

response, the council of the Indies sent the engineer Antonio
de Arredondo to survey Florida 1 s defenses. Arredondo • s report
confirmed everything the governor had reported concerning
Florida's inability to withstand an attack across old Guale.
All Moral received from Spain, however, was an increase in his
forces of one hundred men; his request for funds to improve
his admittedly inadequate fortifications went unanswered in
1736. 69
To gain time to prepare for what he knew was the
inevitable assault,

Moral entered into negotiations with

Oglethorpe over boundary differences, Indian incursions, and
Fort St. George.
an agreement.

In October 1736 Moral and Oglethorpe reached

Both sides agreed to control their respective

Indian allies; Oglethorpe would evacuate Fort st. George, but
without prejudice to Great Britain 1 s title, and Spaniards
would not occupy it; and the question of the boundary would

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

114
be referred to the governments in Europe.

Moral's exercise

in realpolitik was denounced in Spain for having formally
recognized British title to Georgia, but for Moral the treaty
was only a

stratagem to gain time to prepare for the

inevitable assault.ro
Oglethorpe, however, was doing the same thing.

Having

returned to London early in 1737, he cultivated the support
of the cautious Walpole ministry at the same time that he
stoked

the

opposition.

anti-Spanish

resentment

of

the

belligerent

After october 1736 the Georgia-Florida boundary

dispute was part of the parliamentary struggle over war or
peace with Spain. 71

Oglethorpe's success with both sides is

reflected in his summer 1737 appointment as

"General

&

Commander in Chief" of the military forces of Georgia and
South carolina, and the fall 1737 decision to raise a regiment
of 684 officers and men for service in Georgia.n
To accomplish his
deceiving

even

the

goals,

Oglethorpe was

government.

When

not

above

Newcastle

asked

Oglethorpe in March 1738 to enumerate the forts under his
command in America, his reply intentionally identified Fort
St. George on the St. Johns with the old Fort King George on
the Al tamaha, which was much farther north and far less
provocative to Spain.~
In

America,

both

sides

prepared

for

war.

Spain

considered a preemptive strike against Georgia in 1737.

The

fleet was within hours of sailing from Cuba to Florida when
word was received that the king had cancelled the operation.
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The assemblage of men and materiel for the campaign was not
totally wasted, however.

From the war materiel the governor

of CUba decided to send to Florida four hundred troops, almost
a hundred skilled and unskilled laborers, and materiel to
rebuild the fortifications of St. Augustine.

Without the

reinforcements Montiano would have been ill prepared to
receive the British diplomatically, much less militarily.~
Oglethorpe returned to Georgia in September 1738 with
his new regiment and prepared for war.

After suppressing a

mutiny that threatened to wreck his regiment before it could
ever see battle, Oglethorpe strengthened his forces along the
frontier and put agents in the Indian nations to collect
intelligence on his friends and his enemies.

The June 1739

suspension of war preparations by both sides was even turned
to his advantage.

In July and August 1739 Oglethorpe toured

the Creek nation.

He did not enlist many Creek warriors in

his campaign, but at the least he probably assured himself
about Creek neutrality once fighting began.~
While Georgians prepared for a war that promised to
deliver them from their enemies, South Carolinians experienced
a brush with a war that they had long feared would lead to
their own destruction.

In September 1739 a group of mostly

Angola-born slaves living near the Stono River decided to kill
their masters and other white residents of the district and
escape to Florida, where it was known they would be welcomed
as free men by the provincial government.

They killed twenty-

three whites, but the local militia quickly put down the
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rebellion, killing scores of rebels and scattering the rest.n
Spanish incitement of desertion had long been a thorn in
the side of the British frontier, and the Stono Rebellion only
increased Oglethorpe's determination for war. Two weeks after
learning of the slave rebellion, Oglethorpe received royal
orders to put Georgia and South Carolina into a defensive
posture and to "annoy" his enemy.

Oglethorpe gave his orders

the widest possible interpretation and prepared for the
conquest of St. Auqustine.n
For all his dreams and plans, however, Oglethorpe would
three times bring British forces to the walls of St. Augustine
only to fall back to Georgia in failure.

Despite his contempt

for the Spaniards and their defenses, the general could not
reduce either into submission. Alone, even with his regiment,
Oglethorpe was not strong enough to take Florida.

Despite his

best efforts, he could not get enough help from the Indians,
South Carolina, or the British navy.
The Indians in Oglethorpe's army were mainly Cherokees
and savannah River Chickasaws.

Not even the prospect of war

honors and booty could induce more than a few Creek warriors
to join the campaign.

Enough Lower creeks were in the Spanish

orbit to keep their faction officially neutral. Upper Creeks,
especially the Alabamas, did not want to see British power
increased.

The Creeks understood well the importance of a

balance of power, and they did not want to see the scales
tipped too much in favor of the British.n
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South Carolinians were in no way neutral in Oglethorpe's
conflict with Florida, but they were reluctant to invest too
much financial,

material,

and human capital in a scheme

concocted by a man they did not fully trust.

The Georgian's

attempt to engross the skin trade had created resentments
which had not healed with the passage of time.
practical considerations as well.

But there were

The Stone Rebellion preyed

on the minds of many South Carolinians and they were nervous
about sending the militia so far away.

And even though

Oglethorpe had a reputation for being a good fighter, South
Carolinians had tried before to take St. Augustine and failed.
After several months of indecision, including two months of
lobbying by Oglethorpe, and with the news that five ships from
the royal navy had orders to support the expedition, the
Assembly finally voted aid in April 1740.

South carolina

promised Oglethorpe almost 500 men, ten small boats, and
supplies for their own forces plus 500 Indians. 79
The royal navy squadron was under orders to assist
Oglethorpe,

but

South

Carolina's

indecision

campaign ever closer to the hurricane season.

pushed

the

Oglethorpe was

told early in his preparations that the ships could not remain
in Florida after July 5, when the danger of
their departure essential.

hurri~anes

made

Despite the fact that he was not

ready to begin his offensive until the second week in May
1740, Oglethorpe decided to press ahead with the reduction of
Florida. 80
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Oglethorpe's summer campaign against St. Augustine was
a miserable failure.

Although British forces landed in

Georgia on May 9, Oglethorpe did not begin his siege until
June 12, which meant that he could count on navy support for
at most three weeks.

To compound the general's poor use of

his land forces, the navy failed to prevent Spanish ships from
bypassing the British blockade to resupply st. Augustine.
Despite pleas from the commander of the South carolina militia
to continue the siege without :navy support, Oglethorpe ordered
a retreat on July 4. 81
Oglethorpe blamed South Carolina for his failure, on the
ground that a prompt reply to his request for aid would have
allowed him to gain his objective before st. Augustine could
be supplied.
however.

South Carolinians would have none of that,

The Assembly appointed a

joint

investigating

committee to study the affair, which not surprisingly blamed
Oglethorpe for everything that had gone wrong.

They honored

their financial commitment to the campaign and promptly moved
on to the other, internal, concerns.~
It took Oglethorpe almost two months to recover from the
physical and psychological exhaustion he felt after the
Florida campaign.

Once he recovered, however, he set about

strengthening his defenses for the counterattack that he was
sure would come.

He was also ce::tain that when the attack

came, he could expect little help from South Carolina or the
British

navy.

south

carolina,

having

once

more

been

disappointed by Oglethorpe, had completely lost its taste for
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schemes of imperial aggrandizement.

The British navy, still

fighting the war of Jenkin's Ear, simply had more important
concerns than Florida.~
In June 1742 the expected invasion finally arrived.
initial target was st. Simon's Island.

The

The Spanish army was

supposed to defeat Oglethorpe's regiment, then lay waste the
coastal

countryside northward to Charles Town.

terrorized

and demoralized the

British,

Having

they were then

supposed to quickly retreat to st. Augustine, having lost few
Spanish lives or supplies.

The Spanish invasion of Georgia,

however, did not turn out well for the invaders.

A successful

landing on st. Simon's Island on July s, 1742, which caused
a panic in Savannah and Charles Town, was the high point of
the Spanish campaign.

On July 7 the British prevailed in two

small skirmishes, one led by Oglethorpe, and they would not
thereafter relinquish the initiative.
revenge for 1740.

Oglethorpe had his

The arrival of a fleet of five ships from

South carolina was decisive for both forces.
Montiano ordered a retreat to st. Augustine.

Governor
Oglethorpe

followed the Spaniards home, but lack of a sufficient invasion
force and bad weather forced him to sail for home after a week
of largely ineffectual maneuvering.~
Except for Oglethorpe's March 1743 raid into Florida,
which produced barely a shot fired, for the remainder of the
war Georgia and Florida were content to confine their conflict
to surrogate Indian raiding. 85

Despite all Oglethorpe• s

effort, and his expenditure of more than £60,000 of his
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personal funds, the ardent imperialist could not change the
status guo ante bellum.

Oglethorpe returned to England in

July 1743 to attend to personal affairs,

defend himself

against a court-martial, and lobby parliament, of which he was
still a member, for a refund on his wartime expenditures.

He

was vindicated by the court-martial and voted the funds he
sought, but he never saw Georgia again.~
Oglethorpe's departure for England in 1743 marked the
end

of

an

era

for

Georgia.

The

engrossment

of

the

southeastern Anglo-Indian trade and the conquest of Florida,
two key aspects of the trustees• plan for Georgia, were dismal
failures.

Although Georgia remained in the shadow of south

carolina throughout the colonial period, the colony was still
an important factor in the life of the southeastern frontier
after 1733.

For Europeans on the frontier, the creation of

a buffer colony on the southeastern marches introduced a new
element in the imperial equation in North America.

Although

the new colony could not reduce Florida, its avowed intention
to do so worried not only Spain, but France, and led to a
general strengthening of garrisons throughout the region.
For Indians in the Southeast, the creation of a new
European capital in the region meant potentially greater
opportunities for presents and trade, and ironically, for
some, even greater security.

The creation of a new British

colony on the borderlands increased Indian bargaining power
not only with Louisiana and Florida but with South Carolina
as well.

For a time, at least, many Indians on the marchlands
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of empire might have agreed that the more centers of European
power, the better their own chances of preserving their people
and their land.

Sparsely populated colonies such as Florida,

Louisiana, and Georgia were just what the Indians needed-large enough to support a lively trade in European goods, but
too small to constitute an overwhelming threat to Indians and
their lands.

Oglethorpe was not the only European to bring

an army to his

enemy's gates only to be defeated:

Bienville's case, however, those gates would be native.
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Chapter V

The Franco-Chickasaw War, 1733-1743

The Natchez war was a watershed in Louisiana history,
but it was scarcely less important for the Southeast as a
whole.

Louisiana and the Natchez were both severely weakened

by the conflict, and bot!':·. would struggle for over a decade to
recoup their losses.

But the exile of the Natchez and

Louisiana's near destruction would have consequences for
others as well.

The Chickasaws offered the Natchez a home,

increasing

enmity

the

Louisiana

already

Chickasaws and the likelihood of war.

felt

for

the

Al thc-:.lgh Louisiana

almost succeeded in destroying the Natchez, she was weakened
significantly

in

the

effort.

Many Choctaws

questioned

Louisiana's viability as an ally and trading partner after
the Natchez War, and began to explore the opening of trade
with the only alternative in the Southeast, the British.

The

attempt of some Choctaws to realign their nation with the
Chickasaws and English would reverberate on the southeastern
frontier for almost two-and-a-half decades.
The Choctaws had many reasons to be dissatisfied with the
French alliance.

Even in the best of times, which for
131
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Louisiana was still not very good, the colony was never able
to supply the Choctaws with all the European trade goods they
desired.

The only products the Choctaws had to trade for

European goods were deerskins, but unlike England, France did
not have a very big domestic market for leather.

The court

of Louis XV made feeble efforts to subsidize the Louisiana
trade, but was unwilling or unable to provide the colony the
number of consumer goods it required for either the colonists
or the Indians. Although a lively interethnic economy existed
within the colony, there were simply not enough European goods
to satisfy the Choctaws,

who outnumbered the French in

Louisiana by four or five to one. 1
Even before the Franco-Natchez War, traders from south
Carolina had visited the Choctaws in an attempt to open a
regular trade.

While Louisiana could muster enough economic,

diplomatic, and military strength to check such initiatives,
there was little chance of any such trade developing.

But in

the aftermath of the war, many factors in the southeastern
balance-of-power had been altered.

The war had weakened

Louisiana in every way and had diverted much of the colony's
supplies from the Choctaw trade. Consequently, arguments that
an English trade should at least be investigated fell on
receptive ears in the council houses.

Many Choctaws no doubt

hoped to emulate the Creeks, who enjoyed trade and presents
from the French and the English.
The leader of the Choctaw pro-English party was the war
chief of Couechitto, Shulashummastabe.

Known to the French

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

133
and English as Red Shoe,
originally

gained

the symbol of his office,

prominence

in

the

wars

against

he
the

slave-raiding Chickasaws. Although he was a red or war chief,
in a departure from tradition, Louisiana 1 s acting governor
Baron de Crenay made him a medal chief in 1732, no doubt
hoping to control him through his medal to keep him active
against the Chickasaws.

But sometime during the late 1720s

or early 1730s, Red Shoe began to see the benefits his nation
could derive from an English alliance, and began to court
English traders through their allies, the Chickasaws.

As one

of the Choctaws• greatest warriors and a French medal chief,
Red Shoe commanded great respect.

But during the ensuing two

decades he would show himself to be no less a diplomat. 2
Despite a long history of warfare with the Choctaws and
a more immediate history of raiding them for slaves, the
Chickasaws were also ready to consider a diplomatic and
commercial

realignment with old enemies.

Slave-raiding

against the Choctaws had been lucrative commercially and in
war honors, but times had changed. With the dramatic increase
in Negro slavery in Britain's middle and southern

colonies,

demand for the far less dependable Indian slaves had made this
traffic steadily less profitable.

But there were great

profits to be made as middlemen and facilitators of an
Anglo-Choctaw trade.

If such a

trade were developed,

warehouses would have to be built in the Chickasaw villages,
there would be more traders traveling through, and overall
business would increase significantly. 3
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The role of facilitator of the Anglo-Choctaw trade was
available

to

the

Chickasaws

emphatically rejected it.

only

because

the

Creeks

The Creeks understood that a

balance of power in the Southeast between France and England
was vital to their continued security.

They understood fully

that their role as the fulcrum of that balance would be
destroyed if the Choctaws and English concluded an alliance
and France was eliminated from the region.

Thus they

implicitly, and at times explicitly, supported the French
alliance with the Choctaws. 4
The presence of the Natchez among the Chickasaws served
as a convenient pretext for the Franco-Chickasaw war of the
1730s, but the war's true purpose was to prevent the creation
of an Anglo-Choctaw alliance.

Because the Creeks would not

allow English traders to pass through their country to reach
the Choctaws, the only possible path lay through the Chickasaw
country.

But the English traders could travel to the Choctaws

in safety only if the Choctaws and Chickasaws were at peace.
Thus, a Choctaw-Chickasaw peace was the sine qua non of an
Anglo-Choctaw trade.

During the early 1730s there were more

than enough Choctaws who for a price were willing to do
violence to the Chickasaws, so it was initially not very
difficult

for

rapprochement.

the

French

to

ruin

a

Choctaw-Chickasaw

As time wore on, and the Choctaw pro-English

faction grew, however, it took ever greater efforts to keep
the Choctaws and Chickasaws at war, not peace. 5
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Jean-Baptiste le Moyne de Bienville was appointed to his
third term as governor of Louisiana in 1732 because he was
considered the only man who could restore France's honor in
the Southeast.

He knew the colony better than any man alive,

and the circumstances demanded a leader who already knew the
Indians, particularly the Choctaws, and how to manage them.
Bienville was the one man who had the confidence of the
colony's habitants and Indian allies. 6
Bienville's immediate task was to restore calm in the
colony, which the news of his reappointment began to do even
before his arrival in Louisiana.

But his most important

mission was to intercept and terminate all British trade with
the Indians of Louisiana.

He had two options in doing this.

He could, if possible, make a peaceful accommodation with the
Chickasaws that would reassert French primacy in the region.
But if the Chickasaws needed to be subjugated or destroyed by
force of arms, the governor was to take every step necessary
to accomplish this quickly and efficiently. 7
Bienville's task was not easy.

The Chickasaws and

Natchez responded to continual attacks from Louisiana and her
Indian allies by waging their own guerilla war on the colony.
With the encouragement and support of the English,

the

Chickasaws made raids on the Mississippi and Ohio River
convoys, attacked Choctaw villages, and even raided the lower
colony for Negro slaves for sale to the British.

Despite

almost four years of warfare against the Natchez, at least two
hundred Natchez warriors survived.

Some lived with the
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Chickasaws, but others lived with their families near their
old home on both sides of the Mississippi River. 8 To

make

matters worse, some of Louisiana's major allies were almost
as troublesome as the Natchez and Chickasaws.
years

of poor manaqement by Perier,

the

After seven
Choctaws were

considered by many veteran officers to be more surly and
difficult to manaqe than usual.

Perier had qreatly increased

the number of Choctaw chiefs to auqment his influence in the
nation, but the move had backfired.

Each chief formed his own

little party; the more chiefs and parties there were, the more
difficult it was to manipulate the nation.

The qrand chief,

throuqh whom the French qoverned the Choctaws, had scarcely
any infl'Uence at all.

Presents due in November 1732 had not

been delivered because there were none to qive; now the
Choctaws expected double presents for 1733.

Bienville knew

it would be impolitic to disappoint their expectations,
especially when the British were ready to meet all theii needs
and more. 9
Other major allies qave worry as well.

The Illinois,

faithful allies since La Salle's day, could not satisfy their
needs by the French, so they traded with the British for the
difference.

If they decided to forsake the French entirely,

they would effectively sever Louisiana's lifeline to Canada.
Farther south, amonq the Alabamas, affairs were disordered as
the result of the murder committed by an Alabama aqainst a
member of the small Mobile tribe.

The commandant of Mobile

had foolishly become involved in the quarrel,

alienating
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everyone. 10
Bienville

found

other

areas

of

the

colony's

administration as discrdered as her Indian relations.
colony lacked money, supplies, and merchandise.

The

Because of

the continuing Indian war, Louisiana's meager population had
declined

further.

Problems

in

the

Illinois

country

necessitated building a new fort there and augmenting the
garrison, but Bienville had no troops to spare. 11
While Bienville studied the situation in Louisiana, his
Indian allies harassed the Chickasaws and Natchez from north
and south.

From the north, the Weas of the Ohio River carried

out most of the attacks, but parties from as far away as the
st. Lawr.ence intermittently raided the Chickasaws for hair and
horses.

From the south, Choctaws and natives from the small

nations attacked Chickasaw villages, corn fields, and hunting
parties.

Despite these attacks, however, English convoys

continued to get through to the Chickasaw villages. 12
As hoped, the continuing attacks of Choctaws from the
south and Weas from the north prompted the Chickasaws to sue
for peace soon after Bienville's arrival in Louisiana.

At

first, hoping to limit attacks from the north, they offered
to make a

separate peace with Canada.

decisively rebuffed,

When this was

the Chickasaws sent a chief to the

Alabama fort with a letter from the nation, dictated to and
written by a French prisoner, offering to make peace.

The

letter hinted that the Chickasaws were as contemptuous of the
Natchez as the French were and treated them little better than
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slaves.

This offered the hope that the Chickasaws would

finally hand over the Natchez living among them as the price
of their own survival. 13
The Chickasaws possibly were willing to hand over the
Natchez living among them because there were actually few of
the remnant Natchez in the Chickasaw villages.
were split into three bands.

The Natchez

Only one lived near the

Chickasaw villages, in a small village of its own.
two bands lived near the

ol~d

Natchez lands, one band on each

side of the Mississippi River.
sent two separate parties to

The other

During summer 1733 Bienville

de~troy

these camps.

Although

the camps were destroyed and a few Natchez, mostly women and
children, were killed or captured, the majority fled to the
Chickasaw villages to join the rest of their kindred.

This

swelled the Natchez population of the Chickasaw villages to
almost two hundred warriors and their families. 14
But Bienville was indisposed to accept the Chickasaw
offer to make peace.

The honor of France demanded more, and

he knew the Chickasaws well enough to know that they would
not remain peaceful if they were in a position to prosecute
war.

Far from calling off the Choctaws and Weas, Bienville

increased the attacks.

His plan was to weaken the Chickasaws

into paralysis or force them to abandon the country.

The

Abihkas had invited the Chickasaws to settle with them, and
Bienville hoped to see it happen.

If the Chickasaws left

their present territory to live with the Creeks, the French
would be able to use the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers in almost
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complete

safety. 15

Maurepas

agreed

that

the

voluntary

withdrawal of the Chickasaws was the ideal solution to a
vexing problem. 16
The

Choctaws

supported

Bienville 1 s

anti-Chickasaw

policies, but revealed growing dissatisfaction with Louisiana.
One chief, considered by Bienville one of the most pro-French
Choctaws, was sent to the Chickasaws on a bogus peace mission
to

div~rt

Chickasaw attention from an impending attack.

Courted by English traders, he not only betrayed Bienville's
plan to the Chickasaws, but on returning home · lobbied his
nati.:.m on behalf of the Chickasaws and English. Many Choctaws
wished to trade with the English and were angry that Bienville
wished to deny them that privilege while his subordinates were
trading with English ships on Mobile Bay.
years

ovardue did

Choctaws.

Presents that were

not help France's position with the

Some Choctaws refused to join attacks on the

Chickasaws, while others who joined the expeditions deserted
along the way or

simpl~·

refused once battle was joined to

attack the Chickasaws. 17
Despite the nation 1 s growing ambivalence, Choctaw parties
continued to take the field against the Chickasaws and won
some impressive victories. Although the Chickasaws were known
as the best fighters of the Southeast and the Choctaws were
considered indifferent warriors when away from their villages,
in a reversal of usual practice it was the Chickasaws who
cowered in their fortifications and refused to fight.

A late

1733 attack resulted in the deaths of over forty Chickasaws,
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with only five Choctaws killed in the battle.

But one was the

son of the grand chief and another was a brother of Alabama
Mingo, one of the senior medal chiefs. Their gains and losses
only made the Choctaws all the more determined to continue to
attack the Chickasaws. 18
The Choctaws• belligerency toward the Chickasaws did not
extend to British traders or their Indian emissaries.

During

the spring and summer of 1734 the Choctaws were the objects
of a diplomatic blitz by the traders.

During springtime one

or more English traders visited Seneacha, one of the Six Towns
division villages, and reportedly brought ten horses charged
with presents and merchandise. Seneacha 1 s grand Fanimingo was
invited to accompany the traders on a goodwill tour of the
Chickasaws,

Abhikas,

Talapoosas,

Kappas,

and

Shawnees. 19

During the summer, an Abihka representing British traders
spread as much propaganda as possible to alienate the Choctaws
from the French. 20
The English traders 1 diplomatic offensive gained at least
a psychological advantage in summer 1734 with the visit of the
Choctaw chief Red Shoe to Charlas Town. Although Red Shoe had
apparently been dealing with the representatives of Georgia
Indian agent Patrick Mackay, the chief was courted in South
carolina.

The older colony was better able to afford the

entertainment and inducements befitting such an important
guest. 21

Negotiations proceeded smoothly and both sides were

reportedly happy with the agreement to begin a

regular

Anglo-Choctaw trade. 22
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In the end, however, Red Shoe's visit was not the great
success hoped for by the English or feared by the French •

....

Red Shoe had gone to the English without his nation's
authorization and returned home to a
Although

the

chief

returned

from

chilly reception.

Carolina

loaded with

presents, an Euglish flag, and a fine scarlet suit bordered
with gold braid, he did not have everything he had hoped for.
He did arrange for a trade at good prices compared to
of the French.

those

But because they did not fully trust the

Choctaws, British merchants would not trade with the Choctaws
directly but only through the Creeks.

Moreover, Red Shoe

returned just as Bienville sent the Choctaws more trade goods
than they could possibly afford to buy. Seeing the diplomatic
winds blowing against him, Red Shoe made sure that he would
be allowed to receive his annual presents at Mobile with the
rest of the tribe.

He also assured everyone that it was not

his intention to disavow the French entirely, but rathe:i:· to
trade with both France and England, as the Creeks did. 23
IIi the fall of 1734 the Chickasaws once more offered to
make peace, but asked for time to deliver up the Natchez,
during which there would be no attacks by the Choctaws.
Bienville agreed to this all the more readily because the
Choctaws had already told him they did not have the food
reserves necessary to make winter attacks. 24

But Bienville

decided to hold one of the Chickasaw ambassadors in

Mobile

as a hostage for the good behavior of his tribesmen.

In the

summer of 1735 the Chickasaws attacked an Illinois-bound
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convoy in order to obtain their own hostages.

But the attack

miscarried, and nine of eleven Frenchmen in the convoy were
killed.

All

possibility of a

peaceful

settlement had

evaporated. 25
The Chickasaw attack on the Louisiana convoy was a
convenient insult on which Bienville could hang a declaration
of war, but the governor's real concern as usual was the
British effort to open a Choctaw trade.

During the winter of

1734 two British traders almost succeeded in establishing a
warehouse in the Alabama village of Oukouitamopa, barely one
league from Fort Toulouse.

A disaster for Louisiana was

averted only by the presence of French troops and a delegation
of pro-French Choctaw notables. 26

But even more worrisome to

Bienville, he learned in the spring of 1735 that the English
planned to make

several

settlements

near the Alabamas.

Although Bienville had earlier dismissed "New Georgia" as no
real threat to Louisiana or Florida, 27 he now concluded that
they would stop at nothing to penetrate French territory. 28
By the fall of 1735 Bienville accepted that war was the
only solution to his Chickasaw problem.

Bienville did not

trust his allies completely, even though the Choctaws had
rejected Red Shoe's Carolina trade arrangements.

Bienville

knew that the British traders would not give up so easily and
that once a trade was begun it would be difficult to end.
Furthermore, the unrelenting efforts of the English to arrange
a Choctaw-Chickasaw peace made a Choctaw-Chickasaw war all the
more imperative.

Bienville knew that if a Choctaw-Chickasaw
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peace were ever concluded, Louisiana and all her people would
be lost.
By December 1734 the court had already come to the same
conclusion.

Maurepas was worried that war with England could

break out at any moment.

He wanted Bienville to move against

the Chickasaws immediately to neutralize the British in
southeastern North America.

The minister advised Bienville

that three hundred Frenchmen plus the Choctaws should be
sufficient to the task.

Bienville was to practice all economy

possible in planning the campaign, but at the same time he
should make any expenditure necessary to ensure its success. 29
With the decision

for war Bienville requested and

received permission to build the long-discussed Choctaw fort.
Located on the Tombecbe River fifteen leagues upriver from a
bend known as Tascaloosa, Fort Tombecbe was designed to serve
tactical as well as strategic goals for the region.

The fort

would not sever all Anglo-Choctaw contact, but it would serve
as a valuable watch on English activities.

More

i~~ediately,

it would serve as the springboard for Bienville's Chickasaw
campaign if the attack was launched from the Mobile River and
Choctaw country. 30
Despite the need for a war against the Chickasaws,
Louisiana was in no way ready to mount a major military
effort.

supplies and merchandise were at an all-time low.

Supplies were badly needed by colonists, the army, and the
government,
crucial.

but merchandise for the Indians was no less

Lack of trade goods made the Indians difficult to
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manage even in the best of

times~

without presents it was

almost impossible to enlist the Indians in small raiding
parties, much less major campaigns. 31
The garrison was as undermanned as its supply room was
poorly stocked. The thirteen French and three swiss companies
marshalled on paper lacked 142 men, almost three complete
companies.

Since most of the troops would have to be left at

their posts to protect the colony, the 250 men needed for the
expedition would have to be completed with militia and
Negroes.

Diverting this manpower from the fields would do

great damage to the colony's agriculture, but there was little
else Bienville could do.

He did not trust the Choctaws enough

to employ them in his main attacking force.

Instead, he

planned for them to divert the Chickasaws 1 attention by
attacking another village while he carried on the main
assault. 32
As if to underscore the urgency of his preparations,
Bienville had his hands full of British traders and their
intrigues in the very heart of Louisiana in the summer and
fall of 1735.

Two visits by English treders to the Choctaw

grand village, sponsored by Red Shoe and Alabama Mingo, were
disrupted, but it required the active participation of a
French officer to

b:~ak

up the second visit.

Such obvious

manipulation of the nation was unusual and revealed the
desperation of the French position. 33

During the winter of

1735, English traders attempted to advance their commercial
initiative all the way to the Red River through ambassadors
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from the Chakchiumas, allies of Louisiana who were also
friendly with the Chickasaws.
the scheme

from

Bienville was able to prevent

taking place and almost destroyed the

Chakchiumas, whose survivors were forced to take refuge among
the Choctaws, in the process. At the same time, a report that
the English were simultaneously courting and threatening the
small nations around Mobile pushed the commandant and many of
the settlers into a panic.

The governor knew he could not

fight the trader-inspired brush fires forever.~
By the fall of 1735 Bienville had formulated a plan to
destroy the Chickasaws.

Leading an army of five hundred

soldiers, voyagers, habitants, and Negroes, Bienville would
ascend the Mobile toward the enemy villages, accompanied by
an army of Choctaws.
of Illinois,

Pierre Diron D'Artaguiette, commandant

was supposed to gather all the forces and

supplies he could from that quarter and meet Bienville four
leagues from the Chickasaw villages at the end of March 1736. 35
Bienville found raising enough troops and outfitting his
army to be difficult tasks.

The governor stripped all posts

of everyone but the infirm and recent arrivals, and still had
to raise three volunteer companies.

One of the companies was

composed entirely of armed Negroes, with free Blacks as their
officers. 36 Arms and food were also in short supply throughout
the colony.

Provisioning the campaign reduced reserves to

practically nothing. 37 To make matters worse, the royal supply
vessel arrived in Louisiana a month late and without the badly
needed mortars Bienville had ordered.~
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Even transportation was a problem.

Bienville ordered a

number of batteaux and piroques built for the campaign, which
he expected to be ready for October 1735.

The contractors

were still working on some of them in mid-January 1736.
Bienville had planned to leave Mobile by March 1, but because
of the lack of vehicles and contrary winds, he could not set
out for the rendezvous until April 1. 39
When the governor realized how great a delay would occur
in his arrival at the rendezvous, he dispatched a pirogue to
instruct D1 Artaguiette to put off his departure for the
Chickasaws until the end of April. 40
late.

But it was already too

By March 4 D'Artaguiette and his army were already at

the Prudhomme Bluffs.

Bienville's delay would cause both the

Frenchmen and the Indians in D'Artaguiette•s army to become
impatient.

Not only would they have to wait, but to do so

they would have to hunt for food continually.
Actually,

Bienville's

catastrophic consequences.

delay

would

41

have

far

more

D1 Artaguiette 's force included

not only the Kaskaskia Indians, but some Iroquois, Cahokias,
Michigameas, Arkansas, and Ohio River natives as well.
D1 Artaguiette learned of Bienville's delay,

When

he called a

conseil de guerre of his officers and the chiefs of the
various

Indian

provisions

for

detachments.
an

extended

The

Indians

campaign

and

preferred to make war quickly and go home.

were

without

instinctively
But scouts had

reported that there was a small village of about thirty cabins
on the edge of the great Chickasaw prairie, separated from the
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main villages.

The Iroquois proposed taking this village,

where they expected to find provisions, fortifying themselves
within it, and there wait for the southern army.

Since almost

all of his officers approved of this plan, Dartaquiette agreed
to try it.

The attack was made on Palm

sunday morning,

1736. 42
According to the English trader William McMullain, who
was present when D'Artaquiette attacked the Chickasaws, the
villagers were not at all surprised by the appearance of the
French army.

In January 1736, Chickasaw hunters learned about

the impending French attack from Shawnees they met on the
creek trail.

The Chickasaws put themselves into a defensive

posture and waited.

When D'Artaquiette•s attack came, the

besieged Chickasaw villagers were quickly assisted by several
hundred of their fellow warriors.
counterattack caused almost all

The suddenness of the
the

Indians except the

Iroquois and Arkansas to flee in panic.

D'Artaguiette

attempted to conduct an orderly retreat, but he, his chaplain,
and almost all his officers were captured by the Chickasaws.
To make matters worse: English traders found letters on the
field of battle which outlined the entire French plan. 43
Unaware of D'Artaquiette•s defeat and death, Bienville
did not leave Mobile until May 1. The tedious upriver passage
was made more miserable by continual rain.

Bienville did not

reach the planned rendezvous until May 23 • After several days
without any sign of D'Artaquiette or his forces, the governor
decided to launch his attack unaided.

Unfortunately for the
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French, the Choctaws had their own plans for the battle; when
they could not convince Bienville to go along with theirs,
they simply ignored his.

Because of the lack of coordination

and the Chickasaw's advance preparation for the attack,
Bienville was defeated almost as decisively as Dartaquiette.
The French force was almost abandoned by the Choctaws, who
only helped bring out the wounded because of the intervention
of the grand chief and Alabama Mingo.

In the process of

extracting the French from an otherwise hopeless situation,
the Choctaws lost twenty-two warriors.

The operation fueled

much resentment of the French by the Choctaws and convinced
many Choctaws that the French could accomplish nothing without
them. 44
Bienville tried to put the best face possible on this
double defeat.

He cited D'Artaquiette's decision to attack

the enemy unaided and his subsequent defeat as the most
important cause for the campaign's failure and the loss of so
many officers and men.

But the defeat made all the Indians

of the colony eager for satisfaction, and the Choctaws even
declared that they were ready to return to the field by
autumn.

Knowing that his majesty would want to vindicate the

glory of his arms, Bienville requested arms and ammunition for
his own forces and all the Indian allies. 45
Bienville directed some of his
governor of South Carolina.

frustration

on the

When he realized there were

Englishmen in the Chickasaw village he was attacking, he
directed his men to direct their attack instead at the
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neighboring village.

Despite this, however, the Englishmen

had followed the Chickasaws to the new scene of battle, and
after the battle was over, encouraged the Chickasaws to kill
rather than spare their prisoners.

such conduct was contrary

to the peace subsisting between the two crowns, and Bienville
demanded justice against such acts.~
The governor did, however, place some of the blame on
the Ministry of the Marine.

He was particularly vexed about

the defeat because of the cowardice of his soldiers, which
exposed their officers to death and dishonor.

But not much

more could be expected of the soldiers sent to Louisiana.

Of

recent recruits, Bienville complained, only two or three were
over five feet, ten inches tall, and over one-half of the
fifty-two had already been flogged for theft. 47
An

angry court agreed with Bienville at least that

another campaign was necessary.

Maurepas ordered Bienville

to begin preparations immediately.

'l'he king would help by

replacing

the

garrisons,

missing

soldiers

from

send 750 marine troops,

French

and

Swiss

and supply artillery

officers, bombardiers, artillery, and canon for the campaign.
Maurepas

had

already

directed

Canadian

governor-general

Charles de la Boiche, Marquis de Beauharnois, to enlist the
northern tribes in the campaign.

He wanted Bienville to be

ready to march by September 1737. 48
Maurepas

involved

himself

in

every

campaign's planning to ensure its success.

aspect

of

the

The minister had

recruiters in the field in France to enlist men in the
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campaign.

He also appointed officers to coordinate artillery

for the campaign, to obtain the different kinds of equipment
and supplies that would be needed, and even to devise plans
for attacking the Chickasaw villages. 49

He even convinced

Bienville to mount the expedition from the Mississippi rather
than the Mobile River. 50
Choosing the Mississippi River as a base of operations,
however, necessitated delaying the campaign until 1739.

The

campaign would require a tremendous number of large bateaux
and smaller pirogues to transport supplies and men, including
sick soldiers and their replacements, between New Orleans and
the field.

There were few workmen in Louisiana and they were

not

productive.

very

Thus

the

two-year

delay

was

unavoidable. 51
Part of the reason for choosing the Mississippi was based
on Bienville 1 s belief that cannon and artillery would be
necessary to defeat the Chickasaws.
experience at the enemy villages,
intelligence

concerning

the

In addition to his own
he

Chickasaw

obtained valuable
villages,

their

fortifications, and the surrounding terrain from an Abenaki
who lived among the Alabamas.

According to the Abenaki the

Chickasaws did not fear bombardment because they did not think
the French could get the war machines to their villages.

The

Mobile River was too shallow to support the large vehicles
necessary to carry them.

The terrain between the Mississippi

River and the villages was. crisscrossed by many creeks in
summer and swampy in winter. 52
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The Chickasaws would have felt even more secure had they
known the trouble Bienville would have in discovering a route
capable of supporting his cannon from the Mississippi River
to their villages. Because the Chickasaw country was not well
known, Bienville immediately began to search for a location
for his base camp and a route from it to the enemy.

He sent

several experienced officers on reconnaissance expeditions
over the next two years.

A reconnaissance in the late fall

1737 brought back encouraging information, but it conflicted
sharply with the little that was definitely known about the
region's geography. 53

A spring 1738 effort led only to the

death of the intrepid De Lery in an ambush and the decision
that :further parties should be sent out to obtain more
definite knowledge of the country. 54
To maintain pressure on the Chickasaws, Bienville kept
his allies continually in the field against the enemy and paid
handsome rewards for scalps and prisoners.

Constant attacks

kept the Chickasaws close to their villages, which in February
1737 were undergoing a famine.
their

women

and

children

in

The men were forced to leave
their villages

under

the

protection of English traders while they went out to hunt. 55
In the fall of 1737 a Franco-Choctaw party of five hundred
destroyed the Chickasaws• grain fields.

The Choctaws killed

ten Chickasaws and took one prisoner, despite the fact that
the Chickasaws refused to leave their fortifications for
battle. 56
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such a great victory inspired imitation, even in Red
Seeing

Shoe's pro-Chickasaw western division villages.

Choctaw ardor for war rising to a feverish pitch, French
officer De Lery offered to lead one more war party before
winter set in.
field.

Nine hundred Frenchmen and Choctaws took the

This time the Choctaws killed twelve Chickasaws, took

ten scalps, and killed or captured fifty-three horses.

For

all this they suffered only one killed and five wounded.
Bienville noted to Maurepas that this was remarkable conduct
for a people who formerly trembled at the name Chickasaw. 57
In early 1738 Maurepas appointed marine captain Louis de
Nouailles D'Ayme as military commander of the expedition.
Once in Louisiana, D'Ayme would have command of the

troup~s

detachees de la marine, the regular French and swiss garrison,
and the militia.

Although the captain had no experience with

either land warfare or American Indians, according to Maurepas
he had "the talents and experience necessary to command this
expedition," and Bienville was directed to work closely with
him. 58

In fact, D'Ayme's contribution to the campaign would

prove minimal.
Red Shoe's influence seemed on the rise even as his
nation ostensibly turned more ardently anti-Chickasaw.
even

though

his

own

pro-English

and,

by

But

extension,

pro-Chickasaw partisans remained numerically small,

many

Choctaws who would not help him make peace with the enemy
seemingly were not going to hinder him either. 59

In 1738 he

traveled widely in pursuit of an English alliance, arriving
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unexpectedly in Savannah in February and in Charles Town in
May.

The Choctaws were well-entertained in both colonies and

William Bull of South Carolina spared no expense to impress
them with the power and grandeur of George II.

Although the

Choctaws were frank this time in admitting that many of their·
headmen were still in the French interest, the prospect of a
Choctaw trade animated many Englishmen.~
Bull was keenly aware of the economic and strategic
benefits that would accrue to England from a
A

~hoctaw

Choc~aw

alliance.

trade would increase South Carolina 1 s economy

significantly. But more importantly, he knew that without the
Choctaws Louisiana could not long survive.

An Anglo-Choctaw

alliance would not only deprive Louisiana of the bulk of her
fighting force, but would sever all overland communications
between Louisiana and Canada.

It would be an expensive but

imperially worthwhile relationship. 61
In the early summer of 1738 Red Shoe brought ten
Chickasaw chiefs into the eastern division villages, where
the two groups ratified a Choctaw-Chickasaw peace treaty.
According to its terms the Choctaws were required to end all
hostilities against the Chickasaws,

help the Chickasaws

against all their enemies, and report to the Chickasaws on
all the movements of the French.

In return, the Chickasaws

were required to give all the wives and children of the
Natchez to the Choctaws as slaves. 62
Red Shoe was able to conclude such a treaty because of
basic dissatisfaction with the French alliance.

In the first
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place, the French could not supply the Choctaws with the trade
goods they needed,
apparently could.

while the Chickasaws'

English allies

Moreover, at least some Choctaws correctly

suspected that the French were deliberately keeping them at
war with the Chickasaws to weaken them, resulting in an ally
that was easier to control.~
Bienville

immediately offered large rewards to any

Choctaw who would break the peace, but there were no takers.
Alabama Mingo,

formerly

one of Red Shoe's most ardent

supporters, was interested, but could do nothing.

Red Shoe

had wisely sent hostages to the Chickasaws for Choctaw good
behavior and no one wanted to put them at risk.M
The English tried to enhance Red Shoe's position by
circulating the story that the French had invited the English
to join them in the destruction of all the southeastern
Indians which,

according to the story,

naturally refused.

the English had

They even had the Abhikas call a general

meeting of the Creeks to spread the story, but the move
backfired.

At the conference, the Alabamas learned that the

Choctaws were reportedly getting ready to break completely
with the

French~

several Alabama chiefs went to the Choctaws

to defend the French.

They inquired about the Choctaws'

dissatisfaction with the French and explained what they saw
as the evils attendant upon a Franco-Choctaw split.

The

Alabamas had a reputation for wisdom as well as strength and
their talk undoubtedly impressed many Choctaws. 65
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Bienville used both a carrot and a stick in trying to
keep the Choctaws within the French orbit.

He showed his

stick in the summer of 1738 when he forbade French traders to
supply Red Shoe's villages as usual.

This ploy did not work,

however, as it only fueled the villagers• resentment of France
and their determination to ally with the English. 66 By January
1739, when Bienville decided to attract Red Shoe back into the
fold,

the chief was on one of his periodic visits to

Carolina.Q

There he and the chiefs of sixteen towns, along

with several Chickasaw dignitaries, were wined, dined, and
entertained by the governor, council, and militia.M
In November 1738 Bienville went to Mobile for the annual
ritual of distributing the Indian presents. An always onerous
task was this time doubly difficult.

At the same time that

he was recruiting for his spring 1739 campaign against the
Chickasaws, the Choctaws had more than the usual number of
complaints for Bienville to satisfy. Presents, as usual, were
far behind schedule.

More than that, however, two Choctaws

were missing and two Creoles were suspected of killing them.
The two Creoles, brothers, were tried and found guilty of the
murders and were executed in the presence of the Choctaws.~
Bienville 1 s diplomacy seemed to be working,

because

between February and May 1739 Choctaws brought Bienville
fifteen scalps, for which generous bounties were paid.

To

further stimulate hostilities, Bienville announced to the
nation that he would not distribute the annual presents until
the Choctaws had signified their loyalty to France by bringing
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in more scalps.

By mid-May, most of the Choctaw villages had

announced their opposition to the Chickasaws. 70

They were

joined in this by warriors from the Ofogoulas, Chakchiumas,
Avoyelles, Tensas, Apalachees, Arkansas, and Caddoes. 71
Despite two years of preparations, however, the projected
summer 1739 expedition against the Chickasaws did not leave
New Orleans until September.

Not only were D'Ayme and his

troops and supplies months late in reaching Louisiana, but
there were fewer men and supplies than anticipated.

D1 Ayme

had to put 70 men in the hospital on arrival, and only five
of those were expected to leave with the army.n

Even worse,

powder and flour were in short supply and the supply boats
carried no goods for Indian presents. 73 News that another ship
carrying presents might arrive in a few weeks or a month was
not much consolation.

The Indians could not be stirred

without presents, and any delay could force them into a winter
campaign.

Mobile commandant Henri de Lauboey prophetically

warned that a winter campaign would be difficult on the draft
animals and would

make many of the normal

routes of

communication impassible.~
While the army prepared to move out from New Orleans,
advance

parties

were

preparing

their

field

position.

Bienville had chosen the Prudhomme Bluffs on the Mississippi,
near the mouth of the Wolf River, as his base camp.

It was

chosen for its proximity to the enemy and its convenience as
a central supply depot.~ The fort was finished on August 15,
1739, and named for the day, the feast of the Assumption.n
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The largest army ever seen to date in North America
assembled at Fort Assumption in October and November 1739.
The first large contingent to arrive was that of Canada.

Led

by Bienville's nephew Charles Le Moyne, Baron de Longueuil,
the detachment of over 700 officers,

soldiers,

civilian

volunteers, and Indians reached camp on October 10, 1739.n
A month

later~

D'Ay.me and Bienville arrived from the south a

few days apart leading their own mixed force of French and
Swiss soldiers, civilian volunteers, Negroes, and Indians.~
Bienville's army consisted of approximately 1,500 Europeans
and almost 1,300 Indians.~
The preparations for such a grand campaign did not escape
the notice of the English or the Chickasaws.

South Carolina

was apprised of New France's war preparations by a letter from
New York that reported on the departure of the Longueuil
expedition.

Correctly estimating the size of the force, its

target was known only to be some British-allied Indians
situated "near some Branches of the Messasippi [sic] River."
Bull in turn notified Georgia and the Creeks about it and
warned them to be on their guard.~
The Chickasaws did not need letters from Englishmen to
tell them of the mortal danger the faced.

They had offered

to make peace with Louisiana before, and in hopes of avoiding
their complete destruction they decided to try again.

On

October 13 the French found letters in two different locations
around their camp.

Written for the Chickasaws by French

prisoners; the letters offered to make

peace and return all
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prisoners.

The Chickasaws also left traditional tokens of

peace in the area, perhaps to make sure France's native allies
were aware of their willingness to make peace.

These included

a war club with the top broken off, white feathers, an ear of
corn, tobacco,

a bear skin, and medicine.

By this the

Chickasaws signaled that they wanted to sit at the same mat
with the French, to eat together and smoke the same pipe, and
that they wanted the trails to be white, not bloody. 81
But when Bienville called his Indian forces together at
Fort Assumption, he talked of war, not peace.

The Indians

pledged their devotion to France and their desire to strike
the Chickasaws and go home.

Bienville told them he planned

to make the assault in three weeks, after the horses and draft
animals had arrived.~

But such optimism was to prove

unfounded. The draft animals and horses arrived late and many
were lost along the way.~
Even worse was the lack of a road on which the animals
could carry supplies, mortars, and artillery to the enemy
villages.

As the search for a road dragged on, camp life

became more and more of a strain for the French and Indians
lodged

in

Fort

preoccupation.

Assumption.

Supplies

were

a

constant

Despite the periodic arrival of foodstuffs

from the Illinois and Arkansas departments, Indians had to be
sent out continuously to hunt for meat.

By the middle of

January food was being rationed.M
The seemingly endless waiting was difficult on everyone,
with potentially explosive results.

On December 18, a drunk
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Canadian volunteer killed a drunk Potawatomi chief. Lonqueuil
a~d

Bienville managed to keep matters from escalating, and in

traditional Indian fashion the Canadian made his peace with
the offended tribe by "covering" the dead chief with necklaces
and merchandise. 85

A few days later a group of Iroquois

harangued Bienville concerning its weariness of camp life and
its desire to know just when they would leave for the
Chickasaw villages.M
By mid-December D'Ayme feared that the campaign was lost
even before it could begin. 87

On the day after Christmas

Bienville, D'Ayme and Longueuil had a long discussion about
the state of the campaign.

They had as yet found no road,

supplies were critically low, the weather was worsening, and
so was morale.M By New Year's Eve, the road still not found,
Bienville and D'Ayme decided to accept the Chickasaw offer to
make peace.

Bienville dictated a letter, to be brought to the

Chickasaws by a swift runner, stating his terms: he would give
them peace if they fulfilled the pledge made five years
earlier to kill all the Natchez living with them.$
On January 11, Bienville received the long-sought news
that a

practical route to the enemy had at last been

discovered.

It followed the crest of several ridges, and

required the building of no bridges, only the clearing of
brush.

Bienville put one hundred men in the field clearing

the way,

and in five days they broke through the dense

underbrush to the clear woods.~
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By this time, however, it was too late to mount the
campaign so long planned: there were not enough supplies or
draft animals, and food was almost gone.
approve

the

request - of

the

Bienville did

Iroquois

for

a

joint

Iroquois-canadian attack on the Chickasaws, but this was
mainly a face-saving gesture.

Even while preparations were

being made for the march, the painful but obvious decision
was being made to terminate the campaign.

On February 15,

after almost a week of subtle maneuvering by D'Ayme and other
ranking officers, a council of war formally decided to end the
campaign. 91

Once the decision was made, decampment began

immediately.

On

February

16

the

first

boatloads

of

volunteers, Negroes, and the sick departed for New Orleans. 92
The decision to terminate the campaign changed the
canadian-Indian expedition,

led by Captain Pierre Joseph

Celoron De Blr.l.inville, into an advance peace party.

,.,.,
7

.~

But

they were joined on the march by some Choctaws who had no
peaceful intentions in mind.
Fort Assumption,

a

group

While Bienville was encamped at
of Choctaws had gone to

the

Chickasaws after repeated invitations to ratify the peace and
trade.

Although they were initially well treated,

the

Chickasaws began to act surly after an English trader arrived
in the village and began to speak ill of the French and their
Choctaw allies.

The trader was also quite liberal in

dispersing powder and shot.

As the Choctaws were leaving for

home the Chickasaws fired on them, killing sixteen out of
twenty.

The four survivors managed to escape to the nearest
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Choctaw town, from which they alerted the entire nation of the
Chickasaws• treachery.

Feelings ran so high even Red Shoe

declared his intention to join the French in the destruction
of the Chickasaws.~
Despite the best efforts of the

Iro~~ois

and Choctaws to

engage in a full-scale battle, peaceful contact was made with
the Chickasaws.

After several days of negotiations, it was

arranged for two Chickasaw chiefs to go to Fort Assumption to
make peace with Bienville.

And the peace was a hard one.

Bienville demanded that the Chickasaws kill or deliver up the
Natchez among them; kill their allies the Koroas, who harassed
French traffic on the Mississippi; and renounce all commerce
with the English.

The Chickasaws agreed to all of these

demcmds, and asked only that Bienville put an end to the
continual raids of the Choctaws. This Bienville refused to do,
on the grounds that the Choctaws made their own decisions
regarding warfare.

At the same time, however, he admitted

that he would continue to pay for Chickasaw scalps.

Despite

the inequities in this arrangement, or perhaps because the
Chickasaws knew that the French could not really enforce it,
the treaty was ratified on March 31.

As a pledge to the

Chickasaws of his pacific intentions, as Bienville left for
New Orleans the next day he torched Fort Assumption.~
In spite of the pro-forma conclusion of a peace treaty
that was ostensibly highly favorable to France, not many on
the French side thought too highly of the campaign or its
results. 96

In the end,

as Maurepas had warned in the
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beginning, Bienville would have to accept responsibility for
the costly failure.
was

In the minister's opinion, the campaign

characterized

throughout

by

"irresolution

and

uncertainty," and the lack of any plan, general or specific,
to guide its execution.

The king was allowing Bienville to

retire, but only after he had worked to restore the security
of the colony, and to repair the damage done by two defeats
at the hands of the Indians. 97
The Chickasaw campaign of 1739-1740 was an important
event in Louisiana history, but its consequences were neither
obvious nor immediate.

Bienville claimed at least a partial

success for the expedition for having humbled the Chickasaws,
which it had in fact done.

True to Bienville's prediction,

never again would the Chickasaws significantly trouble the
colony. 98
Far

from

reestablishing

the

reputation

of

France,

however, the Chickasaw campaign damaged France's standing in
the Southeast where it counted most, among the Choctaws.
Despite their late entry into the campaign and even the reason
behind it, the Choctaws came away from the campaign convinced
of their increased power relative to the Chickasaws and the
French.

The seeds of pride sown in the campaign against the

Chickasaws would bloom within less than a decade into civil
war among the Choctaws.
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Chapter VI

The Choctaw civil war, 1746-1752

By the late 1740s the Choctaws had become so dependent
upon the French that they experienced something practically
unthinkable in Indian culture: civil war.

Unable to obtain

the European goods they needed from Louisiana, they turned to
South Carolina for trade and

allian.~e.

They honestly hoped

to emulate the Creeks by "holding" both France and England as
allies.

But the Choctaws were not the Creeks, and the Choctaw

villages did not occupy the borders of three imperial systems
as

did the

creek towns.

When

opposition to their new policy,

faced

with

Louisiana's

the Choctaws,

unable to

reconcile all the different demands placed on them, saw the
bonds that held their society together dissolving under the
strain.
The Choctaw Civil War was the result of internal and
external factors.

Externally,

it was a product of the

relationship between the Choctaws and Louisiana.

After more

than four decades of alliance with Louisiana, the Choctaws
depended upon

Louisiana

traders

not only

for

guns

and

ammunition, but for a whole range of European manufactured
170
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goods t.h.at had replaced their native equivalents.

In one

sense, the French and English were correct to label Choctaw
policy of this period a revolt: the war stemmed from a revolt
against Louisiana's endemic inability to supply the Choctaws
with the European goods they could no longer do without. 1 In
the aftermath of the Chickasaw war, Louisiana was no longer
a priority with the French court and the budget suffered.
Despite a general increase in commercial shipping to Louisiana
in the late 1740s, inflation and declining allocations for
Indian presents and trade goods had a drastic impact on the
Choctaws in the early 1740s.

The Choctaws knew whom to turn

to for their wants if Louisiana could not supply them.
There were, of course, cultural and political reasons
for the Choctaw civil War as well.

The Choctaws emerged from

almost a decade of war with the Natchez and Chickasaws with
a changed opinion of themselves and the French.

They were

formerly considered somewhat desultory warriors off their home
turf.

Now they were veterans of a decade of war that saw the

Chickasaws, fiercest warriors of the Southeast, repeatedly
driven

into their

Choctaws.

fortified villages

in terror of the

The Choctaws had served as frontline troops in

Louisiana's desperate war for survival and appreciated their
importance to the chronically beleaguered colony.

Knowing

their value to Louisiana, the Choctaws expected to be rewarded
accordingly. 2

Not

satisfied

with

their

treatment

Louisiana, they sought satisfaction elsewhere.
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Politically, the ambitious and gifted Red Shoe was the
chief architect of the initiatives that resulted in civil war.
A great warrior and a skilled politician, Red Shoe was able
at various times to attract a majority of Choctaws to his
policy of trading with England as well as France.

In doing

this, Red Shoe acted outside his sphere as a red chief and
diminished the authority of the white chiefs who usually
determined such policies.

As the push and pull of rival

European powers increased, the fabric of Choctaw society was
progressively weakened and was finally ripped apart.
Officials in the colonies invariably blamed commercial,
political, and diplomatic setbacks with the Indians on their
European rivals, but it is clear that Red Shoe's English
initiative was his own idea and was designed to serve his own
ends.

Red Shoe did not need Englishmen to tell him how

indigent he was, even if they_did so at every opportunity.
Red Shoe also did not need a Tory politician to tell him of
the influence he would have with his nation if he engineered
a bountiful British trade.

He and his nation stood to gain

significantly if he could imitate the Creeks and steer a
neutral course between Louisiana and South Carolina.
Tribal politics were not conducted in a vacuum and basic
political decisions were made with an eye toward native and
European friends and enemies.

All Choctaws were formally

allied to Louisiana, but with regard to their native neighbors
the nation 1 s three divisions each had a different orientation.
These

different

friendships

were

largely

determined
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geography and

involved the divisions

in peacetime with

neighbors that other divisions considered highly unfriendly.
Thus, the Western division had many ties with the Chickasaws
and Chakchiumas,

including marriage alliances,

while the

Eastern division was particularly friendly to the Upper
Creeks, especially the Alabamas. The Six Towns division, plus
the independent villages of Chickasawhay and Yowani, had
similar ties to the small nations of the Gulf Coast. 3
These external alliances had a major impact on the origin
and course of the Choctaw Civil War.

Red Shoe had made his

reputation fighting the Chickas3ws, but his division's basic
friendship with the Chickasaws made it easier for him to make
contact with and cultivate the Chickasaws• British traders.
At the same time, Eastern division allies the Upper Creeks did
not want to see the Choctaws end their French alliance. Upper
Creek support of Louisiana and continuing encouragement of
anti-British sentiments among the Choctaws was a considerable
stumbling block to Red Shoe 1 s plans to initiate a British
trade for his nationo And even after the assassination of Red
Shoe, the first Choctaw party to shed Choctaw blood was not
led by a Choctaw, but by a Six Towns ally, the chief of Grand
Tohome.
Europeans from both sides of the imperial frontier had
their

partisans

in

each

of

the

major

nations

of

the

southeastern marchlands and attempted to manipulate the
nations according to their own plans and goals. When Red Shoe
resumed his efforts to open a British trade and alliance in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

174
the mid-1740s, the old alarm bells went off in Louisiana.

The

engine of Louisiana diplomacy was cranked up to prevent the
formation of a Choctaw-Chickasaw-south Carolina alliance that
could destroy the colony.

South Carolina responded to Red

Shoe's initiative, but instead of putting the full weight of
the government behind this golden opportunity to weaken or
destroy their rival, the governor and assembly placed the
Choctaw trade in the hands of private traders who were
woefully inadequate to the commercial as well as the political
and diplomatic tasks required of them.

Like the Chickasaws

in the 1730s, the Choctaw British party would be left on its
own by South Carolina in its contest with Louisiana.

Unlike

the Chickasaws, however, the Choctaws were never adequately
supplied by the

Bri~ish

and they could not break the French

alliance without a dependable British replacement.
The catalyst for the Choctaw Civil War was Europe's War
of the Austrian succession.

French officials feared that

Louisiana would be dragged

into

combatant.

the war

as

an

active

At the beginning of the war, Maurepas feared less

that England would invade Louisiana directly than that she
would have her Indian allies do it for her. 4

The English

apparently hoped to do so through an Abihka chief, but the
Upper Creeks warned the English and their partisans that the
Upper Creeks would not allow their land to become stained with
French blood. 5

The capture of a French ship carrying

Englishmen who had been arrested on the Mississippi River made
Maurepas

anxious

that

they

might

be

employed

in

some

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

175
expedition which could put their knowledge of Louisiana to
good use. 6 James Oglethorpe' s preparations for war caused two
years of worry for Louisiana before it was learned definitely
that his target was st. Augustine and not Mobile or New
Orleans. 7
South carolina had reason to fear the European war as
well.

coastal south carolina was particularly vulnerable to

attack.

Much of her population and many of her larger

plantations was situated on the coast and coastal waterways,
easy to strike from the sea.
knew the waters well.

French and Spanish privateers

They had preyed on the coastal

plantations during the War of Jenkins' Ear, and everyone
expected them to return in due course. 8
The lack of formal warfare between the Europeans did not
mean that the Southeast was unaffected by the war.

During the

1740s the Choctaws, never oversupplied by the French, had good
cause to be dissatisfied with their Gallic allies.

Due to

warfare and a worsening financial situation the crown could
not satisfy the commercial needs of Louisiana 1 s colonists,
much less the Indians.

From 1741 to 1749, the crown sent an

average of only 1.5 ships to Louisiana per year, and several
were seized before they could reach the colony.

Private

merchants did a little better at 2.8 ships per year during the
same period, but they charged prices that often brought them
from 100 per cent to 500 per cent profit on their goods.

At

these prices few of the colony's private traders could afford
to buy goods for resale to the Indians.

As a result, goods
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for the Indian trade was always in short supply. 9
French officials in Louisiana were well aware of the
political and diplomatic consequences of their continued
inability to supply the Indians.

Governor Pierre de Rigaud

de vaudreuil, scion of one of Canada's most distinguished
families, was chosen to succeed Bienville as governor in 1743
precisely because of his lifetime of experience with the
Indians. 10
vaudreuil was initially quite hopeful that he could order
affairs in the Mississippi Valley to France's advantage. He
met the Choctaws in Mobile in December 1743 for the annual
distribution of presents and came away feeling that he had the
Choctaws right where he wanted them.

Some

chiefs, such as

Red Shoe, were chided for lack of devotion to France and had
their authority diluted.

Other chiefs,

considered more

faithful, were rewarded in goods and marks of esteem, which
in turn bolstered France's standing with the nation.

Contrary

to previous reports, the governor found the Choctaws docile
and quite attached to France.

Indeed, he believed that if

France could provide enough trade goods, all the nations of
the region would embrace the French and reject the English.
vaudreuil proposed that Maurepas send to Louisiana one hundred
million livres in well-chosen merchandise over the usual
annual allotment.

Because the goods would attract all the

peltries normally traded to the British, the advance would
immediately be repaid out of the profits of the trade.

With

present stocks, however, Vaudxeuil could accommodate only the
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Choctaws for the year and the Chickasaws for perhaps a few
months. 11
vaudreuil's

hope

that

Bienville's

peace

with

the

Chickasaws could be confirmed was dashed by the lack of goods
to trade

as well

Chickasaw policy.

as the

contradictions of Louisiana's

On the one hand, the Chickasaws were told

that if they could make peace with the Choctaws, Louisiana
would accept that peace. 12

On the other hand, Louisiana

officials understood that if the Choctaws and Chickasaws did
make peace, the road would be open for English entry into the
Choctaw nation, which would eventually result in the exclusion
of the French from the lower Mississippi Valley. 13 Vaudreuil
realized that without enough goods to satisfy both the
Chickasaws and Choctaws, a general peace was untenable for
Louisiana. 14

In December 1744 the governor made plans to

reignite the war with the Chickasaws by France's northern and
southern Indian allies. 15
vaudreuil's grand design to implement the old Iberville
pan-Indian peace was thus quickly replaced with a more
realistic, if scarcely less challenging task: to preserve the
Choctaw alliance.

The governor,

like his predecessors,

realized that a bountiful trade with the Choctaws had to be
a key element of any plan.

He soon took up the old litany,

which he repeated in letter after letter for almost a decade.
Vaudreuil tried to convince Maurepas tha.t if the French could
not supply the Choctaws all their needs, the English would and
Louisiana would be lost.

The only sure way to preserve the
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Choctaw alliance--the sine qua non of Louisiana's existence-was to supply adequately the Indians. 16
As Vaudreuil predicted, the meager amount of trade goods
sent to the Choctaws were not enough to keep the Choctaws from
inviting

English

traders

to

their

villages.

Initial

indications were that vaudreuil had successfully brought Red
Shoe back into the French fold through a combination of carrot
and stick rewards and punishments that sent the chastised
chief into the field against the Chickasaws. 17

In March 1745

Red Shoe and his chief lieutenant Mongoulacha Mingo each
brought a Chickasaw scalp to Mobile to prove their fidelity.
But even as the French were congratulating themselves for
having convinced Red Shoe to war on the Chickasaws, the wily
war chief was wooing his nation in favor of South Carolina.
At a national meeting at Yanabe village in July 1745, Red Shoe
and Mongoulacha Mingo convinced their fellow chiefs that they
should invite English traders to their villages to relieve
them of their dependence upon the French,
everything and delivered nothing.

who promised

Red Shoe was authorized to

send a deputation to the English to call traders to the nation
and to negotiate for regular commerce. 18
Louisiana relied on its old e:ipedients to break up Red
Shoe • s Chickasaw peace. Whenever Vaudreuil or his lieutenants
learned of the imminent arrival in the Choctaw villages of a
delegation of Chickasaw ambassadors or English merchants
bearing goods, they enlisted Choctaw warriors to attack them.
If the attack resulted in the deaths of Chickasaws or
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Englishmen, so much the better.
was

~illed,

But even if none of the enemy

they were usually deflected from their mission by

the attack.
opportunities.

For the Choctaws,

such forays were golden

Not only were they paid for their efforts by

the French, but there was the chance to obtain scalps, war
honors, and perhaps significant amounts of booty as well.
Early in the conflict, this practice seemed an efficacious and
relatively inexpensive strategy. 19

Maurepas supported the

policy fully. 20
Vaudreuil demonstrated the value of well-timed presents
early in his administration.

To frustrate Red Shoe's plans,

presents were sent to the nation and an assembly was held at
Concha, Alibamon Mingo's home village.

The Choctaws were

reminded of all the benefits they derived from the French
alliance and no doubt about the part the British had played
in the old Chickasaw slave trade.

The presents paid off,

because in early october 1745 Choctaws attacked a Chickasawbound carolina convoy, killing two English traders. 21
Not all

French officials appreciated the political

importance of the Indian trade, however.
1745

commissaire-ordonnateur

During the fall of

Sebastien-FranQois-Ange

Le

Normant de Mezy undoubtedly strengthened Red Shoe •s proBritish talk when he suddenly raised the price of goods sold
to the Indians. Trade goods were obtained by post commandants
from the royal warehouses, and the profits made on those goods
helped support the posts.

Because of the crucial importance

of the Choctaw post, whereas most posts charged 50 per cent
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above the French price of goods, the Choctaws were allowed to
buy goods at French prices.

When Le Normant raised the cost

of all goods by 100 per cent of their French price, without
consulting vaudreuil, he threatened to undermine the entire
French program.

Soldiers and Indians alike complained about

the new pricing structure. The new prices threatened not only
to alienate the Indians, but also to cause wholesale desertion
of the frontier garrisons to the English and Spanish. 22
Le

Normant•s policies threatened Vaudreuil's Indian

diplomacy in other ways as well.

Governors used goods from

the royal warehouses as presents when needed in diplomacy,
but those warehouses were under the administrative control of
the commissaire-ordonnateur.

Unlike his predecessors, Le

Normant would not allow post commandants to withdraw goods as
needed but required prior notice of the request from the
governor.

As Vaudreuil and Le Normant were in New Orleans

and the situation at the frontier posts was so fluid, such a
system

threatened

to

undermine

French

control

of

the

Choctaws. 23
Le Normant further alienated Vaudreuil when he refused

to speedily distribute goods which arrived in Louisiana on a
royal vessel in october 1745.

Le Normant not only delayed

sending the goods to the Choctaws but according to the
governor, sold some of the goods at excessive prices through
his partners who owned "boutiques" in New Orleans.

So much

merchandise had been sold this way that Le Normant had
afterward less than half of what Vaudreuil had ordered for
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the Choctaws.

Furthermore, due to Le Nor.mant•s new prices,

the Choctaws refused to come for their presents, and most of
the traders had threatened to abandon commerce with the
Indians as unprofitable.

Vaudreuil threatened to exercise

his authority over the warehouses if Le Normant•s policies
put the colony in any more danger. 24

Louboey seconded

Vaudreuil by informing Maurepas that extraordinary measures
were absolutely essential under the circumstances for the
colony's surviva1. 25
Maurepas supported Vaudreuil in the controversy with Le
Normant over prices.

The crucial importance of Indian

diplomacy to the colony and the impact changing prices could
have on the results of Indian diplomacy necessitated that the
governor be forewarned of anything that could cause unrest
among the Indians.

Only with advance warning could Vaudreuil

instruct his officers on how to prepare the Indians for any
changes. 26
But Maurepas recognized that post commandants often used
goods from the royal warehouses for personal gain under the
guise of Indian diplomacy.

In spring 1746 the commandant of

Fort Tombecbe put the warehousekeeper in jail on specious
pretexts, took over the royal warehouse, and obligated himself
for almost 3000 livres.

Under Louisiana's dual system of

administration, the commandant had no right to manage the
warehouse, whatever the actions of the warehousekeeper.

The

commandant was suspended for three months as an example to his
fellow officers. 27
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It

is

not

surprising that the Choctaws

sought to

establish an alliance with South Carolina, considering the
problems Louisiana experienced in supplying the Indians.
James Adair claimed to have first inspired the Choctaws to
abandon the French for the English, at the direction of
Governor Gleno

Working through some Chakchiumas, who were

friendly with both the Choctaws and Chickasaws, Adair
offered the Choctaws peace and commerce with the English.
Adair attributed Red Shce's willingness to respond to this
offer to the rape of one of his wives by a soldier of the
Tombecbe garrison. 28 According to Edmond Atkin, however, Red
Shoe approached the British entirely on his own.

Atkin

credited Adair's partner John Campbell with facilitating Red
Shoe's 1738 opening to the British, and campbell and Adair
together for helping to get talks started again in 1746.
Atkin styled Red Shoe as "King of the Choctaws," but like the
post of French medal chief, this was probably a creation of
the English and not a traditional Choctaw designation.~
vaudreuil was not able to deliver the 1745 present to
the Choctaws until March 1746, but the governor flattered
himself that he was in firm control of the Choctaws.

Red Shoe

did not accompany the nation to Mobile. which made Vaudreuil's
job easier.

Vaudreuil used his presents to obtain assurances

of fidelity from the Choctaws and promises that they would
press the Chickasaw war more vigorously than ever.

The

governor could not directly ask the Choctaws to make war, as
that would have required many more presents.

Instead, he
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talked informally with those chiefs and considerees who
favored war anyway and simply fanned their sentiments. 30
Despite all Vaudreuil and his lieutenants could do or
say, the Chickasaws had a message that many Choctaws were
apparently eager to hear.

In their negotiations with the

Choctaws, Chickasaws used several persuasive arguments in
favor of making peace.

The Chickasaws

~~ew

had threatened to withdraw their traders

that

th~

French

if a Choctaw-

Chickasaw peace were concluded, so they told the Choctaws not
to worry, that the English would supply them with everything
they needed.

In addition, if peace were made, the Choctaws

could redeem Choctaw slaves held by the Chickasaws.

The

Chickasaws also appealed to the Choctaws as "red men, 11 and
hoped that despite what the French wanted, the Choctaws and
Chickasaws could live together in peace. 31
In early November 1746 Red Shoe formally presented the
nation with his plan.

While the majority of the chiefs were

away at Mobile receiving their annual presents, Red Shoe
convened a council to propose peace with the Chickasaws.

A

delegation of thre1e Chickasaw men and one woman traveled to
Bouctoucoulou village to arrange further peace talks, but on
the second day of their visit the grand chief's partisans
killed three of the four envoys.

To avenge this latest

insult, as well as the two traders killed the year before,
Red Shoe decided that Frenchmen must die.

Red Shoe's

partisans, lying in wait along the roads commonly used by
Frenchmen, whether by accident or design killed Cadet Henri
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de Verbois and two French traders passing from one Choctaw
village to the next.

Verbois allegedly had been involved in

the rape of one of Red Shoe's wives.

32

Adair claimed at least some of the credit for the deaths
of the three Frenchmen.

He said he had wooed Red Shoe and the

Choctaws with "well-adapted presents," which he lamented were
too often the springs of government "even in the Christian
World."

He also,

of course,

took every opportunity to

denigrate the French and elevate the English.

He contrasted

the freedom of the Chickasaws, whom great French armies could
not destroy, and the misery of the Choctaws, who could get
nothing from the French except for the blood of Chickasaws and
Englishmen.

He compared his enemies to dangerous snakes, and

gave the Choctaws vermilion and scalping knives with which to
strike the French snake.

According to Adair, the Choctaws

soon thereafter killed Verbois and his companions. 33
Red Shoe hoped to bring other English allies into his
plans, so he sent part of the three French scalps to the
Abihkas and Talapoosas.

Wanting no part of what looked like

the onset of a war with Louisiana, the Upper Creeks treated
Red Shoe's emissaries with contempt and instead sent the
scalps back to the French with marks of distinction.

They

even reportedly offered the French a force of seven-to-eighthundred men to help seek satisfaction.

When the English went

to Coweta to propose the destruction of the Alabama fort, the
emperor informed them that if the English spilled the blood
of even one French child, the Creeks would make war on them.
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To underscore their support for the French, the Alabamas,
Abihkas,

and Talapoosas sent deputies to the pro-French

Choctaws urging them to give satisfaction to the French.~
By preserving the Choctaws• alliance with Louisiana, the
Creeks were protecting their role as the neutral
arbiter of the southeastern borderlands.

The pro-British

faction favored war with Louisiana, but the pro-French and
neutral parties opposed the war on strategic grounds.

The

Creeks were able to balance France and England partly because
they not only separated the European antagonists, but also
because they separated the Choctaws from the English. Trade
between south carolina and the Choctaws would not only
strengthen a traditional Creek enemy, but could also lessen
their military and diplomatic value

to South Carolina.

Diplomatic weakening could easily result in less favorable
economic arrangements with South Carolina, and the Creeks knew
all too well that Louisiana could not take up the slack. 35
The Choctaw Little King's visit to Charles Town in April
1747 offered South Carolina a chance to strike a mighty blow
against her old enemy Louisiana.

Speaking on behaJ.f of his

brother Red Shoe and the nation, Little King offered to
destroy the French fort at Tombecbe with a force of Choctaws,
to join with the Creeks to destroy the Alabama fort, and to
help the English build a fort in thei! nation.
King

insisted that to do this,

But Little

the Choctaws needed an

immediate supply of ammunition to finish what they had begun
and to advance their program.

The chief requested that South

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

186

carolina send at least one trader back to the nation with him
under his protection with needed ammunition and other goods.~
Governor James Glen readily assented to this proposal
and put forward Charles McNaire, "then a stranger lately come
to South

Carolina,~-=

as the best man to supply the Choctaws.

McNaire was not experienced in the Indian trade, but Glen
assured the Assembly that he had the backing of men who did.
McNaire•s relative Matthew Roche, an experienced trader, would
furnish him with the goods and horses necessary for the
business.

In addition,

he would have as assistants an

experienced trader and an interpreter who spoke Choctaw.
McNaire was almost ready to go and he offered to carry the
government present,

which amounted to nine horseloads of

merchandise, free of charge.

Because McNaire seemed "a more

sober decent sort of Man" than the usual Indian trader, these
arrangements were speedily approved. 37
A company was

formed to conduct business with the

Choctaws under the name of Charles McNaire and Company.
Members included Matthew Roche,

Jordan Roche,

and James

Maxwell, with the actual trade to be conducted by McNaire,
Thomas Maxwell, Arthur Harvey, and John Vann.

Unknown to the

Assembly was another, silent partner: nominally Dr. Thomas
Glen, but in reality his brother the governor.

From the

beginning Glen attempted to arrange a monopoly for McNaire and
Company, but as South carolina operated under a free trade
regulated by licenses, he was stymied when some objected to
this manipulation of the Choctaw trade.~
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Glen's handling of the Choctaw "revolt" against Louisiana
reflected his general approach to governmental affairs before
1750.

From 1743 to 1749 Glen held himself aloof from the

existing political parties in the province and tried to create
one of his own.

In the same way, Glen used McNaire, a

newcomer to South carolina with no experience in the Indian
trade, to foster trade with the Choctaws.

Both policies would

fail in the long run, but for different reasons.

His decision

to ally himself with the colony's great families was no sign
of defeat, just a change in strategy.

But after the failure

of McNaire and Company to succor the pro-British Choctaws
there

was

no

chance

to

retrieve

a

golden

but

missed

opportunity to steal away Louisiana's most important ally. 39
In

response

to

the

killings

of

Verbois

and

his

companions, Vaudreuil sent Mobile major Jadart de Beauchamps
into the nation in September 1746 to learn the Choctaws'
reaction to this unprecedented situation.

In a series of

meetings held in Chickasawhay village, beyond which the safety
of his party could not be guaranteed, Beauchamps met with most
of the influential leaders of the nation.

The Choctaws

revealed that they were well aware that what the French seemed
to want from them could easily result in civil war.

Rather

than obtaining satisfaction themselves in traditional fashion
through limited war, the French proposed that the Choctaws
give satisfaction by delivering the heads of their own people
to the French.

For this there was simply no vehicle in

Choctaw culture.

Beauchamps expected the meetings to result
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in real

bargaining that would lead to

some consensus.

Instead, the Choctaws used the meeting to stress their loyalty
to France but at the same time to show why they could not do
what was being asked. 40

Beauchamps and Vaudreuil both failed

to understand the message.

The Choctaws' fears for their

nation if they met the French demand was proven tragically
correct. 41
Unlike Glen, Vaudreuil put the full weight of his office
behind his Choctaw faction.

Despite Beauchamps' talks with

the Choctaws, Vaudreuil decided that the one sure way to smash
Red Shoe's pro-English schemes was to destroy Red Shoe
himself.

In early 1747 the governor called an assembly of the

principle Choctaw chiefs and warriors at Tombecbe.

vaudreuil

demanded the head of Red Shoe and his two principle adherents,
Mongoulacha Mingo and Chicacha Oulacta.

After the assembly

the Choctaws sent runners to the Chickasaws to warn all
English traders that they would be pillaged if they tried to
go into the Choctaw nation. 42
Vaudreuil realized that the Choctaws' willingness to come
to terms depended upon two important factors.
internal national politics.

one was

Red Shoe headed a large party

and it took time to marshal the forces necessary to reach such
a decision.

Secondly, Red Shoe had been unable to deliver on

his promises of a bountiful English trade.

Without goods to

deliver, he lost many of his followers to the French party. 43
Because delivering the heads of their own people was so
abhorrent to the Choctaws,

members of the French party
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proposed

giving

the

heads

of

two

English

traders

as

substitutes for Mongoulacha Mingo and Chicacha Oulacta.
vaudreuil accepted this proposal as a good way to keep the
English out of the nation.

Vaudreuil was well aware that the

pro-English western party opposed the killing of any traders.
He reasoned that the adoption of this policy would strengthen
the Eastern, pro-French party.~

Louis XV and Maurepas fully

approved this pol icy. 45
French calls for the head of Red Shoe took some time to
answer.

In october 1746 two young warriors from Petit Yazoo

and Chickasawhay tried to ambush Red Shoe.

Failing this they

set fire to his cabin, but missed the chance to kill him as
he fled.

The two young men then went straight to Tombecbe and

informed commandant FranQois Hazeur of their actions and their
determination to succeed at it.

To encourage them, Hazeur

placed two piles of goods, each equivalent to a chief's annual
present, on the grounds of the fort.

Between the piles was

left a place to put Red Shoe's head.

The two warriors were

promised a chief's present annually for the rest of their
lives if they produced the head.
given

powder,

vermilion.

shot,

To effect this they were

flintstones,

butcher

knives,

and

The young men abandoned their mission, however,

when they learned that Red Shoe was being guarded day and
night. 46
Red Shoe was killed, by whom it was never known, on the
night of June 22, 1747 as he escorted the trader Henry Elsey
from the Chickasaws toward the Choctaw villages.

Red Shoe·
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was ill and, according to native cut>tom, 'Was sleeping apa.&:t
from the rest of the convoy.
the attack miscarried.

Unfortunately for the French

Elsey, the rest of his escort, and

all his goods escaped unharmed and the convoy successfully
reached Red Shoe's village of Couechitto.

There the trade

goods were given out as presents, and Imataha Pouschouche,
Little King, was acknowledged by the pro-British Choctaws as
Red Shoe 1 s heir and successor. 47
The assassination of Red Shoe prompted the Western party
to take the developing war to those who were responsible for
starting it, Louisianans.

In September 1747, Western party

chiefs led an attack on Mobile-area settlements that resulted
in the deaths of several Frenchmen and a Negro slave, in an
attempt to rally recent converts and bind them more fully to
the British.~

In March 1748, after receiving an infusion of

English munitions, a party of Choctaws struck the German
Coast,

just a few miles upriver from New Orleans.

The

attackers killed one farmer, wounded his wife, took their
daughter prisoner, and carried off the family's five Negro
slaves.
settlers

In both attacks the countryside was abandoned, with
fleeing

respectively.

in

fear

to

Mobile

and

New

Orleans

To make matters worse, in the aftermath of the

German Coast attack a French soldier was killed when French
forces pursued the perpetrators and instead attacked a party
of friendly Choctaws out hunting.

A greater disaster was

averted only by the courage of the Choctaw hunting party
leader, whose bravery in identifying himself and his party

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

191
prevented the skirmish from leading to casualties.~
The arrival in the western division of several shipments
of ammunition in the summer and fall of 1748 resulted in more
attacks against Louisiana.

In October, Western division

Chakchiuma partisans made two attacks on the Natchez post
which resulted in the deaths of several soldiers and Frenchallied Indians. 50
German Coast.

In November another attack was made on the

The inhabitants fled again in terror, but this

time local defense forces made a better show of it.

French

forces pursued and engaged the attackers, most of whom were
killed, and all the prisoners and booty were recovered. 51
Having experienced two attacks in six months, the area was
virtually abandoned for several years. 52
The assassination of Red Shoe did not itself spark the
civil war, perhaps because the identity of the actual
perpetrator was never revealed and perhaps never known even
by those who carried out the attack. Red Shoe 1 s assassination
was avenged by the deaths of Frenchmen at Mobile and Natchez,
which satisfied his clan 1 s need for revenge.

Up to this

point, retaliation by both sides had, except for Red Shoe
himself, been extracted from non-Choctaws.

But in october

1747 a party of Choctaws led by the French ally, the chief of
Grand Tohome, attacked a party of English traders and their
Choctaw escorts. One Englishman and the Choctaw chief leading
the escorts were killed.

In response to this murder of a

Choctaw by a Choctaw party, Western party Choctaws attacked
the Conchas village, home of the Grand Tohome 1 s Choctaw
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warriors.

The civil war had bequn. 53

Choctaw society and the entire course of the civil war
was no doubt affected by the smallpox epidemic that ran
through the nation during 1747.

As many as 1,200 Choctaws

died. such mortality would have been devastating at any time,
but during 17 47 the Choctaws were becoming increasingly
divided over Red Shoe's attempt to initiate trade with south
So

carolina.

many

deaths,

including

many

chiefs

and

considerees, weakened the fabric of Choctaw society and made
resolution of the conflicting demands of Louisiana and south
carolina difficult to achieve. The smallpox epidemic possibly
killed three times as many Choctaws as the civil war. 54
At the end of December 1747 McNaire returned to Charles
Town with the Little King, who was unaccompanied by anyone
except a lone Chickasaw warrior.

The arrival of so important

a chief without an entourage was a great surprise.

More of

a wonder to many was the fact that he was entertained and
dismissed without the council being called to consider his
appearance.

Later, Matthew Roche stated that while McNaire

and the Little King were negotiating in Charles Town, McNaire
expre~sed

the opinion to Glen that too many traders would

spoil the Choctaw trade.

Glen thereupon promised to prevent

that from happening and gave McNaire a proclamation, signed
by the governor and bearing the colony's seal, that was to be
published

in

the

Creek

and

Chickasaw

nations.

The

proclamation stated that McNaire was conducting official
colony business with the Choctaws, and that all persons were
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strictly forbidden to enter the Choctaw nation until his
return. 55
McNaire left Charles Town in January 1748, ostensibly to
deliver the ammunition and trade goods sought by the Little
King.

But when he arrived at the Choctaw villages in March,

he had no ammunition with him.

He had stopped at the Creeks

and the Chickasaws to publish his proclamation.

But he had

traded all his ammunition to the Chickasaws,

so when he

arrived at the Choctaw villages he had none except a small
amount left behind from his earlier visit.

According to

McNaire • s own testimony, he and John Campbell stayed among the
Choctaws for four months trying to bring over as much of the
Choctaw nation as they could to the British interest. 56
In the meantime, Little King stayed among the Creeks
waiting for the ammunition which was supposed to be
right behind McNaire.

~oming

Considering the promises that had been

made, the lack of supplies, and the artful diplomacy of the
French, it would have been highly impolitic for him to return
to the nation without ammunition.

The ammunition made it as

far as the Creeks in Auqust, whereupon several traders and
Creeks set out to bring it to the Choctaws.

Instead of taking

the long but safe path through the Chickasaws, however, the
party passed by the shorter route that took them near the
Tombecbe fort.

When they reached within two days of the

Choctaws, however, they stopped and sent for an escort.

They

waited for their guide and escort for twenty-one days, then
returned

to

the

Creeks.

The

Choctaws,

desperate
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ammunition in their growing war against the French, had
obtained only a few pounds of powder and ball which McNaire
had been able to buy from other traders at the Chickasaws.
By the end of August, Campbell and Little King finally arrived
among the Choctaws.
ammunition.

They carried with them no guns or

Whatever became of the public present that had

made it to within two days of the Choctaw villages was never
known. 57

During the summer of 1748 the Choctaws were forced to
improvise for ammunition in their civil war, as they had run
out of lead shot.

The nation did not receive any goods at

all until November or December 1748.

Despite his monopoly,

when McNaire finally left the nation his competitors quickly
entered the nation to trade for the skins that had been piling
up in anticipation of McNaire 1 s arrival. 58
To meet the escalating threat from South Carolina,
vaudreuil demanded ever more retaliation by the pro-French
Choctaws.

He hoped in this way to eliminate the pro-British

leadership. Red Shoe 1 s head and the scalps of the two traders
were delivered to Vaudreuil, but only after the attacks on the
German Coast and Mobile.

Vaudreuil rejected the two British

scalps as immaterial to his demand for satisfaction, and now
demanded the scalp of Little King.

He hoped to end the war

by eliminating South carolina 1 s new "king of the Choctaws. 1159
In traditional Indian culture, the aggrieved party itself
was responsible for extracting revenge.

But the French

demanded tha:·: the Choctaws themselves give satisfaction for
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the murder on the German Coast.

vaudreuil sent word to the

Choctaws that if satisfaction were not given immediately, the
French would abandon the Choctaws entirely.~

The chief who

led the attack was killed on his return home by his own
brother and their village chief. 61

A few months later

Mongoulacha Mingo was killed for his part in Red Shoe 1 s
schemes by five of his own warriors.Q
The deaths of individual Choctaws at each others hands
opened the floodgates of civil war.

When the French demanded

satisfaction for the German Coast attack, the Choctaw grand
chief and Alibamon Mingo led an attack on Couechitto and
Nuskobo, both Western party villages.

Both villages were

burned, their inhabitants taking refuge inside their fort.
The chief of Nuskobo, two Couechitto considerees, and six
Chakchiumas were killed in the attack.

In response, on August

16 the Western party attacked Oulitacha, home of the supreme
medal chief.

over one hundred fell in battle there.

The

attackers had the worst of it, and lost the captain of
Boucfouca, one of their main leaders.~

At the beginning of

November 1748 Vaudreuil claimed that not one member of Red
Shoe's family remained alive, not even a child.M
Each attack and each death led almost inevitably to more
killings, especially when they involved Frenchmen.

By the

time Alibamon Mingo brought the "rebel" scalps to Vaudreuil
at Mobile in November, the second attack on the German Coast
had been made.

Vaudreuil now demanded that this attack be

avenged as well before he forgave the Choctaws.

To do this
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warriors from the Six Towns, Chickasawhay, and Yowani attacked
a Western village, taking a scalp and several prisoners. 65
The end of the war of the Austrian Succession had
important consequences for the Choctaw Civil War.

With the

European war over, imperial concerns shifted to other problems
and other theaters.

Neither London nor Paris sustained much

interest in what was happening on the southeastern frontier.
As soon as the fighting ended, Maurepas notified Vaudreuil
that he could cease all extraordinary expenditures until he
received further orders.~
In South Carolina, the failure of McNaire and Company to
supply the Choctaws was not fully understood.

Where private

enterprise had failed, the council and assembly were hesitant
to step in.

Glen •s maneuvers in favor of McNaire and Company,

which because of its inscrutable dealings became known as the
Sphinx Company, exacerbaLted his already strained relationship
with the council.

on September 30, 1748, after McNaire•s

second return from the Choctaws, Glen attempted to call local
council members out to a country plantation to discuss some
"proposals" of Maxwell and McNaire.

Atkin protested for

himself and two other council members that the meeting was
inappropriate for several reasons, including the gravity of
anything concerning the Choctaws being discussed or decided
by less than the full council.

A few days later, Glen

informed the council that there were some Choctaws at Fort
Moore who wished to descend to Charles Town and asked their
advice.

Atkin replied that the council could not advise him,
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as council members knew nothing concerning the Choctaws'
number, quality, or errand. Atkin would not even advise that
a meeting of the council be called,

in case the matter

concerned only "the private purposes of some Traders. 1167
A council meeting was called on October 19, but although
McNaire

was

nearby,

nothing

was

discussed

concerning the trader or the Choctaws.
meetings,

however,

officially

Outside of the

Atkin first learned from trader John

Pettycrow that the previous year's present of guns and
ammunition had not been fully delivered.

Atkin proposed to

Glen that an inquiry be made into this, but the governor
balked at the idea and did not ask McNaire for an explanation
of the affair. 68
Despite all Glen could do to keep the affairs and
failures of the Sphinx Company secret, Pettycrow•s muttering
and other signs indicated that all was not well in Choctaw
country.

The sixteen Choctaws who arrived at Fort Moore in

1748 had been sent there by Adair, unknown to them, to act as
hostages for the good conduct of the nation.

The council,

never eager to spend money on Indians, viewed them as beggars
at best.

In January 1749 the Little King sent chief

Pouchimataha with twenty headmen and considerees to Charles
Town to plead for the survival of their nation.

Pouchimataha

told the Carolinians that all the headmen of Little King's
village were dead and that if his delegation did not soon
return with guns and ammunition they would all die at the
hands of the French party.

Not knowing all that had been done
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to enforce a monopoly for the Sphinx Company or of McNaire•s
failure to deliver the public present of ammunition, the
council could not accept the simple truth that there were no
goods to be had in the nation.

According to Atkin, however,

discussing the matter among themselves after the Choctaws had
gone, council members agreed that the situation undoubtedly
concerned "a piecE' o~, private Management. 1169
In January 1749 McNaire presented the council with a
memorial concerning his trade with the Choctaws and a request
for a reimbursement of his expenses.

The governor objected

to part of the memorial which stated that in 1747 Glen had
directed McNaire to spare no expense "to promote the Publick
Welfare," for which he would be duly reimbursed.

McNaire

stuck to his story, however, and Glen allowed the request to
go

forward.

The council was not so easy on McNaire.

Councilors could get no clear answer on what had happened to
the 1748 public present of 100 guns, 1,500 pounds of powder,
and 3,000 pounds of balls.

Ful:-thermore, the council was led

by John Vann, Matthew Roche, and others to believe that there
was no one but McNaire willing to trade with the Choctaws.
There was apparently some talk of Glen's connection with the
Sphinx Company, because McNaire sought out Edmond Atkin to
assure him that the governor was in no way involved.
maneuvers by Glen,

McNaire,

Despite

and their confederates,

the

council would not be forced to confer a monopoly on McNaire
and Company or to reimburse any of its agents for their
11 expenses • 1170
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With the council suspicious of Glen's handling of the
Choctaw trade, relations were deteriorating between Glen and
McNaire.

In May 1749 McNaire presented the General Assembly

a memorial asking for reimbursement of his expenses and losses
in

furthering

the

Choctaw

revolt.

He

also

submitted

separately to the Assembly an account for £7048.50 currency
in

e~ens~s

and. £4 7 oo currency losses in the affair. Although

McNaire could claim no official sanction from the governor for
his

part

in the

Choctaw revolt,

the memorial

and the

circumstances of its submission by the governor to the
assembly created a strong impression on many in the assembly
that McNaire had a valid claim on the public treasury. Jordan
Roche and James Maxwell were members of both the Sphinx
Company and the assembly,

and they courted their fellow

assemblymen assiduously in favor of McNaire.

Atkin believed

that some of them were owed money by members of the company
and stood to lose personally if McNaire was not given the
requested relief. 71
A committee of the assembly was appointed to consider
the request.

After consulting only documents put forward by

McNaire and Company, the committee validated McNaire•s claim
to

responsibility

for

engineering

the

Choctaw

revolt.

Although it did not find the colony liable for his losses,
which it calculated at £1678 sterling, it did direct that the
colony's

agent

in

London

reimbursement from the king.

assist

McNaire

in

seeking

The committee also recommended

that he be awarded £200 currency, which was later reduced to
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£100, for his services to the colony, and that the colony
support a petition for a £1,000 currency reward from his
majesty, which amounted to about £143 sterling.n
The council was opposed to rewarding McNaire for what,
even with their limited knowledge of the affair, they knew to
be unjust claims.

To prevent McNaire•s claim for a reward

from Ioeing forwarded to the king, they agr«!ed to pay him
£1, 000 currency in final compensation

for all his claims.

Despite this, with the support of the assembly McNaire would
press all his claims in south Carolina and England.~
Glen had supported McNaire •s petition reluctantly, as
the only way to recover his investment in the Sphinx Company.
With the assistance of his friends in the assembly, and the
unwitting cooperation of a council that Glen had purposely
kept ignorant of so much coucerning ';.he Choctaws, McNaire
transformed a request for reimbursement of expenses to a
recognized claim of sole credit for having engineered the
Choctaw revolt against France.

As much as this galled Glen,

he could not oppose McNaire•s pretensions without endangering
his own financial interests. 74
Having seen McNaire rob him of credit for one of his
proudest achievements as governor, Glen made his final break
with the Sphinx Company in the summer of 1749.

On May 31,

the assembly sent a message to the governor and council that
if they decided that it lias necessary to send ammunition to
the Choctaws while the commons was adjourned, it would approve
the expenditure of £1,000 currency for that purpose.
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Choctaws were in dire need of ammunition, and Glen chose John
Pettycrow to carry the present to the Choctaws.

Because of

the delay in arranging for proper authorization from the
council and assembly for sending the present, Pettycrow did
not

leave

for

Indian

country

until

late

August

1749.

Transportation problems and the activities of pro-French
scalping parties further delayed the arrival of the ammunition
in the Choctaw villages until January 12,

1750.

When

Pettycrc,w arrived in the nation he found the British party
negotiating a possible settlement with French officials.~
South Carolina's response to the Choctaw initiative was
probably affected by the economic recession that the colony
experienced from 1744 to 1748.

French and Spanish privateers

did their work well and preyed on South Carolina's rice ships
particularly hard.

Freight and insurance rates skyrocketed

and the price of rice fell by two-thirds.

The dislocation of

shipping affected colonist in other ways as well.

The cost

of imported goods rose and provincial taxes doubled to support
military expenditures. 76 Under such circumstances, it is easy
to understand that the assembly, which did not distribute
presents annually as did Louisiana, would be reluctant to
spend much money on far-away Indians who had always been in
the French interest anyway.
Both factions in the Choctaw Civil War were poorly
supplied during 1749, but fighting continued.

Little King

died in spring 1749, apparently of natural causes, and was
succeeded as leader of his party by Pouchimataha.

Despite
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the fact that Red Shoe's entire family had been killed along
with all the other leaders specifically condemned by the
French, the requirements of retaliation led to ever more
killings.

As the war wore on, it divided not only divisions,

but towns and districts also.

Seneacha was particularly

divided by the conflict and suffered grievously as warring
factions within the towns fought on different sides of the
war.n
vaudreuil came to realiz,e by fall 1750 th.at if the French
did not end the war decisively the Choctaw nation would fight
on until it destroyed itself.

In September 1750 commandant

Joseph Boucher de Grand Pre of Tombecbe, leading an army of
French soldiers and Eastern party warriors, attacked the
villages of Cushtusha and Caffetalaya.
of their cabins to fire,
warriors were scalped.

The towns lost many

and twenty-five western party

As the Choctaws had requested four

years earlier, the French had finally taken the field and
extracted satisfaction for themselves.~
Eastern and Western-party partisans ratified a treaty of
peace between the warring factions on November 15, 1750.

The

treaty, dictated by Grand Pre, contained four main provisions:
the Choctaws themselves were responsible for avenging the
deaths of any Frenchman; English traders and their Choctaw
sponsors were to be killed with no revenge obligation; the
Choctaws would once again take up the Chickasaw war; the
Western party villages would destroy their forts and exchange
their

prisoners

with

the

Eastern

division.

English
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commissions

of the Western party leaders were sent to

vaudreuil, and the Western division was once again admitted
into the French fold.N
For Louisiana and south Carolina, the end of the Choctaw
civil War amounted to a return to the status quo ante bellum.
The Choctaws remained in the French camp, the Chickasaws
remained enemies of Louisiana and the Choctaws, and the Creeks
maintained a stance of friend of all, enemy of none. With the
onset of

11

the next war," just a few years later, the balance

of power between the Europeans remained largely the same as
it had been one or even two decades earlier.
From the native perspective, however, a return to the
old status quo was impossible.

As many as twelve hundred

Choctaws had died from smallpox.

Over four hundred Choctaws

died in the civil war, and whole villages had been destroyed
or abandoned.

The civil war revealed that when faced with

the loss of European trade, the only option the Choctaws had
was to do without.

The Choctaws were forced to acknowledge

that they could refuse their French "allies" nothing, not even
their own blood.

The Choctaws were neither the first nor the

last to learn this painful lesson.
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Chapter VII

wars and Rumors of Wars:
The Imperial Frontier, 1750-1759

The southeastern marchlands were the scene of turmoil,
tension, and war during the 1750s.

The Southeast was the

scene of several regional conflicts during the early 1750s;
in 1754 the Seven Years' War began in the Ohio Valley,
although it was two years before war was officially declared
between England and France. 1

While war raged from the Ohio

Valley to the Gulf of st. Lawrence and beyond, however, the
forces that had shaped a status quo between European and
Native American powers in the Southeast held firm.

Europeans

on the colonial frontier experienced the same divided councils
at home and lack of support from their metropolitan capitals
that

had

prevented

positions for decades.

them

from

improving

their

relative

Native Americans who tried to change

the balance of power continued to find Creek neutrality an
effective barrier to shifting alliances. The balance of power
would change forever after 1763, but not because of anything
that took place on the southeastern marchlands.
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Florida was spared an active role in the seven Years'
war, but it was affected by the conflict nonetheless. Florida
was dependent upon seaborne traders for the majority of her
food supply: wartime disruption of shipping led to hunger and
a continual preoccupation with food supplies in St. Augustine
and Pensacola.

Like thA French in Canada and Louisiana,

Floridians solved their supply problem largely through illegal
trade with the British.
probJ.em.

The attacks

Harassment hy Indians was also a
l~Tere

so bad that Spaniards at st.

Augustine had difficulty cutting firewood, and many Florida
Indians had to be transported to Cuba for safety. 2
For Louisiana, the 1750s was a decade of almost constant
danger.

The Choctaw civil War still raged when the first

rumblings of the Great War for Empire were heard in the Ohio
Valley.

British traders had entered the Ohio Valley during

the late 1740s, and by 1750 they had begun to trade with the
Miamis, perennially under-supplied French allies.

Reports of

British traders in the region sent shock waves through canada
and Louisiana.

Chickasaw war veteran Joseph Celeron de

Blainville was sent into the Ohio Valley in 1749 to bolster
France's claim to the region and to assess the British
threat. 3 Celeron's presence in the region, in turn, prompted
the British to increase their activities there. 4
By October 17 50 a number of Miamis had formally renounced
their French alliance and taken up the British standard at a
new village.

The new Indian "republic," as the French styled

the "rebel" encampment derisively, attracted warriors and
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their families from almost all regional French-allied tribes,
which made suppressing the "rebellion" a potentially explosive
undertaking.

The British-allied Indian enclave was destroyed

by a French-led force of Ottawas and Chippewas in June 1752,
but the episode highlighted French vulnerability in the Ohio
Valley, the crossroads of eastern North America. 5 In response
to these and other problems, Vaudreuil was made governorgeneral of Canada and the government of Louisiana passed to
naval captain Louis Billouart, ·chevalier de Kerlerec.
Kerlerec had spent most of his life in the French navy,
in the course of which he had served in the Natchez campaigns
of 1730. 6

Kerlerec • s instructions accurately stated that

governing the Indians would be his primary task as governor.
He was warned that supplying the Indians was always costly and
difficult and that it was necessary to lead the Indians
carefully, especially the Choctaws, to keep them happy and to
spoil English intrigues among them. 7 But in his ten years as
governor, Kerlerec would find that the greatest difficulties
in managing the Indians would stem not from British intrigues,
but from neglect by his home government and opposition from
fellow officials inside Louisiana.
Louisiana was perennially short of merchandise and
presents for the Indians during the 1750s.

While this was

usual for Louisiana, the advent of the Great War for Empire
increased shortages at the same time that wartime exigencies
made the need for merchandise and presents all the greater.
Kerlerec was denied communications with and supplies from
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France and the French west Indies almost from the beginning
of the conflict in 1754.

Louisiana and canada obtained most

of their licit commercial goods from the French West Indies,
with the lion's share going to more prosperous Canada.

But

the total volume of trade between the mainland and the islands
was reduced in 1756 to half of its 1755 level; in 1757 tonnage
was reduced by half again; and in 1758 the trade was so
insignificant that figures were not even compiled. 8 With the
French navy largely chased out of the West Indies, it required
only a small patrol of privateers to block almost completely
the supply of Louisiana. 9
Between 1755 and 1759 Kerlerec was almost totally cut
off from his superiors in France becausa most of Louisiana's
incoming and outgoing mail was intercepted by the British.
Mobile-area Indians were Kerlerec•s only source of news during
most of the war.

In June 17 59, desperate for news and support

from France, the governor pleaded with French officials in
Paris to evade the British blockade by sending aid and mail
by way of Pensacola. 10

The ministry reestablished regular

contact with Louisiana late in 1759. 11

By then, with Quebec

captured, the American war was effectively over.
Kerlerec•s

supply

problem was

the

greatest

single

constraint on his Indian diplomacy, but compounding this was
the obstructionism of a string of commissaire-ordonnateurs.
All four men who served in that office under Kerlerec, like
their predecessors, were admonished at times to cooperate with
the governor, and sometimes specifically reminded that all
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matters relating to the Indians were under the direct control
of the governor. 12
The commissaire-ordonnateurs, however,

Jealous of the

goods used for Indian trade and presents.
prerogatives

of

their

office,

these

controlled the

officials

regularly

refused to give the govez,-nor a statement of just what was
available

to

him. 13

At~

dthar

times,

~:.j:le

·commissa ire-

ordonnateur•s subordinates at the posts delivered either less
goods to the governor's agents than ordered, or a different
quality or style than specified by the governor.

The Indians

were very particular about their presents, and the wrong color
or pattern could turn even the delivery of a present into a
diplomatic disaster. 14
Kerlerec sought to avoid supply problems through creation
of a reserve of goods for use in Indian diplomacy.

such a

reserve would regularize the distribution of presents and
thereby strengthen his position vis-a-vis the Indians.

A

reserve might also help conceal the colony's isolation when
regular supply shipments were intercepted by the British. 15
Far from augmenting the colony's budget in this way, however,
successive

ministers

demanded

increasing

economy

from

Louisiana officials. 16
But planned economy was not possible,

because royal

supply ships could not get through the British blockade.
Louisiana officials were forced to buy goods for the Indian
trade from private merchants at highly inflated prices. 17
Some goods

we~~

purchased from British cartel ships that

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

214
sometimes blatantly traded in contravention of both French
and British law.

Because Louisiana officials had no other

source of goods, they were forced into trade with the enemy. 18
so great was Louisiana's supply problem before 1760 that
Kerlerec delivered the "annual" presents to the Choctaws and
Alabamas, Louisiana's most important allies, only in 17 53,
1755, and 1759.

Kerlerec was well aware of the common wisdom

that the allegiance of the Indians was available only to him
who could purchase it.

Because of this he gave small presents

whenever he could, promised extra presents whenever he missed
a deadline, and put his most diplomatic foot forward at every
meeting with the Indians. To his superiors in France Kerlerec
begged for assistance in almost every letter home. 19
Kerlerec's problems with the Indians were not confined
to keeping them supplied.

In the summer of 1754 Kerlerec was

forced to prevent war between the Choctaws and Upper Creeks.
A Choctaw-creek war would have been disastrous for Louisiana.
To avoid a two-front war, the Choctaws would have had to make
peace with the Chickasaws, which would have eventually allowed
British traders entry into the Choctaw nation. English agents
among the Upper Creeks tried to foster just such a ChoctawChickasaw rapprochement.

Six months of artful diplomacy and

the distribution of generous presents to all concerned parties
by Louisiana officials averted not only a war, but for the
colony a dangerous peace as we11. 20
Even masterful diplomacy could not take the place of
trade.

In 1759, after four years without regular trade and
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presents from Louisiana, the Choctaws concluded an alliance
with south carolina.

Louisiana had lost so much support in

the nation by this time that Kerlerec found himself almost
powerless to prevent the Choctaws from opening the British
trade that many Choctaws had sought since the 1720s and over
which they had fought a civil war.
Kerlerec•s other great preoccupation was his pursuit of
a Cherokee alliance.

Cherokee emperor Old Hop first broached

the possibility of an alliance in July or August of 1753 by
sending his French slave L 1 Esprit, whom the British knew as
"French John," to the Alabama fort with the offer. Kerlerec
immediately sent the news to Vaudreuil with a request for help
in wooing the Cherokees.

But Vaudreuil was already at war in

the Ohio Valley and had no help to send. 21

Kerlerec had no

trade goods and few presents for the Cherokees, but he did
have an able diplomatic corp5 for the endeavor.

In addition

to L 1 Esprit, Kerlerec employed the services of Antoine Adhemar
de Lantagnac.

As a noble cadet of thirteen,

Lantagnac

"wandered away" from Fort Toulouse and was taken by Indians
to South Carolina.

He stayed in South Carolina for seven

years, during which time he entered the Cherokee trade, before
returning to Louisiana. 22

He spoke Cherokee and English

fluently, as well as a smattering of other native languages,
and knew many influential Cherokee leaders.~
Kerlerec had an Indian agent as well, the Abihka chief
Yashastanage.

Known to Europeans variously as "Mortar,"

11 Le

Loup, 11 and "the Wolf Warrior of Okchoy, 11 he was an extremely
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valuable agent for Louisiana. Mortar was a steady Francophile
among the Upper Creeks, where he helped balance the larger
Anglophile faction.

Just as important, he had access to

Cherokee councils through his brother, who was married to a
Cherokee

from

Settico.

In

1758

Mortar

established a

settlement on Coosawaitee Creek, near the Cherokees, from
which he could more effectively lobby the Cherokees in favor
of a French alliance. 24
Developing the Cherokee alliance ran into the same
obstacle that had always prevented the successful conclusion
of a Chickasaw alliance: the inability of Louisiana to supply
trade goods. Kerlerec concluded a treaty of alliance with the
Cherokees in January 1757, but to make it effective required
not only presents but merchandise. 25

The governor received a

small number of goods from France in response to this need
almost two years later, but much of it had spoiled by the time
it reached Louisiana. 26
Kerlerec did not have enough merchandise and presents
for his new or old allies, but he did have a range of
diplomatic devices to use in his "management" of the Indians.
Diplomatic practices included positive actions, continual proFrench

propaganda,

and

even

disinformation

campaigns.

Louisianans were very careful in all their dealings with the
Indians

lest

the

manipulate them.

Indians

discover

obvious

attempts

to

No policy was to be implemented that might

compromise Louisiana's standing with the Indians. 27
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Frenchmen realized that every contact between themselves
and the Indians was a diplomatic contact and strove to create
as much good will as possible between themselves and the
Indians.

According to this way of thinking,

providina

-

J

blacksmith and gunsmith service to the Indians at government
expense

was

Officials

a

subtle

but valuable

diplomatic

in South carolina and Georgia

device. 28

recognized the

benefits Louisiana derived from this practice and sought to
have their respect~v~ governments do the same. 29
As always, the commissioning of medal chiefs was an
important part of Indian diplomacy.

Kerlerec even brought

the Cherokees into this system by granting a medal to
Oconostota, a chief of the overbill town of Tomatly. 30

Poor

communications between Louisiana and France made even this
process less effective, however.
November 1753. 31

Kerlerec ordered medals in

The ministry did not commission artisans to

produce the medals until October 1755. 32

The medals finally

reached Louisiana late in 17 59 •33
Kerlerec and his frontier post commandants used the words
of diplomacy to advantage in their talks with the Indians.
Frenchmen were in some instances able to reinforce antiBritish feelings by telling the natives what they already
"knew.••

When the seriously ill Coweta emperor believed in

1754 that the British were poisoning him, Frenchmen encouraged
that belief. 34

Frenchmen also harped on the Indian 1 s well-

developed fear that South Carolinians and Georgians wanted to
take their lands.

Georgia Indian agents were instructed in
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1755 not to make a quid pro guo connection between presents
and land concessions because of this French line. 35

Edmond

Atkin admitted to William Pitt in 1760 that this French
propaganda was very easy for the Indians to believe.~
Anti-British propaganda varied according to particular
situations and audiences.
the

creeks,

Frenchmen

At a time of general illness among
spread a

rumor that

the British

knowingly spread illness through the nation by sending them
contaminated goods. 37 From time to time Frenchmen also accused
the British of wanting to make slaves of all the Indians. 38
On one occasion, at least, the Indians were told that the
British had proposed that the Europeans together destroy the
Indians, but that the French had of course refused. 39
Kerlerec worked diligently after 1753 both to defend
Louisiana and to increase his colony's position relative to
the British colonies.

Ironically, when Louisiana was finally

resupplied in 1759, the tide of war turned against France.
Despite increases in supplies, troops, and merchandise and
presents for the Indians, Kerlerec still found himself on the
sidelines of war, powerless to help the Cherokees in their war
against the British.
For South Carolina, the 1750s were years of economic
prosperity, frontier struggles, and political turmoil.
economic prosperity was

largely due

increasing mastery of the seas.

to

Great

The

Britain's

There were no foreign

privateers to prey on coastal plantations or shipping during
the 1750s; the only brake on the colony's exports was the
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embargo placed on trade with the enemy.

Rice production

increased while the price for rice remained stable, and indigo
production boomed.

South Carolina's prosperity was largely

limited by the failure of the slave trade to keep up with
demand. 40
south

Carolina,

like

Louisiana,

preoccupied with northern Indians.

began

the

decade

The British problem,

however, was making peace between the Catawbas and Iroquois,
two fellow allies.

The Catawbas had long been subject to

raiding by the Iroquois, but by the late 1740s and early 1750s
this Indian enmity was threatening the general peace.
Iroquois

were

passing

dangerously

close

to

The

frontier

settlements, causing numerous alarms; as Anglo-French tensions
mounted in North America, Englishmen feared that the French
might somehow use this irregular warfare to cause trouble all
along the frontier from South Carolina to New York.

The

Iroquois and Catawbas made peace at a conference held in New
York in July 1751, although it took over a year for all treaty
provisions to be honored and a firm peace established. 41
South Carolina's political turmoil during the 1750s was
the result of internal political trends and the intrusion of
outside influences on the colony.
of

political

power--governor,

Internally, the three loci
council,

and

commons--all

struggled to maintain or increase their power relative to the
others.
assailed

Governor James Glen saw his authority and position
from

almost

every quarter.

challenge came from the Board of Trade.

The most

serious

During the 1730s and
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1740s colonial governors were largely left alone by the board,
which left colonial affairs to be handled by the Duke of
Newcastle, secretary of state for the southern department.
Glen used his large discretionary authority to chart an
independent course as governor.

When the Earl of Halifax

became president of the Board of Trade in 1748 he began to
exercise strictly the Board's authority, which fell quickly
and heavily on Glen.

In 1750 Glen lost almost all latitude

in exercising his authority when a cabinet shuffle gave
Halifax complete control over colonial affairs. 42
Glen found following royal instructions to the letter
even more difficult because of opposition from the Council
and the Commons.

Glen neutralized the council's opposition

largely through compromise and forging political alliances
with the powerful families that controlled it. 43

But the

opposition of the Commons was harder to overcome. The Commons
was involved in a political struggle to determine its own
affairs, and its main tool was its control over the public
purse.

The Commons was an inescapable partner in Indian

policy because it controlled expenditures for presents, and
gift-giving was the sine qua non of Indian diplomacy.

Glen

considered Indian diplomacy his special province and no doubt
doubly resented the "interference" of the Commons in Indian
affairs. 44
The

Commons

manifested

clearly

its

ability

and

willingness to interfere in Indian affairs in 1751 when it
ordered an embargo on the Cherokee trade.

In the spring of
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1'151 the theft of some deerskins by a party of Carolinians
quickly degenerated into frontier warfare when it appeared to
the Cherokees that frontier officials would protect the guilty
parties.

Glen responded favorably when Cherokee headmen

attempted to end the disturbances, but the commons did not.
Ignoring the fact that Carolinians were responsible for
starting the trouble, the Commons ordered an embargo against
the Cherokees over the strenuous objections of Governor Glen.
Tensions remained high until November 1751, when a treaty
between South carolina and the Cherokees adjusted differences
over

depredations

frontier trading.

and

instituted

tighter

controls

over

But the treaty did not end all problems

between South Carolina and the Cherokees. 45
The treaty of 1751 required that South Carolina build a
fort in the Cherokee country.

Thomas Nairne had urged the

establishment of an Overbill fort as early as 1708. 46

Each

time the project was discussed over the next four decades,
however, its implementation was stymied by lack of funds,
political squabbles, and metropolitan indifference.
was

approved

in

March

1752,

but

because

of

A fort

political

differences between the governor and Commons, it was not built
until November 1753.

Named Fort Prince George for the Prince

of Wales, it was more than the Commons bargained for and less
than Glen or the Cherokees wanted. 47
In 1754 Glen became embroiled with Virginia in a struggle
for control of the southeastern Indians.

Before the mid-

1750s, Indian affairs in the British colonies were controlled
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mainly by New York in the north and South Carolina in the
south, with very little interference from the middle colonies.
By the late 1740s, however, Virqinians formed the Ohio Company
and beqan to plan for the settlement of trans-Appalachia.~
French officials began to fortify the Ohio Valley and Great
Lakes region because of the Ohio Company's activities, but
Glen felt scarcely less threatened.

Despite the fact that few

Virginia traders had ever shown sustained interest in the
Cherokees, Glen interpreted Virqinia•s western policy as an
attempt to divert the Cherokee trade and the management of the
southern Indians away from South Carolina. 49
Dinwiddie's leading role in the emerging conflict with
France after 1754

seemed to confirm Glen's suspicions.

Dinwiddie spurned Glen's offer to help enlist the Cherokees
and Catawbas in the defense of the frontier and employed
traders to approach the Cherokees and catawbas directly. Glen
responded to Dinwiddie's ascendancy with an essentially
obstructionist policy which was supported by the Council and
Commons. 50
Some colonial officials blamed Glen's lone-wolf Indian
policy for General Edward Braddock • s defeat by an army of
"French and Indians" on July 9,

1755.

Glen had been

instructed to enlist the southern Indians in the campaign,
but when Braddock began his doomed march Glen was holding a
conference with the Cherokees at Saluda Old Town.

Glen 1 s

strategy was to bring the Cherokees firmly under British
control by breaking their ties with the French.

He obtained

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

223

from the Cherokees an acknowledgement of British sovereignty
and permission to build an overbill fort in return for £500
worth of presents, trade concessions, and steady supplies of
ammunition.

But Glen's negotiations took so long that the

Cherokees missed Braddock's march.

Governors Dinwiddie and

Arthur Dobbs of North carolina blamed lack of Cherokee numbers
for Braddock 1 s devastating defeat.

Glen's troubles were

compounded when the assembly failed to honor immediately
Glen's commitments to the Cherokees, rendering the Indians•
submission to the British crown null and void. 51
Dinwiddie further offended Glen over the building of an
overhill fort.

The home government sent £10,000 sterling for

various defensive measures in America, including the Overbill
fort, but put the fund under Dinwiddie's control.

Glen,

working from a very different set of assumptions than the
Virginian, planned a fort that required a construction budget
of £7,000.

Dinwiddie, however, would release only £1,000 for

the fort.

Glen was leading an expedition to the overbills to

build his long-sought overbill fort when in July 1756 his
successor arrived;

precipitating one last delay

in the

construction of the fort. 52
William Henry Lyttleton succeeded James Glen as governor
of South carolina in July 1756.

Lyttleton experienced few of

the problems that had plagued Glen during the early 1750s.
Lyttleton was an aristocrat with family and personal ties to
leading members of the government and was therefore totally
in step with the administration on the governance of South
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carolina.

He quickly gained control of the Council when he

removed its most outspoken member and replaced him with the
first of many royal placemen.

The governor's position

relative to the assembly was strengthened further by the
British declaration of war against France in May 1756.

With

the nation formally at war and the French expected to attack
the frontier at any time, the assembly was hesitant to impede
the war effort. 53
After Braddock's defeat South Carolina along with other
colonies
authority.

became

increasingly

t..lbordinated

to

imperial

After the declaration of war between England and

France in 1.756, the government sent a British army to North
America for the first time.

To provide for the support of

the army and navy in North America, Parliament passed the
Quartering a11.d Mutiny acts and other legislation which
required that colonial governors and assemblies cooperate with
royal army and navy officials as needed. 54
The British government also began for the first time to
erect governing structures outside and above the separate
colonies with the creation of the Indian superintendencies.
The need for a common approach to In1iian affairs had been felt
for many years in some quarters on the grounds that many
problems experienced with the Indians could be traced to a
lack of unified control over Indian affairs.

Conflicting

claims of jurisdiction over major nations, different systems
for regulating the Indian trade, and growing encroachment on
Indian lands caused major problems for all the frontier
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colonies

in

peacetime:

in wartime,

they

threatened

to

undermine the entire war effort by destabilizing the frontier.
A plan for an Indian superintencency was put forward at the
Albany Congress of 1754, and in 1755 Sir William Johnson was
appointed superintendent for the northern colonies. 55
In May 1756 the Board of Trade appointed Edmond Atkin
superintendent for the southern colonies.

Atkin was in

England at the time, where since 1750 he had produced two
major "reports" on southern Indian affairs, one a history of
the

Choctaw Revolt,

the

other a

general

plan for

administration of Indian affairs in North America. 56

the

Despite

his enthusiasm for the job, due to his own slow nature,
several bouts of illness,

and lack of cooperation from

imperial officials in North America, Atkin did not reach
Williamsburg until the spring of 1757.

The Earl of Loudon,

commander in North America, severely handicapped Atkin from
the start when he made the superintendent dependent for his
budget on the southern governors.

Loudon probably did not

realize that the governors resented the superintendents and
could not be counted on to support generously a man who robbed
them of their traditional control over the Indians. 57
Atkin 1 s record as southern Indian superintendent from
1757

to

1760

contemporaries.

was

not

universally

praised

by

his

He faced a difficult task in strengthening

Anglo-Indian ties, especially as his sometimes abrasive manner
often irritated his own countrymen as well as the Indians.
Atkin was able in Virginia in 1757 to consolidate control of
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all allied Indians under one official and to reconcile the
Cherokees at a time when their defection would have severely
affected the war effort in the Ohio Valley.

Responding to

Choctaw initiatives in 1758 Atkin reestablished ties with
Louisiana 1 s closest neighbor. 58
Atkin worked to strengthen the Anglo-Creek alliance in
an almost uninterrupted diplomatic offen.sive that lasted from
October 1758 to February 1760.

But Atkin's diplomatic foray

was indeed offensive to many southerners, red and white.

To

strengthen his bargaining position with the creeks, Atkin
withdrew all the nation's traders to Augusta and did not allow
them back in until he was ready to enter the nation himself
six months later.

Becn.use the superintendent took so long to

begin his mission, his recall of the traders constituted an
unprovoked and unwarranted embargo on the Creeks. The embargo
angered

Indians and traders alike,

and Atkin's secrecy

concerning his movements and activities were unsettling to
colonial officials as well.

Atkin was almost assassinated

while in the middle of talks at the Talapoosa town of
Tuckabatchee by one of Mortar's agP-nts, but he survived and
turned the situation to his advantage. The Anglo-Cherokee war
added a note of urgency to Atkin • s negotiations, but by
February 1760 the Creeks had confirmed their neutrality.
Georgia Governor Henry Ellis did not give Atkin much of the
credit for Creek neutrality.

Ellis credited Atkin only with

"having left Matters there in a settled state, after he had
greatly disturbed and embarrassed them. 1159

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

227
Part of the worry experienced by British colonists on
the southeastern marchlands was due to a greatly distorted
impression of Louisiana • s ability to threaten her British
neighbors.

In the spring of 1752 a Louisiana deserter

informed Virginia officials that there were 12,000 troops in
Louisiana and that New Orleans contained 8, 000 tihi te and 1, 200
Negro inhabitants; at the time there were only about 8000
whites and blacks in the entire colony.~

British officials

recognized that those figures were "probably" an exaggeration,
but they worried nonetheless. 61 Officials received "reliable"
reports in 1754 that the French were sending 8,000 troops and
their families to North America, with 3,500 of those going to
Louisiana.~

These reports undoubtedly made the general lack

of news more frustrating than usual. Henry Laurens complained
in 1755 that south carolina did not receive news concerning
Louisiana "but once in an age. 1163
In 1757 intercepted correspondence indicated that 4,000
Alsatian men, women, and children were bound for Louisiana•s
Illinois country.M

British officials had enough confidence

in the report to send the Jamaica man-of-war to the Bahama
Channel and the Windward Passage to block the transport of
troops and supplies to Louisiana.~

In an effort to have the

most reliable information possible, Pitt ordered that two
subjects with particular knowledge of Louisiana be sent to
Halifax, Nova Scotia, for consultation with imperial military
and naval officials.~
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The thought of such a large military establishment in
Louisiana naturally excited the imagination of officials in
South carolina and Georgia.

Although the British appreciated

the difficulty of an overland invasion of the southeastern
colonies, they experienced almost yearly alarms of just such
a project. 67

At the same time, the threa.t from Louisiana

prompted some officials to propose an invasion of their enemy
to end the French menace once and for all.

In the spring of

1758 both Pitt and Forbes considered launching a coordinated
naval attack on Mobile and New Orleans, which Pitt suggested
should be accompanied by an overland attack against Fort
Toulouse.~

In response, in November 1758 Lyttleton outlined

how he could lead an army through Creek country to the French
without exciting the fear and jealousy of the Indians.~

In

t.he fall o:f 1759, however, both the capture of Quebec and the
eruption of the Anglo-Cherokee war put at least a temporary
halt to such plans. 70
For Georgia the 1750s was a decade of promise and peril.
It was a decade of promise because in 1754, after two decades
of proprietary control, Georgia became a royal province.
Freed from the paternalistic and moralistic control of the
trustees, Georgians looked forward to growth, peace, and
prosperity.

Georgians greeted the arrival of royal governor

John Reynolds in October 1754 with a feeling of deliverance.
But Reynolds disappcinted almost everyone on both sides of the
Atlantic.

The governor was charged not only with the

demographic and economic development of Georgia, but its
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defence as well.

To build up the defenses of Britain's most

exposed colony required settlers; but settlers would not
emigrate to a colony threatened by France, Spain, and the
Indian allies of both.

Reynolds was faced with a two-horned

dilemma and got hung up on both. 71
Georgia's role as the southern buffer of British North
America required a strong military presence in the colony but
there was none.

Unable to raise adequate men and revenues to

build and garrison the frontier forts needed, Reynolds did not
do much more than beg London

for

his

colony's

needs.

Recognizing Georgia's dependence on the Indians and the
continual efforts of Louisiana to seduce them from the British
alliance, Reynolds requested that imperial officials supply
him with men, money, and supplies with which to fortify and
defend the colony.n The assembly chose not to raise taxes for
defence and, like the governor, pleaded poverty and begged for
help from London.~ Despite the lack of favorable response to
general

pleas

for

assistance,

in January 1756 Reynolds

proposed the establishment of a system of forts at the head
of the colony 1 s rivers manned by fixed garrisons and augmented
by patrol boats on the coast and rangers on the frontier, all
to be paid for by the crown.

The plan was not implemented.~

Given Georgia 1 s total dependence on the Indians for
defense, Reynolds most important task as governor was ensuring
good relations with the Indians.

In this as in other things,

however, Reynolds depended upon his former shipmate and friend
William Little.

Reynolds conferred on Little the post of
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Indian commissioner along with six others positions in the
Georgia government.

After a brief and unhappy experience

meeting the Creeks upon first becoming governor Reynolds left
Indian diplomacy totally to his favorite.

The Indians were

upset at being ignored by the governor, and Little's total
lack of experience in Indian diplomacy could have led to grave
problems. 75

Fortunately for the colony the crown reqularly

sent goods to be given to the Indians as presents because with
the installation of a royal governor the Indians visited the
colony more often, and often it was only to profess their
friendship, i.e., to collect presents.~
Reynolds' mismanagement of defence and Indian relations
was compounded by his clumsy attempts to manipulate political
affairs in the colony.

In 1757 he was recalled due to popular

discontent and replaced with Henry Ellis, another British
gentleman with no experience in colonial government.

But

Ellis was as effective and popular as Reynolds was inept.
Despite his inexperience, Ellis quickly grasped what was
necessary for the preservation and advancement of Georgia, and
he pursued policies and practices suitable to the successful
implementation of his program.n
Henry Ellis realized from the beginning of his service
in Georgia that the colony• s welfare rested mostly in the
hands of its two most important neighbors,
Carolina and the Creek confederacy.

i.e. ,

South

Ellis spent some time in

Charles Town establishing a good relationship with Lyttleton
before going on to Georgia.

During the next three years, the
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two governors remained in constant and mostly harmonious
correspondence with each other.

Ellis established equally

amicable and frequent contacts with the creeks as well.

The

govenor 1 s close attention to both allies-- was designed to
afford Georgia the most security she could have.

South

carolina was Georgia 1 s only hope if the Indians turned against
her; close identification of Georgia with South carolina made
an Indian war with the colony much less likely.~
Ellis's subordination to Lyttleton did not indicate an
abdication of the Georgia governor 1 s role as an important
Indian diplomat.

Ellis was stroking Creek headmen offended

by Reynolds' indifference to them even before taking over as
governor.

Within days of taking over the government of the

colony on February 16, 1757, Ellis was holding conferences
with creek headmen, dealing with the aftermath of the Ogeechee
incident, and mediating problems between traders and Indians. 79
In April the governor went on a tour of the southern frontier
to learn about its problems first-hand and to make his
presence felt by the Indians.~
Ellis assumed a more prominent role in Creek diplomacy
in the fall of 1757 when Creek headmen, refusing to meet with
Lyttleton in Charles Town, met with Ellis at Augusta.

At the

end of October and the beginning of November Ellis treated the
Indians to a conference held with all the pomp and ceremony
befitting a solemn meeting between important allies.

There

were troops under arms marching and prominent Georgians
mounted to lead the Indians into the conference, cannons
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booming, flags flying, and of course several days of talk,
food, drink, and presents.

The meeting produced a treaty

which reconfirmed all past treaties with the "Great Squire,''
meaning Oglethorpe; considered all past grievances forgotten;
agreed to consider all insults as the act of individuals to
be adjusted by the governor and duly deputized headmen; agreed
to a common definition of friends and enemies; and decreed any
supposed land grant to the Bosomworths as invalid. Aware that
the Francophile party would never accept a declaration of war
against Louisiana, Ellis did not press for one. 81
Ellis also helped bring a measure of stability to the
Georgia-Indian

frontier

Bosomworth claims.

with a

final

settlement of the

A savvy politician, Ellis first coaxed

the Creeks in the treaty of November 1757 to pronounce the
supposed donation of land to Bosomworth as never having taken
place.

Then to keep Mary and her emperor cousin Togulki

happy, Ellis confirmed Mary's ownership of st. catherine's
Island,

where

she

had

cattle

and

other

considerable

investments, and granted her £2000 sterling in compensation
for all her services to Great Britain.

With this settlement

Mary ceased being a thorn in the side of Georgia and once
again was able to help keep the Creeks in friendship with the
British. 82
Georgians knew that treaties and displays of mutual
affection alone would not keep peace with the Indians.

From

1755 to 1758 the legislature passed several acts to prevent
trouble between the colony and its neighboring Indians by
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separating Indians and colonists as much as possible.

One

act aimed at preventing colonists from settling on lands not
specifically granted them, as squatters usually encroached on
Indian territory when they did so. 83

Another bill made it

illegal to trade with Indians within the boundaries of the
colony, or even to encourage Indians to come into the colony
for that purpose.M To strengthen both of these laws, in 1758
the legislature made it a crime for private persons to
purchase land from the Indians and for anyone to trade with
the Indians without a license. 85
During

the

1750s

the

European

colonies

on

the

southeastern marchlands sat on the sidelines of a great
imperial conflict. Each of· them struggled to strengthen their
defenses with what they all

considered were

inadequate

financial and human resources.

Just when the Great War for

Empire reached its military climax in North America, the
southeastern marchlands erupted in war.

Ironically, that war

took place between two erstwhile allies, South carolina and
the Cherokees.

The British worked very hard to bring the

Cherokees into their war against France, but neither the
British nor the Cherokees found wartime cooperation a positive
experience.
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Chapter VIII

The Indians on the Marchlands, 1750-1759

The 1750s was a decade of turmoil and trouble for the
Indians

as

marchlands.

well

as

the

Europeans

of

the

southeastern

southeastern nations had to cope not only with

traditional enmities, but also with a rising tide of European
settlement and growing dependency relative to the Europeans.
By the end of the decade the entire alliance system of the
Southeast was threatened as never before.

Factions within

each of the major nations of the region tried to change the
balance of power in the region by shifting their own or
another nations European alliances.

Through all the changes,

the Creeks collectively continued to hold everyone else in
balance, but they found that balance increasingly hard to
maintain.

The 1750s was truly a decade of wars and rumors of

wars for the Indians of the southeastern marchlands.
The same problem plagued the Chickasaws in the 1750s as
it had in the 1730s and 1740s: the enmity of Louisiana and
its chief result, the continuing Choctaw-Chickasaw war.

Of

French enmity there was never any doubt; that the Choctaw war
might end there was always hope.

The French had required the

241
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Choctaws to accept war with the Chickasaws as the price of
peace in their civil war.

Despite this,

many Choctaws

maintained close contacts with the Chickasaws throughout the
decade. 1

The appearance of British traders in the Choctaw

villages periodically throughout the 1750s was possible
largely because the Chickasaws served as

intermediaries

between British traders and the Choctaws. 2
To forestall a Choctaw-Chickasaw peace, Louisiana kept
the Choctaws and Chickasaws at war.

The number and size of

Choctaw parties varied according to the season and French
resources,

but

their

Chickasaws gravely.

continual

pressure

affected

the

The Choctaws made few frontal attacks on

Chickasaw villages, but they burned Chickasaw cabins; raided
Chickasaw fields and orchards; picked off Chickasaw hunting
parties in the woods; killed or captured Chickasaw men, women,
and children near the villages; and stole Chickasaw horses. 3
The Chickasaws did not need the excuse of a European war
to fight either Frenchmen or Indians.

As part of their on-

going war with Louisiana and her allies,

the Chickasaws

periodically harassed French convoys on the Mississippi.

In

1753 they attacked a Mississippi convoy, possibly with the
help of Cherokees and other British allies. 4
attacked the Natchez area.

In 1754 they

The Natchez attack was probably

aimed at Ofogoulas living near the fort rather than the
French, but several Frenchmen were killed when they pursued
the retreating Chickasaws contrary to Ofogoula advice. 5

The

Chickasaws also brought their war against the French to Fort
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Massiac at the forks of the Ohio and Tennessee Rivers.
canadian In?ians used the fort as a staging point fer. attacks
against the Chickasaws. 6
The Chickasaws made war on other French allies the
Arkansas as well.

During the summer of 1753 an attack on the

Arkansas resulted in several enemies killed and taken captive,
and some of them were sold by the Cherokees in Carolina. 7 The
Chickasaws also attempted to create trouble between the
Arkansas and French by trying to frame the Arkansas for the
killing of a French officer.

The French discovered the ruse

and took measures to strengthen ties to the Arkansas. 8
The Chickasaws suffered more than just the loss of their
people in the long war with the Choctaws. Attacked frequently
from north and south, Chickasaw warriors had to stay home to
protect their families and could not hunt for deerskins.
Deerskins were their only source of trade goods, and British
traders would not advance credit to any warrior too often.
In 1756 the Chickasaws complained to Henry Lyttleton that the
war against France had reduced them to poverty. 9

Lyttleton

responded by sending the Chickasaws a present of ammunition,
paint, and sundry goods.

Having spent so much on one present,

however, Lyttleton let the Chickasaws know that they should
not make the long and tiring journey to Charles Town to thank
him; it would only have cost South Carolina another present. 10
A year later the Chickasaws were still unable to buy their own
ammunition and requested more, fearing another attack from
Canadians and Indians at Fort Massiac. 11
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The Chickasaws had problems with their Cherokee allies
during the early 1750s, but nothing serious enough to threaten
the alliance.

In 1752 the Cherokees

.-.~!lowed

Shawnees to pass

through their country to attack the Chickasaws. 12

In 1756 a

party of Cherokees that had failed to find any Frenchmen to
fight killed three Chickasaws instead and stole their skins. 13
In September and october of 1756 a party of Chickasaws went
to war against the Cherokees in retaliation for the loss of
ten warriors to the Cherokees. '4
The Chickasaws did not take a large part in the other
regional wars or the European conflict, but they were not left
totally undisturbed.
open

in

the

The prospect that a southern front might

Europeans'

war had

ramifications

Chickasaws no less than other nations.

for

the

The most distant of

British allies, the Chickasaws could easily be cut off from
their British suppliers by the sort of north-south pincer they
had experienced in the Franco-Chickasaw war of the 1730s.
Because of this fear it was widely rumored in the southeast
in 1754 that the remainder of the Chickasaws might withdraw
to the safety of the Carolina frontier to join the Squirrel
King on the savannah River. 15 The Chickasaws did not move, but
they did ask Glen to send the Squirrel King's warriors back
to their own country to help defend it against their many
enemies. 16 In January 1757 the South Carolina Gazette reported
that the Chickasaws wanted a fort and that it should be built,
if for no other reason than gratitude. 17
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The Squirrel King's warriors were as valuable to South
carolina and Georgia as they were to their fellow Indians.
The Chickasaw village, which was located only twelve miles
from Fort Moore, was the main defensive force of the Georgia
back country. 18 Captain Daniel Pepper, South Carolina 1 s Creek
agent, stated in March 1757 that in case of an attack from
Louisiana the seventy Chickasaws at New Savannah "would be of
more Service to us than four Hundred other Indians. 1119 Eve r
attentive to an opportunity to end the Choctaw war, in 1756
the Chickasaws sought to conclude a Chickasaw-Creek-Choctaw
peace.

The project was supported by South Carol ina, and Creek

headman Gun Merchant agreed to coordinate the talks. 20 Because
of opposition from the French and Francophile creeks, however,
the project fell through.

Frustrated, the Chickasaws branded

the Creeks as no friend of the Chickasaws or South carolina. 21
The Choctaws also struggled with an old dilemma during
the 1750s: France's inability to supply them, and their own
inability to forge an alliance with Great Britain.

Even

before the beginning of the Europeans• war, Louisiana was not
able to supply the Choctaws adequately with either trade goods
or presents.

Barely a year after Louisiana had forced them

to renounce trade with the British, some Choctaws maintained
contact with the Chickasaws and British because French traders
could not supply all of their needs.

Vaudreuil give the

chiefs enough presents to keep them happy, but not enough for
the chiefs to take care of all of their warriors• needs. 22
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Louisianans were unable to supply adequately the Choctaws
and were unwilling to allow Carolinians to do so either.
vaudreuil and Kerlerec were attentive to any ne'W·s of British
traders headed for the Choctaws, and used every means at their
disposal to prevent them from reaching their destination. For
a fee Louisiana officials could always find Francophile
Choctaws to waylay British traders coming from the Chickasaws.
But this was an uncertain and expensive exercise.

Choctaw

ambushes sometimes succeeded, costing the traders much in
lives, time, and money.~ Occasionally, however, some traders
made it through. 24
The Choctaws became dissatisfied more than ever with the
French alliance after the beginning of the Europeans• war.
Despite Kerlerec•s promises of plentiful trade goods, he did
no better than Vaudreuil in supplying the Indians. 25 Whenever
possible

French

officials

prevented

the

Choctaws

from

receiving British traders, yet they never had enough trade
goods or presents of their own for the nation.

Kerlerec was

unable to deliver the annual present during the fall of 1754,
but the Choctaws excused this failure because the governor
promised double presents in the fall of 1754. 26

This promise

was kept, and Kerlerec delivered presents to the Choctaws and
Alabamas on schedule. 27
however,

Because of a British blockade,

Louisiana 1 s two most important allies would not

receive their "annual" present again for over four years. 28
The Choctaws did not accept the lack of trade goods and
presents in stony silence.

In 1754, headmen publicly told
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Kerlerec that if they did not receive their presents, they
would seek out the British.~
•.

In 1756, after missing their

annual presents, some Choctaws actively solicited British
traders, 30 and Kerlerec feared that several villages were
wholly in the British interest. 31

In the spring of 1757

several Choctaw headmen held a meeting with South Carolina's
Creek agent Daniel Pepper, in which they formally proposed
forming an alliance with the Chickasaws and the British. 32
In October 1757 more than fifty Choctaw headmen tried to meet
with British traders at the Talapoosa villages, but French
officers successfully scuttled the meeting. 33
French officials suspected that the attempt to forge a
Choctaw-Chickasaw-south Carolina alliance was the motive for
aggressive moves by Western Division Choctaws against the
Upper Creeks in summer 1754.

A Choctaw war chief on a party

against the Chickasaws attacked two Talapoosas, killing one.
The chief claimed that it was an honest mistake, as he had
not expected to find an allied nation so close to the enemy
villages.

But the killing may have been deliberate.

If the

Choctaws went to war with the Talapoosas the other Upper
Creeks and Cowetas would be forced to take part as well.
Because the Francophile Eastern Division lived closest to the
creeks, the war would necessarily fall hardest on them.

The

Choctaws would be forced to make peace with the Chickasaws to
survive a Creek war, which the Western Division favored
anyway. 34

Kerlerec was able to prevent the affair from

starting a Choctaw-Creek war, but maintaining this precarious
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peace was a day-to-day exercise. 35
Late in 1758 growing disenchantment with the French among
all Choctaw villages gave the Anglophile party an opportunity
to talk peace with the Chickasaws once again.

Choctaws and

Chickasaws concluded a peace in December 1758.M The arrival
in February 1759 of the first French present in four years did
nothing to cool the Anglophile party's ardor for a British
alliance. Thirty Choctaw headmen traveled to the Upper Cre-aks
in the

spring of

Carolina. 37

1759

seeking an alliance with South

During the summer of 1759 Choctaws met with

Edmund Atkin at the Upper

Cr~ek

village of Mucullassas, where

in early September they concluded a treaty of peace and
alliance.~

Within a few months the first convoy of goods was

on its way to the nation.

The Anglophile party had so much

support in the nation, as well as the tacit support of the
Creeks, that even though the British traders and their Choctaw
escorts passed within earshot of the Alabama and Chocts.w
forts, the French were powerless to interfere. 39 The British
trade that some Choctaws had sought since the 1720s seemed
finally to be realized.
however,

Like so many other initiatives,

this one was interrupted by the Anglo-Cherokee

war.
The Creeks continued to hold the balance of power during
the 1750s, but found that balance increasingly difficult to
maintain.

At various times all of their neighbors put

pressure on the Creeks to make changes in their basic policies
that would affect the regional balance.

The Creeks began the
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decade at war with the Cherokees, and several times almost
went to war with the Choctaws.
War

After 1754, the seven Years•

intensified Anglo-French competition

alliance.

for

the

Creek

Against all European-American f!ommon wisdom the

Creeks did not abandon Louisiana after the colony found itself
without trade goods and presents for half a decade.

When at

the end of the decade a major war threatened to engulf the
entire

Southeast,

the

Creeks

continued

the

policy

of

neutrality they had embraced a half-century earlier.
The Creeks were faced several times during the 1750s with
the possibility of war with the Choctaws.

The Choctaws

committed attacks on Creeks in 1751, 1754, and 1756 which
easily could have resulted in war between the Choctaws and
the entire Creek confederacy.

The Creeks, already at war

with the Cherokees and Iroquois, were reluctant to wage a twofront war; for some Creeks, moreover, a war with the Choctaws
threatened to embroil them with their allies in Louisiana.
Each time the Choctaws threatened to start a war, Creeks and
Frenchmen worked with their friends among the Choctaws to make
peace. 40
The Creeks were preoccupied with the Cherokees for much
of the 1750s, but not always for the same reasons.

At the

beginning of the decade Creeks and Cherokees fought a war over
the Cherokees' friendship with the Iroquois.

The Iroquois

periodically waged war on the catawbas and Creeks, which they
were able to do only because the Cherokees allowed the
northerners to pass through and be supplied in Cherokee
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country.

The war lasted for four years and was fought mainly

between the Lower Creeks and Lower Cherokees.

The war itself

was not particularly debilitating by Indian standards, but it
eventually threatened interests in south Carolina and the
creek nation itself and had to be terminated. 41
The Creeks and Cherokees were both allies of South
Carolina, and parties from each side brought their war to
Charles Town itself.

In the spring of 1751 a party of

Cherokees and Senecas attacked and pursued a party of Creeks
into a trader's store.

In the confusion the attackers killed

not only· some Creeks, but also two Englishmen and several
Chickasaws.

Then,

in April 1752, the Creek chief Acorn

Whistler arranged the killing of several Cherokees just
outside the gates of Charles Town.

South Carolina, still

embroiled with. the Cherokees over the store insult, now
demanded satisfaction of the Creeks.

The Creeks did give

satisfaction, but it had to be handled as diplomatically as
the Creeks knew how.

The killing of Acorn Whistler, who had

partisans in the Upper and Lower towns, could have led to
civil war, as the killing of Red Shoe did with the Choctaws.
To put an end to such disturbances, chiefs from throughout the
nation deputized Malatchi, mico of Coweta and senior creek
chief, to make peace with the Cherokees.
Cherokee-Iroquois incursions,

however,

Because of continued
the peace was not

confirmed until 1754. 42
The Seven Years• War placed additional strains on the
Creeks after 1754.

From the French came pressure to join
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in a war against the British.

Louisi~nans

intensified

after

1758

when

elements

This pressure was
of

the

Overbill

Cherokees, long courted by Mortar, formed an alliance with
Louisiana.

Despite Mortar's continuous efforts to turn both

the Creeks and Cherokees away from the British, the Creeks
knew that the French could not supply even the Choctaws with
all their commercial needs, much less the Creeks as well.
The creeks thus continued to "hold" both England and France
as allies. 43
During the 1750s the Creeks experienced problems with
the British alliance as well. One problem was what the Creeks
believed were unfavorable commercial arrangements with British
traders.

Despite almost a century of sustained trade and

alliance with Europeans, the Creeks still viewed trade as a
political and diplomatic act, not as an exercise in supply and
demand between private individuals.

Thus, when Creeks saw

Cherokees getting higher prices for their leather they grew
dissatisfied; the fact that the Cherokees 1 deerskins were
thicker and thus commanded higher prices in Europe meant
nothing to the Creeks.

It took almost three years, but in

January 1756 Anglophile Upper Creek headman Gun Merchant
signed a treaty with Glen that was supposed to lower the price
of British trade goods and to strengthen the Anglo-Creek
alliance.

Lowered trade prices were granted in exchange for

the right to build a fort among the Upper creeks, a promise
the Creeks would not harm settlers on the Ogeechee River, and
a promise that the Creeks would either force the Choctaws to
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make peace with the Chickasaws or join the Chickasaws in a war
against the Choctaws.~
The Creeks did not buy according to price alone and they
would not sell the balance of power in the Southeast for a few
extra strouds and duffels.

As badly as most Creeks wanted

more favorable prices, they could not accept a British fort
in the nation, no matter what the cost. A British fort in the
Upper Creek country would necessarily lead to fighting between
it and Fort Toulouse, which would have forced the Creeks to
take sides in the Anglo-French contest.

The Upper and Lower

Creeks decisively rejected Gun Merchant's treaty.

Headmen

from throughout the nation declared themselves happy with the
trade as it stood and protested the extension of English
settlement on the Ogeechee River. 45
The ever-rising tide of British settlement into the
interior, closer to Creek hunting grounds and villages, was
the Creeks' second major British problem.

On September 3,

1756 a clash occurred between frontiersmen and horse-stealing
Creeks. Three Creek.s died in the encounter and tempers flared
on bo, ~1 sides. Georgians were sensitive to the intrusion into
Indian territory and the possibility of an escalating series
of revenge killings. Georgia officials consciously led the
Indians to believe, falsely, that two Englishmen had died as
a result of the fight.

The Creeks, fearing that the incident

might lead to problems with the trade, and fearing punishment
for the killing

of

Englishmen,

commercial satisfaction.

were willing to accept

Georgia authorities quickly agreed
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that presents be given to the families of the slain warriors. 46
There were other frontier incidents between settlers and
Indians in several districts over the next several years, but
nothing serious enough to threaten the Anglo-Creek alliance. 47
For the Cherokees, the major issue of the 1750s was
growing disenchantment with the British alliance.

The decade

began with economic warfare between the Cherokees and South
Carolina in the form of a Carolina embargo on the Cherokees
and ended in military conflict between the erstwhile allies.
The Cherokees, like the Creeks, experienced problems with
traders and encroaching British settlement.

The Cherokees

were not satisfied with South CaroJ.ina 1 s response to their
problems and attempted to solve them through a combination of
appeals to Carolina 1 s British allies and imperial enemies.
Unlike the Creeks, however, the Cherokees did not remain
neutral in South Carolina's affairs and became enmeshed ever
deeper in the conflicts that raged around them.

At the

beginning of the 1760s the Cherokees learned that rejection
of the British alliance would cost them dearly.
Relations between the Cherokees and South Carolina broke
down so completely in 1751 that the Cherokees made war on the
carolina frontier and the colony placed an embargo on trade
with the Indians.

The problem stemmed in part from Cherokee

distrust of Carolina justice.

In the spring of 1751 a party

of Carolinians stole some deerskins from a party of Cherokee
hunters.

Cherokees became convinced that local justice James

Francis protected the guilty men from punishment.

Cherokee
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resentment of particular traders and generally poor trading
conditions boiled over into war hysteria.

Only two South

Carolinians were actually killed by Cherokees in retaliation
for

the thefts,

but rumor swelled several unsuccessful

assaults on traders into a massacre. Cherokee headmen quickly
made peace overtures to Governor Glen but the Commons House
was in no mood for compromise.

The Commons placed a total

embargo on the Cherokee trade over Glen's objections.~
The abortive uprising highlighted increasing Cherokee
resentment of their relationship with South Carolina.

The

Cherokees had been at war with the Creeks for several years,
which had prevented them from hunting and increased their debt
to British traders. 49
many ways.

Traders also provoked the Indians in

They sometimes sold rum to the Indians, spread

false information concerning other traders 1 bad intentions
toward the Indians, and even assaulted the natives. 50 Licensed
trader Patrick Graham's admQnition to keep "loose,

idle

Fellows" ou'l: of the Creek nation at this time was equally
applicable to the Cherokees. 51
The embargo of 1751, which followed a similar episode in
1748, convinced some Cherokee headmen that they must somehow
break Carolina's trade monopoly.

In search of a British

alternative, in the fall of 1751 uku Old Hop sent his second
man Little carpenter to Virginia to open a trade.
Carpenter was disappointed.

But Little

Virginia awaited a new royal

governor and was not ready to move into Carolina 1 s sphere
without higher authority.

Furthermore, when Glen learned of
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Little Carpenter's mission he intentionally misled Virginians
into believing that Little Carpenter had no standing in the
nation to negotiate for anything.

All Little Carpenter

received from Virginia was the vague assurance that Virginia
traders would be told of the Cherokees• plight. 52
The Cherokees and South Carolina attempted to adjust
relations in a treaty signed in Charles Town in November 1751.
The Cherokees were :.:-equi:;:ed to hand over the metis trader
Andrew White,

who

had killed a

C.arolinian,

and Little

carpenter; make good some trader losses; and prevent Iroquois
from molesting the

~rontier.

South carolina was required to

institute a modified trading regime to keep traders from
troubling each other or the Indians, to establish new prices
and weights for goods and skins, and to prohibit the sale of
Glen also informally promised the

rum in the nation.
Cherokees a fort.

The treaty was less than successful in

solving problems.

Little Carpenter was sent northward on

"national business" and not delivered to South Carolina.

No

enforcement mechanism effectively controlled the traders; rum
continued to be sold; and the assembly failed to approve a
Cherokee fort. 53
Just as Indian policy in south Carolina was influenced
by internal politics, so was Cherokee "Carolina" policy. Many
of the decisions reached around Cherokee council fires in the
early 1750s were the result of an internal power struggle over
who

represented

the

Cherokee

nation

to

outsiders.

Traditionally, the uku or "First Beloved Man 11 of the overbill
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town

of Chota was

Cherokees.

recognized as

the

"emperor"

of th.?.

Each division had its own council and made its own

decisions, but the uku was accorded great respect and his talk
carried great weight throughout the nation.

When Cuming

concluded the great alliance of 1730, he recognized Moytoy,
a senior headman of Great Tellico, as emperor.

Old Hop, who

served as uku from the 1720s through the late 1750s, resented
the

upstart

Moytoy

and,

successor, Ammonscossittee.

after

1741,

Moytoy•s

son

and

Old Hop worked diligently in the

1740s and 1750s to regain his position as the senior leader
of his nation. 54
The political struggle between Old Hop and Ammonscossitte
was a factor in the Creek-Cherokee war of the early 1750s.
The war was caused mainly by the overbills' friendship with
the Iroquois, but because of geography the war fell mostly on
the Middle and Lower Towns where Ammonscossittee lived and
enjoyed the most support.

Ammonscossittee•s failure to

mitigate the effects of the war, which lasted for almost four
years, caused his supporters to look to the uku for guidance.
Ammonscossittee was forced to acknowledge the preeminence of
Old Hop to see the war ended, and by the summer of 1753 Old
Hop was formally recognized by the British as well as emperor
of the Cherokees.

Once these concessions were made, Old Hop

helped arrange an end to the war. 55
Old Hop's increased stature in Carolina did not solve
the problems inherent in the Carolina trade monopoly.

In 1754

Old Hop began to look for trade and alliance elsewhere.
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Unhappy with the British alliance, he cultivated a French one.
Using both native and European intermediaries, in the late
summer or early fall of 1754 Old Hop sent talks to Kerlerec
that the Cherokees were interested in an alliance with
Louisiana. The Louisiana initiative had little support in the
Middle and Lower Towns for the first several years.

Despite

the opposition of his fellow Indians and South Carolina, the
emperor was able to sustain negotiations with Louisiana for
more than half a decade before events led the nation to accede
to his policy. 56
Cherokee disenchantment with the British during the late
1750s was increased, ironically, by the building of British
forts in the nation.

South Carolina built Fort Prince George

opposite the Lower Towns village of Keowee late in 1753 and
Fort Loudon in the fall of 1756 not far from Chota.

The forts

were intended to shore up the Cherokee alliance by serving as
diplomatic centers and places of refuge in case of attack by
the French or their Indian allies.

The Cherokees had

requested forts for protection and to promote trade, but when
the

forts

served

neither

increasingly to resent them.

purpose

the

Cherokees

came

Old Hop resented that a fort was

built first in the Lower Towns, which had no real need for
such an installation.

When the Overbill fort was finally

built, it was poorly placed for defence of any Indian villages
and came at a time when general Cherokee-South Carolina
relations were deteriorating.

Thus British forts became

symbols of encroachment and broken promises,

objects of
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resentment, not good will. 57
The Cherokees hoped that they could turn South carolina's
need to their advantage in the Seven Years' War.

With

Dinwiddie bidding for their favor and Glen eager to maintain
the trade monopoly the Cherokees pressed their advantage.

At

a conference called by Glen at Saluda Old Town in June 1755,
the Cherokees set forth their demands to enter the war effort.
In return for a cession of their land to George II, the
Cherokees obtained several important promises from Glen.

The

governor promised to increase the number of traders in the
nation, to set a new and more favorable price structure, to
prohibit the sale of rum,
protection of the overbills.
were disappointed.

and to build a fort for the
But once again the Cherokees

Glen had no authority to increase the

number of traders or to lc1wer their prices and the assembly
would not grant him money for a fort. 58
Old Hop remained willing to consider alternatives within
the British alliance as well.

Virginia's Dinwiddie presented

Old Hop such an opportunity when the governor attempted to
bring the Cherokees into the Seven Years' War without Glen's
assistance.

Old Hop eagerly responded to the Virginian's

advances by pressing him for what Glen had promised but failed
to deliver: a fort and better trading arrangements.

Cherokees

and Virginians met on the Lower Towns-catawba path at the
Broad River in March 1756 and worked out a new relationship.
The formal terms of the treaty required the Cherokees to
renounce their French alliance entirely and to meet the French
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only on the field of battle.

Virginia was required to build

an overbill fort, in return for which the Cherokees would send
four hundred warriors to Virginia. Informally, the Virginians
agreed to open a regular trade with the Cherokees. Virginians
built an Overbill fort in the summer of 1756 but never manned
it, increasing Cherokee resentment of the British~ 59
The Cherokees • services to Virginia turned out to be
negligible militarily and a disaster politically.

Despite

the opposition of James Glen, at least 250 Cherokees served
in Virginia in 1756.

But Virginia and imperial authorities

treated the Cherokees more like enlistees than mercenary
allies.

The Cherokees considered this treatment at least

negligent and perhaps insulting.

As a result some Cherokees

harassed frontier settlers in their homes and fields, stole
cattle, and generally disturbed an already agitated populace.
The Cherokees first campaign in Virginia created resentment
on both sides of the alliance.~
Despite the problems with Virginia and South Carolina,
in the spring and summer of 1757 over 250 Cherokees took part
in the defense of the Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania
frontiers.

Little better managed than in their first Virginia

campaign, the Cherokees again came into conflict with Virginia
officials and frontiersmen.

Thay were treated poorly by

Edmund Atkin and his subordinates, which caused some of them
to return home in disgust.
among those who remained,

There were more than 3o casual ties
including 15 dead,

reckoned a major loss by Indian standards.

which was

Edmund Atkin made
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matters

worse

in

July

when,

temporarily

without

interpreter, he jailed several Cherokees as spies.

an

With the

nation already angry over its warriors treatment in Virginia,
in December 1757 four Estatoes were killed on the Edisto River
in North Carolina.

A chain of revenge killings on both sides

ensued. 61
Anglo-Cherokee relations deteriorated further during
1758.

The Cherokees were considered by many imperial and

colonial officials as essential to the defense of the frontier
and great efforts were made to enlist them in that service.
Once they took the field, however, the Cherokees were ignored
by the governors of Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, as
well as by the northern and southern Indian superintendents.
The ill treatment they received led some Cherokees to exercise
their frustrations on the Virginia frontier, which in turn
caused greater resentment from Virginians.

General John

Forbes lamented that because of the lack of support from
provinicial legislatures, "if anything fail the cause may be
attributed to the want of Indians who's [sic] presence I have
lost for Saving a few hundred pounds, after foolishly having
spent several thousands upon them. 1162
The Cherokees were continually encouraged

in their

increasing ill-will toward the British by France 1 s Creek agent
Mortar. Mortar spent most of the winter of 1758-1759 with the
Cherokees spreading pro-French talks.

In the summer and fall

of 1759 several parties of Creeks and Cherokees visited each
other's nations.

Creek emperor Togulki and his regent
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Ishenpoaphi journeyed to the overbills and discussed with Old
Hop the formation of an anti-British Creek-Cherokee alliance. 63
During the summer of 1759 Mortar saw an opportunity to
craft the anti-British creek-Cherokee coalition he had sought
for so long.

Cherokees, especially from the Lower Towns, were

receptive to anti-British talks in the aftermath of the
Virginia troubles,
carolina.
as well.

which had spread to North and South

But many Creeks were also unhappy with the British
Atkin's impolitic behavior, although excused by the

strongest

Anglophiles,

had

created

resentment

in

some

quarters.

More than that Atkin's Choctaw peace, concluded in

July, raised in many Creeks the old fear that if an AngloChoctaw alliance and trade developed, the Creeks would lose
their political and commercial advantage in the Southeast.
In the summer of 1759 many Creeks and Cherokees were ready to
consider basic realignments. 64
In late July 17 59 Mortar, Togulki, Ishenpoaphe, and Lower
Cherokee headmen planned for late August a coordinated attack
on British traders to force both nations into war with the
British.

In true Indian fashion, however, tribesmen in both

nations who did not agree with the plan wrecked it.

The

uprising was scheduled for late August, but Anglophile Creek
headmen learned of the plot and warned traders to be on their
guard.

By August 3 even Lieutenant Coytmore of Fort Prince

George in the Lower Cherokees had heard of it.

Coytmore

immediately apprised Atkin of the scheme, who announced it to
all

Creek headmen,

effectively killing

it.

Anglophile
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Cherokee headmen also ruined the plot on their end by
threatening to .kill all the Cr.eeks in the Cherokee nation if
the plan went forward. 65
Despite the best-laid--and sometimes poorly-laid--plans
of various European and Indian groups on the marchlands, the
Southeast did not become a part of the Great War for Empire
before 1759.

The main obstacle to most of these plans was

Cr::ek neutrality.

The Creeks understood that their position

as the neutral arbiter of the Southeast depended upon a
balance between the Europeans, which in turn depended upon
the alliance system that had emerged after the Yamasee War a
half-century earlier.

The Creeks would allow no conflicts to

develop to disturb that system if they could help it.

Late

in 17 59 1 however, the marchlands erupted in war 1 and the
Creeks were powerless to prevent it.
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Chapter IX

War on the Marchlands

1

In the fall of 1759, the Anglo-Cherokee war erupted on
the marchlands of empire, ironically, just as the Great War
for Empire reached its climax in Canada.

The Anglo-Cherokee

War of 1759-1761 was not a product of the Great War for
Empire, but its by-product.

The Europeans•

imperial war

exacerbated tensions between Cherokee and British allies, but
it did not cause them.

The French took advantage of Anglo-

Cherokee differences to push for a Cherokee break with the
English.

Anglo-Cherokee differences were not the creation of

"artful

French

relationship.

diplomacy,"

they

were

inherent

in

the

In the Anglo-Cherokee war, the Cherokees would

learn just how dependent they had become on the Europeans.
senior Cherokee headmen, having foiled Mortar • s September
conspiracy,
Carolina.

were determined to come to terms with South
Because of their recent proof of fidelity, headmen

felt safe going to Charles Town to deal with Lyttleton
personally. The Cherokees proposed that in lieu of delivering
those Cherokees who had killed whites that the guilty be sent
267

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

268

instead against the French for scalps.

Glen accepted such an

arrangement in 1751 and the Cherokees saw no reason why
Lyttleton would not as well.

The peace delegation was led by

Oconostota and eventually included important headmen from
throughout the nation such as Wawhatchee, first warrior of the
Lower Towns, Seroweh of Estatoe and Round 0 of Stecoe from the
Middle Towns,

and Tistoe and Wolf,

headmen of Overbills

Keowee. 1
Lyttleton was less interested in an honorable compromise
than in bringing the Cherokees to submission on his terms.
Despite the fact that he knew Oconostota•s peace party was on
its way Lyttleton decided to effect a military solution to his
Cherokee problem.

In the first week of October the governor
'

proposed to the Assembly that he take

~

force of 150 regulars

and a large body of militia to the Cherokee country, where he
would force the Indians to accept his terms through diplomacy
or force.

The Commons, hoping to avoid war, limited funding

to only three months of campaigning.

But there was not enough

time to raise and supply the men, march them into Indian
country, and bring the natives to terms, so the governor
considered no other options. 2
Given. Lyttleton•s determination to fight, Oconostota•s
diplomatic mission had no chance to succeed.

Lyttleton

rejected the Indians• compromise proposal and informed the
Indians that Cherokees would have to be delivered to British
justice, the number to be determined by him at Fort Prince
George.

Lyttleton promised the Indians safe conduct t.o their
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villages and "invited" them to accompany him to Fort Prince
Despite the pretense of

George to help fash!-on .a peace.

protection, everyone knew that the Indians were hostages for
the good conduct of the nation.
post

commandants

knew

that

Lyttleton and his frontier

the

Cherokees

would

remain

relatively peaceful while important headmen were in Charles
Town. 3
Negotiating a settlement was difficult for both sides.
Lyttleton•s force was too small to fight the Cherokee nation
united against it1 negotiations did not begin until December
10 and his authorization from the Commons expired on January
11 and measles broke out in the English camp, causing illness
and desertions that reduced the governors 1 fighting force
significantly.

The Cherokees had problems as well.

Old Hop

favored a hard line against the British, but Little Carpenter
promoted compromise and conciliation.

Some headmen were

inclined to give satisfaction, but others were prepared to
protect the guilty to prevent their delivery to British
justice.

Growing distrust of the British based on what the

Cherokees perceived as the unjust seizure of hostages made
presenting a peaceful front to the British increasingly
difficult. 4
Lyttleton
Cherokees.

pressed

for

total

submission

from

the

His terms were harsh: the murderers must be

delivered before the hostages would be freed; the hostages
would remain in Fort Prince George until then;

trad~rs

would

return to the nation only after the guilty were delivered;

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

,.

270
the Cherokees would receive no Frenchmen among them; and
anyone who fomented trouble between the Cherokees and South
Carolina would be reported to the governor.

On December 22

Little Carpenter and other Cherokee headmen signed a treaty
conforming to British demands, because it was the only way to
free

important

national

headmen.

Presents,

including

ammunition which they needed desperately, were shown to the
Cherokees but not to be delivered until all the guilty were
handed over.

Lyttleton returned in triumph to Charles Town

early in January 1760 thinking he had put the Cherokees in
their place.

In truth, however, the governor had merely

inflamed the Cherokees against Carolina. 5
The willingness of Little Carpenter and other headmen to
sign Lyttleton's treaty masked widely divergent views in the
nation over relations with South Carolina.

The majority of

Cherokee headmen were either unwilling or unable to satisfy
Lyttleton's demands.

They were unwilling because important

headmen, who in Indian eyes had done nothing but satisfy the
demands for retaliation, were among the guilty.

Some of the

guilty considered expendable by the nation were unwilling to
be sacrificed and fled into the woods, making their delivery
impossible. 6
Lyttleton's campaign against the Cherokees was a serious
blunder and was recognized as such by contemporaries. British
treachery in seizing hostages who had been promised safe
conduct turned formerly ardent Anglophiles into hardened
Anglophobes.

Governor Ellis considered the treaty too
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"mortifying" for the Cherokees to observe. Although Lyttleton
had scored a great victory on paper, in fact he had started
a

war. 7

Doctor George Milligen-Johnston,

Lyttleton 1 s

army,

was

even more to

a

member of

the point.

"This

expedition, which cost the province about £25,000 Sterling,
only increased the Ill-humor of the Cherokees....

[and]

converted their Desire of Peace into a Rage for War" through
gross insults and denial of redress of grievances. 8
Lyttleton 1 s decision to leave the hostages at Fort Prince
George created a situation that practically invited the
Cherokees to make war on Carolina.

Inside the fort were two

things the Cherokees wanted desperately: a group of twentytwo

senior

headmen

and

a

large

supply

of

ammunition.

Compounding problems was the fact that the Cherokees had
developed an intense hatred for commandant Lieutenant Richard
Coytn~?re. 9 All that stood between the Cherokees and what they

wanted was a decaying log fort and a garrison of less than one
hundred men. 10
Lyttleton 1 s peace lasted two weeks before it was broken
by the Lower Towns.

The Lower Towns had suffered the most in

the Virginia troubles, and most of the hostages held in Fort
Prince George were their men.

Seroweh, a former hostage

himself and once a great friend of the British, led the war
effort.

He roused his followers with the killing of Hiwassee

tradei John Kelly and advanced to Fort Prince George to secure
the release of the remaining hostages through diplomacy or
war.

Coytmore learned of his plan, however, and prepared.
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Seroweh, feigning friendship was allowed into the fort with
a small force of warriors hiding weapons.

But the garrison

was obviously prepared for violence, so Seroweh withdrew. 11
The garrison at Fort Prince George was in some ways as
much a captive force as their hostages; the Cherokees declared
war against South Carolina but Coytmore and his men were
powerless to respond.

During the latter part of January over

a dozen British traders were killed in the Lower and Middle
Towns; more would have died but for the protection of their
Cherokee families and friends.

On February 1 the Cherokees

attacked a train of settlers fleeing toward the safety of Fort
More, taking almost two dozen scalps and as many prisoners.
Only the overbills refused to take part in the war. 12
The death of Old Hop in January 1760 led to increased
influence for the growing Anglophobe party.

Little Carpenter

hoped to be elected uku, but too many Cherokees thought he had
sold out his nation to Lyttleton in the December treaty.
Connetarke, known to the English as Standing Turkey, was
elected instead and he did not support Little Carpenter's
treaty. Almost immediately many who had not signed the treaty
and even some who had signed repudiated it.

Little Carpenter

and Oconostota were sent to Fort Prince George for one last
attempt to secure the release of several Chotas among the
hostages. 13
Coytmore held firm on the release of prisoners, despite
the growing indications that the Cherokees would not accept
no for an answer.

What Oconostota could not get directly he
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sought by guile.

Claiming to want an escort to Charles Town

to meet with the governor, Oconostota drew Coytmore out of
Fort Prince George for a parlay, then signaled for an attack.
Coytmore fell, mortally wounded.
Indian attack.

Cannon fire repulsed an

When Coytmore died of his wounds later that

afternoon the garrison inside the fort fixed bayonets and slew
the remaining hostages. Along with the hostages died all hope
of settlement short of war. 14
Having declared all-out war on South carolina,

the

Cherokees were poorly prepared for such an undertaking because
of the long embargo.

They looked everywhere for allies and

found none.
2

Georgians reacted to the eruption of the Anglo-Cherokee
war by strengthening their meager frontier forces.

Rangers

were shifted from the coast to the frontier, leaving only a
token force to defend Savannah. 15 Ellis immediately requested
mc~~Y

for improving fortifications and the support

and militia called into active duty.

c)f

rangers

Ellis gave assemblymen

a choice: they could sacrifice part of their private property
in taxes or lose it all to the Indians. 16

The House quickly

approved all of the governor's proposals. 17
Georgia 1 s next concern after was to bring the Creeks into
the war against the Cherokees.

Atkin immediately sent talks

to the Creeks officially inviting them to join the war effort.
He instructed all

t~aders

to use what private influence they

enjoyed with individual headmen towards the same end. 18 Ellis
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told the Creeks that the war could adversely affect the
trade. 19

Ellis also provided his Indian agents with £1,000

sterling worth of goods to encourage the Creeks to take up the
tomahawk against the Cherokees.

The governor also promised

£5 sterling worth of goods for every Cherokee scalp brought
in by a Creek or a Chickasaw. 20
The

Creeks

did

inducements to do so.

not

join

the

war

despite

lavish

Anglophile headmen affirmed their

loyalty to the British at the same time they declined
officially to take part in the war. 21

Ellis hoped that

although the lavish gift-giving might not lead to war it would
probably prevent war coming to Georgia.

The governor knew

that the Cherokees could not risk bringing the Creeks into the
war by attacking the Georgia frontier. 22
Ellis hoped to force a war on the Creeks that national
lead~rs

would not agree to in council.

From the beginning of

the conflict, Ellis encouraged individual warriors to take
scalps, hoping they would in traditional fashion leave Creek
symbols among the dead bodies to incite retalia1:ion.D

Ellis

also sent John Spencer to incite the Creeks against the
Cherokees, even though Spencer had lost his trading license. 24
Ellis furthermore deputized the Bosomworths to attempt the
same end and approved a reward for any Creek party that could
incite the nation into a declaration of war. 25
Young Creek warriors eager for war honors did not let
national policy stand in their way.

They simply avoided

headmen who disapproved of war and went on raids against the
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Cherokees anyway.~ Several parties of young Creeks attacked
Cherokee towns and returned in trivmph to Georgia to collect
their rewards. 27

Despite all these measures, however, there

was no Creek-Cherokee war.

The Cherokees, unwilling to fight

a two-front war, accepted the protestations of Creek headmen
that their young men had acted without national authorization
and declined to press for or take satisfaction for their
losses. 28
Mortar's

Francophile faction also

national policy.

tried to dictate

Mortar hoped to force his nation into the

Anglo-Creek war on the Cherokee side, and the best way to do
that was to kill and plunder traders.

On May 16 eleven

traders and packhorse men were killed and their stores and
goods pillaged.

The war whoop was heard in many quarters but

the nation would not be stampeded into war.

A few traders

were saved on the day of the initial attack, and in the
following days more traders were gathered together under the
protection

of

senior headmen.

The

first

"massacre" caused a panic on the frontier.

news

of the

Several newly-

built forts were quickly abandoned as frontier settlers
withdrew toward the coast.~
so many Lower Creek headmen were visiting Ellis in
Savannah when the killings occurred that Georgians did not
doubt the chorus of disavowals that flooded savannah from both
Upper and Lower Creeks in May and June 1760.

Gun Merchant,

deputized by many Upper Towns headmen, expressed his loyalty
and pointed out that if the nation had supported the plot no
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traders could have escaped alive.

He also warned Georgians

against pushing for satisfaction because it might inflame the
nation against the British. 30

The Lower Towns demonstrated

their peaceful intentions by bringing the white wing to
savannah along with the traders they had saved and protected
from their bellicose brother&. 31
The Georgia assembly wanted to ensure that the colony
did nothing further to incite the Creeks, despite the fact
that it was Indians who started the trouble.

Assemblymen

recognized that Georgia's effort to promote a Creek-Cherokee
rupture had provoked the "horrid Massacre" and they were
afraid that any attempts to have satisfaction might cause more
trouble.

The assembly therefore asked Ellis not to pursue any

policy that would incite the least Indian jealousy against
Georgia. 32 Ellis agreed with this sentiment wholeheartedly and
absolved the Creek nation of any blame in the affair.

Ellis

told the Creeks that he had done so out of love for them and
treaty obligations to ignore the acts of mad individuals on
both sides of the frontier. 33

The creeks responded to this

self-interested magnanimity by returning most of the goods
stolen from the slain traders.~
During the fall and winter of 1760-1761 Georgians were
involved in almost non-stop talks with the Creeks to cement
the alliance.

A constant stream of warriors, most of them

with no talks to give, came to Augusta and savannah.

All

Creeks were received with open arms and none went away emptyhanded.

Talks of friendship were given to all and important
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headmen were invited to Savannah to deliver and hear national
talks. 35
The Choctaws profited from the frontier troubles to renew
contacts with the British in Georgia.

In October 1760 ten

Choctaw headmen traveled to savannah to hold talks with Ellis.
To prove their sincerity, they brought with them the white
wing and the scalp of a Frenchman killed in retaliation for
an Englishman slain in the nation a year earlier.

.The

Choctaws expressed the.j.r joy at meetirtg Ellis, as they had
been prevented from doing so for two years by the French.
Ellis confirmed Georgia's love for them and his happiness that
they had revenged the British trader. Ellis also praised them
for their Chickasaw peace and encouraged them to make peace
with the Creeks as well.

Once they did this, he promised,

British traders could once again supply their nation.~
Indian complaints against Atkin's activities and conduct
confirmed Ellis' opinion that Atkin did more harm than good
to Anglo-Creek relations. Ellis gave Atkin credit for "having
left Matters there in a settled state, after he had greatly
disturbed and embarrassed them. Voicing the sentiments of his
fellow southern governors Ellis complained to his superiors
that the superintendency was an unworkable office and that
Indian relations should be left to the separate colonies. 37
Ellis hoped that the British would take the offensive in
the Cherokee war by attacking and capturing Mobile.

The

capture of Mobile would mean mastery of Forts Toulouse and
Tombecbe as well.

The elimination of French influence would
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make Britain • s allies more "submissive and manageable" and
afford a good base for operations against the Cherokees.
the very least,

At

such a campaign would improve Britain 1 s

reputation with the Indians.

Ellis realized that the capture

of Louisiana would give umbrage to Spain. The governor argued
that even if Louisiana had to be ceded to Spain in a peace
treaty Spaniards were "in every view more eligible neighbors
than the french [sic] • 1138

James Wright agreed with this

sentiment and called for the capture of the Alabama and Mobile
forts in one of his first letters to the Board of Trade after
becoming governor of Georgia. 39
3

Louisiana's already dismal fortunes sank even lower in
the fall of 1759 when the British captured Quebec.

French

officials recognized that there was no hope of retaining the
colony.

Since Louisiana was settled and maintained largely

to protect Canada's southern and western marches, the loss of
Canada made Louisiana highly expendable. The only grounds for
retaining Louisiana at all was to keep Florida from complete
encirclement by Great Britain. 40
Louisiana's supply problems were exacerbated in the fall
of 1759 by the continuing feud between the governor and
commissaire-ordonnateur.

When Kerlerec went to Mobile for

the annual gift-giving to the Indians,

he left specific

instructions that cartel-ships from all nations should be
welcomed at New Orleans, particularly if they had goods to
trade.

An English vessel appeared and began a lively trade,
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but Rochemore impounded the cargo according to the letter
patent of October 1727.

so grGat was the public outcry

against Rochemore•s actions that Kerlerec quickly returned to
New Orleans and, at the head of a body of officers and
traders, forced Rochemore to return the goods to the English
ship. 41
Louisiana's situation deteriorated so much by the spring
of 1760 that Kerlerec and his senior officers held a £QDg.eil
de guerre, a war council, on April 22 to consider options.
A British ship of thirty guns patrolled the mouth of the
~

Mississippi River near Balize, its object to prevent supply
ships from reaching the colony.

The king's warehouses had

not a single piece of red limbourq, the staple item in Indian
gift-giving.

To counter the British blockade two royal ships

were ordered outfitted as well as possible with men and
weaponry to take the Englishman or to put him to sail.
Regarding presents, the council voted to use whatever money
could be found to buy all the red and blue limbourq that could
be located, as well as substitutes for the other items usually
given to the Indians.

Rochemore was also ordered to lay in

supplies as best be could for future needs. 42 The royal ships
and the armaments were so poor,

however,

that the best

Kerlerec could do was to send one of them to guard the passes
at the mouth of the river. 43
Kerlerec•s fntstration at not being able to supply the
Choctaws and Alabamas was increased by his lack of goods to
help the Cherokees in their war against the British.
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governor had worked hard to foment an Anglo-Cherokee war and
he claimed credit for the war to his superiors in France.«
Kerlerec felt responsible for the Cherokees and he continued
to plead with French officials for their support until long
after they were effectively beaten. 45

The court belatedly

decided to send goods for the Choctaws after it had already
decided to divest itself of Louisiana.~
In the meantime, Kerlerec had problems closer to home
with the Choctaws and Upper Creeks.

The problem with the

Choctaws was to keep them separated from the Chickasaws and
the British; the problem with the Upper creeks was to supply
them their presents as usual.

Mortar's May 1760 attempt to

force an Anglo-Creek war by killing British traders was
unsuccessful, but it nonetheless paid dividends to Louisiana.
The conflict caused a rupture between the Cherokees and the
Chickasaws, which the following winter prevented the British
from opening the trade promised to the Choctaws just a few
months before. Kerlerec :t'ealized, however, that Mortar's coup
would inevitably lead to increased demands for presents and
trade goods, so he called another war council. 47

Due to the

"total necessity" of giving goods to the Upper Creeks, the
council ordered Rochemore and his subordinates to purchase
everything needed to send goods to the Indians immediately. 48
Rochemore did as ordered under protest and dispatched one of
his assistants to Paris to complain about it to the minister. 49
Louisiana•e supply problems continued to worsen due to
Rochemore•s obstructionism and lack of support from France.
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on February 9, 1761 Kerlerec called yet another war council,
this one dedicated to the provision of Mobile, Fort Toulouse,
and Fort Tombecbe.

The Indians at these and other posts were

the only security for the colony, and common wisdom held that
it was

presents

Louisiana.

and trade that

kept

them

friendly

to

The council blamed the absence of stockpiles of

food and merchandise for the Indians 1 needs squarely on
Rochemore.

Kerlerec

orderad Rochemore

to do what was

necessary to obtain the food and guns to supply the posts in
question.

The council found the situation so critical that

its final

statement called for the forcible removal of

Rochemore from his office if he did not move to fulfill the
council's mandate within a week. 50 Rochemore responded to the
council

by

sending

characteristically,

to

when

Havana
the

for

supplies

supplies.
arrived

But

Rochemore

refused to give an accounting of them to the governor. 51
Ironically, Kerlerec did not receive any help from France
until it was too late to do anything but relieve the suffering
of Louisiana's European, African, and Indian inhabitants.
Ministerial officials notified the Louisiana government within
days of each other of the colony 1 s cession to England and
Spain and Kerlerec 1 s return to France, 52 Rochemore 1 s recall, 53
and finally the dispatch of supplies to the long-beleaguered
colony. 54

Minister of the Marine Etienne FranQois, due de

Choiseul-Stainville also notified Kerlerec that presents for
the Indians were on their way as we11. 55
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Kerlerec was generally encouraged about the war effort
because of Spain's entry into the war in the spring of 1762.
In April Kerlerec received offers of cooperation from the
governor of Havana, who also forwarded mail from France.
response to this

Bourbon cooperation,

In

Kerlerec actively

encouraged the Indians to treat Spaniards as

alli~s

and at

the same time sought to instill more diplomatic treatment of
the Indians by Spanish governors in Texas and Florida. 56
Louisiana's joy at the arrival at the end of April 1762
of the first ships from France in three years soon turned
sour.

The three ships carried the Angoumois regiment of four

hundred men and word of further arrivals of men and supplies. 57
on the strength of these advises, Kerlerec sent runners to the
Choctaws, Upper Creeks, and Cherokees telling them that help
was on the way.
disappointment.

But the arrival of the presents brought great
Instead of

limbourg the ships carried

mazamet, in which the Indians were not interested; the trade
shirts were so inferior that Kerlerec lamented they could not
be offered to "the lowest Negro."

The quantity and quality

of the remaining goods were similarly disappointing. 58
Despite Kerlerec • s optimism, the arrival of men and
supplies were irrelevant to Louisiana's fate.
4

Lyttleton had started a war, but he was not to see its
end.

On February 14, 1760 Lyttleton learned that he had been

promoted to the governorship of Jamaica and he left almost
immediately for England to prepare for his new job. The Board
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of Trade appointed Massachusetts governor Thomas Pownall as
governor of south carolina and called him to England for
instructions.

For the interim the board appointed William

Bull, Jr. as lieutenant governor and entrusted the colony's
government to him.

Pownall resigned his office before he

could take up his post and his successor Thomas Boone did not
arrive until December 1761.

William Bull therefore led the

colony through the rest of the Cherokee war. 59
Bull's selection as acting governor was fortunate for
the colony and for the Cherokees.

Although Bull was no soft-

hearted admirer of the "noble savage," he was a political
realist who was willing to compromise to end a war he was not
'

..

sure South Carolina could win militarily.

Bull was also a

former speaker of the Commons House who believed

th~t

there

should be few secrets between the governor and assembly.

Bull

immediately and for the duration of the Cherokee conflict
worked closely with the assembly to bring the conflict to a
speedy solution.~
If the Cherokees believed that this conflict

pit~ed

them

against South Carolina alone, they were soon to learn their
error.

Jeffrey Amherst, commander of British forces in North

America, assigned Colonel Archibald Montgomery and over 1,300
officers and men, including infantry and grenadiers, to the
punishment of the Cherokees.

Begrudging this

southern

campaign, however, Amherst committed his troops only until
mid-October 1760 at the latest.
Carolina in early April.

The army arrived in south

By the early hours of June 2
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Montgomery fought his first battle at New Keowee and Estatoe
and by that afternoon had reached Fort Prince George.

The

colonel offered terms to the Cherokeef; and fully expected them
to comply. 61
Montgomery was sorely mistaken.

British treachery in

twice seizing hostages, a practice which had no parallel in
Indian diplomatic or military conduct, had hardened even
formerly ardent British friends into firm enemies.

After

three weeks at Fort Prince George, Montgomery realized that
the Cherokees would not come to terms before being beaten
militarily.

Montgomery took his army over difficult terrain

toward the Middle Towns.

Before the army reached the first

town, Etchoe, the troops were attacked and took significant
casualties.

Reaching Etchoe after the battle, the army found

it deserted; Montgomery decided that he had accomplished his
mission and set off for Fort Prince George and Charles Town. 62
The colonel was ready to quit the province entirely but at the
solicitation

of

Lieutenant

Governor

Bull

he

left

four

companies to guard the frontier. 63
Montgomery's campaign laid waste the Lower Towns and
Etchoe, but all South Carolinians could see was that it had
increased overbill hatred of their colony.

In the aftermath

of Montgomery's expedition, a sizable faction of the assembly
wanted to take war to the Overbills but Bull demurred.

He

considered Montgomery's experience proof that the war could
not be won militarily.

Bull along with Henry Ellis also

feared that a British offensive might cause the Cherokees to
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attack the frontier in force or that it might somehow be used
by Mortar and his adherents to bring the creeks and Cherokees
together against the frontier.M
In Lyttleton's and Montgomery's campaigns Fort Loudoun
was left alone, unaided and isolated. Given the fort's scanty
provisions, the Cherokees did not have to wait long before the
fort would be theirs.

The Cherokees knew that Montgomery's

retreat doomed Fort Loudoun.

The garrison's position grew so

desperate that, rather than face starvation, soldiers deserted
at the risk of being captured or killed by Indians. Captain
Raymond Demere tried to arrange a truce in the first week of
August, but the CherokE\es would accept nothing less than
surrender.

In return for a surrender, the garrison was

allowed to march out of the fort with their arms and a few
rounds of ammunition for the return home.

The morning after

the capitulation, however, the garrison was fired on by the
Cherokees; the only officer to survive was John stuart, who
was rescued by Little carpenter personally.

Accounts differ

as to what precipitated the attack, but the number of officers
killed almost perfectly matched the number of Cherokees killed
in Fort J:Jrince George. 65
By the winter of 1760-1761, the Cherokees had been
without trade for almost eighteen months.

They were almost

completely devoid of guns and ammunition; food and clothes
were in short supply; as of old they hunted with bone-tipped
arrows.

Ironically, hunger drove the Cherokees back into

carolina to prey on stray cattle and hogs at the farms and
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ranches abandoned because of the war.

And of course they

hunted for scalps wherever they could be found.

Because of

the Cherokees• desperate position, Little Carpenter led many
important headmen in pushing for peace in the spring of 1761.
As a sign of good faith, over a hundred captives were returned
to the British, although thirty to forty settlers were kept
in reserve against the Cherokees still held prisoner in
Carolina.

The

Carolinians

were

adamant

concerning

satisfaction for their dead, however, and made no concessions
to the Cherokees.M
Britain wanted peace only on its terms and seemingly did
To complete the mission begun by

not wish to avoid war.

Lyttleton and Montgomery over a year before, the imperial
government sent General James Grant to chastise the Cherokees
and to reduce them so completely that they would be forced to
sue for peace.
efficiency.

Grant

ca~ried

out his mission with ruthless

During June and July 1761 Grant and his army

destroyed much of what was left of the Lower and Middle Towns.
Sustaining minimum casualties, the army burned villages, tore
up fields, orchards and gardens, and drove men, women, and
children before it westward beyond the mountains.

By the end

of July the Cherokees recognized the futility of continuing
the war and sued for peace.~
The price of peace for the Cherokees was initially
high.

To

satisfy

the

original

demands

for

q~ite

British

satisfaction, four to eight Cherokees, representing all the
major regions, were to b«a handed over to be put to death: all

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

287
prisoners, livestock, and slaves had to be returned; and Fort
Loudoun had to be returned intact to South carolina.

The

Cherokees were required to accept a new boundary that robbed
the Lower Towns of much of their hunting grounds and respect
it; to make peace with the catawbas and Chickasaws; to elect
Little Carpenter emperor; to reject the French entirely; and
in the future to kill any of their people who murdered
Englishmen.

In return, the British would return all Cherokee

prisoners and resume the trade.

These demands were drafted

to satisfy a colonial assembly that was bent on satisfaction
of its own; they were as unacceptable to the Cherokees as they
were satisfying to the assembly.M
That a peace acceptable to both parties was concluded
without much further bloodshed was due to Lieutenant-Governor
William Bull and Colonel James Grant.

Bull did not want to

see the war prolonged by impossible peace demands, and Grant
was anxious to get his army out of South Carolina and back
into the real war.

To end the war decisively, the British

dropped the vengeance requirement from eight to two, as they
held two known killers already, and made minor adjustments in
other requirement, such as the election of Little Carpenter
as emperor.

The treaty of peace between the Cherokees and

south Carolina was finally ratified in Charles Town on
December 18, 1761. 69
Implementing the Cherokee-south Carolina peace took six
months to complete.
with Virginia,

The Overbills concluded their own peace

and showed only passing interest in the
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Carolina treaty, which made fulfilling the latter agreement
more difficult.

With their separate peace the Overbills

opened trade with Virginia and North Carolina, which weakened
South Carolina • s main weapon in enforcing the treaty, the
The final British and Afro-

threat of another embargo.

American priE.!oners were delivered to Carolina officials in
June 1762, l!7hich for Carolina ended the war.

By this time

South Carolina had already begun to implement a new trading
system.

For South Carolina and the Cherokees it was the end

of an era. 70
5

The end of the Seven Years 1 war closed an era for
everyone on the southeastern frontier, Europeans, Africans,
and Indians.

The Anglo-Cherokee War was a sideline in the

larger struggle for North America; Great Britain's victory in
South Carolina was but a reflection of her success worldwide.
Among the European

imperial powers

of the

southeastern

marchlands Great Britain was by far the victor. Great Britain
gained Louisiana east of the Mississippi except for the "Isle
of Orleans,"

which consisted of the

east

bank of

the

Mississippi from the Iberville River (the present-day Amite)
to the Gulf of Mexic:::o, and Florida as well.

Spain •s loss in

Florida was somewhat offset by her acquisition of the Isle of
Orleans and Louisiana west of the Mississippi.

France lost

all her North American possessions except for the two small
islands st. Pierre and Miquelon in the Gulf of st. Lawrence. 71
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More than France and Spain: however, the real losers in
the Seven Years• War on the southeastern marchlands were the
Indians.

From small tribes to major confederacies, they no

longer had any choice of allies and trading partners: like the
Indians of the Northeast, they were now dependent upon one of
two of the surviving European powers." In the following years
they adjusted their diplomacy accordingly, but to different
ends.

Never again would the southeastern Indians deal with

European-Americans from such a position of strength. The once
dominant Indians were now well on the road to dependency.
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Conclusion

Much like the kings and ministers of France and England
during the first six-and-a-half decades of the Eighteenth
century, modern

u. s. historians have gene.t·ally ignored the

southeastern corner of North America in favor of the northern
and middle colonies of both empires from Virginia and Illinois
northward.

To be sure, in the imperial scheme of things these

regions were more important than the
colonial power to the south.

11

deserts 11 of either

No great battles to determine

the course of empire were fought in the Southeast; the little
bit of military conflict there was in the region was largely
irrelevant to either colonial power's strategy in the Seven
Years' War; and the final disposition of the Southeast was
decided by men and events far away in Canada and New England.
Warfare by Europeans as Europeans understood it flared
three times between 1733 and 1763.

Louisiana and the

Chickasaws fought a war between 1736 and 1741;

~~eorgia

and

Florida fought a war between 1739 and 1743; and South Carolina
and the Cherokees fought a war between 17 59 and 17 62. Warfare
as the Indians understood it existed between the Chickasaws
and Choctaws for almost the entire thirty years under review;
the Choctaws tried several times to start wars with the
Creeks; the Cherokees made war at various times on almost
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everyone in the region.
Far from being a region in which not much happened, the
years from 1733 to 1763 included "hot" as well as "cold" wars
for almost everyone concerned.

For rival Europeans, the aim

of their diplomacy was at all times directed at keeping native
allies happy, and attempting either to seduce their rival's
allies into an alliance or to destroy them on their own or
with other native groups.

Each European intentionally fanned

the flames of antagonism and even war between traditional
Indian enemies in the hopes of keeping their own allies weak
and dependent upon patronage and support. Neither England nor
France was at all averse to starting bloody civil wars in the
pursuit of their goal of dominating the southeastern frontier.
Each European colony contained various governmental and
private

interests

relations.

which

competed

to

influence

Indian

In every colony the governor was the duly

constituted official with responsibility for Indian relations,
but in each colony the governor had to deal with other
official

and

unofficial

commissaire-o~donnateur

interests.

In

Louisiana,

the

had an important, and more often than

not debilitating, influence on Indian relations, and to a
lesser extent posts commandants could also influence events
in various ways.

The commandant at Mobile also exerted some

control over Indian affairs, and some did much better than
others.

In Georgia and South Carolina, governors had to deal

with assemblies, both upper and lower houses, agents and later
superintendents

for

Indian

affairs,

powerful

trading

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

296

companies, licensed and unlicensed traders,

and even the

movement of settlement, both sanctioned and unsanctioned, into
Indian hunting grounds.

In addition, on the English side of

the frontier there was also the competition for Indian trade
between South Carolina and Georgia to further complicate
managing the Indians.

on the European side, Indian relations

were the sum total, and sometimes the difference between, all
these competing interests,

which made

successful Indian

diplomacy on the part of those constitutionally charged with
its conduct a most difficult task.
Similarly, there was no such thing as a monolithic
"Indian" block with which to confront either the Europeans or
even other Indians.
Chickasaws,

Choctaws,

Each of the major nations, i.e., the
Creeks,

and

Cherokees,

contatned

factions which undoubtedly exist·ed long before the arrival of
the Europeans.

But contact with the Europeans exacerbated

those internal divisions as rival Europeans played one faction
against another in an effort to maximize their own power
relative to their Indian allies and Indian and European
enemies.

Thus the English and French helped foment the

Choctaw civil war by pushing their respective adherents in the
nation to attempt the negate the other party's influence. The
same could have happened to the Creeks and the Cherokees had
those nations allowed it to happen.

In each case, Europeans

set out to create divisions within the nation, many of them
knowing that the requirements of clan retaliation made murders
committed within clans, moieties, and nations particularly
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destructive emo·tionally as well as physically.
The Indians, of course, were doing the same thing using
rival Europeans to strengthen their own factions within the
nation and the nation relative to all other native and
European powers in the region.

The creeks were known best

for using the Europeans against each other in their basically
unshakable policy of neutrality in the region, but every other
nation in the region also played the Europeans as best they
could

according

politics.

The

to

their

size,

experiences

of

location,
the

and

internal

Yamasees,

Natchez,

Chakchiumas, Koroas, and other nations served as a vivid
example to large and small nations alike that preserving one's
position relative to all the powers of the Southeast was not
just good diplomacy, it was vitally necessary for survival.
One thing almost all the major commentators on the
Indians agreed on was that Indian allegiance was available to
anyone who could purchase

it.

The Choctaw and Cherokee

"revolts" were supposed to be proof of this.

What the

Europeans did not understand, however, was that the Indians
had their own aims and means, and responded to a complex
commercial, diplomatic, and military situation to the best of
their ability, and according to their own notions of relations
between "sovereign" powers.

The Choctaws "revolted" not just

because the English offered them more trade and presents than
the French, but _because French inability to supply them
regularly gave one of their chiefs the opportunity to advance
a policy he had pursued unsuccessfully for many years.
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Cherokees did not "revolt" because the French offered them
more and better trade goods, but because a strong party in the
nation had long suspected that the English wanted to take away
their lands, and had bequn to do so. The Creeks did not allow
the French to build the Alabama fort, and to remain there
unmolested for five decades because they feared the French,
or could not do without their presents.

The French presence

at Fort Toulouse, insignificant militarily, helped the Upper
creeks diplomatically to preserve their position as the
neutral arbiter of the Southeast.
An

important aspect of southeastern history from 1733 to

1763 therefore is the continual,

ever-changing diplomacy

practiced by every power and faction of Indians and Europeans.
Several factors shaped the contours of that history.

Before

1754 North Junerica was little more than an afterthought in the
imperial schemes of England, France, and Spain.

The colonies

were expected to fulfill their assigned functions within the
empire with a minimum of money and trouble.

After 1754 the

English colonies took on a new importance in the British
empire, while Louisiana retained its long-time defensive--and
neglected--character in the French scheme for North America.
Du~ing

their whole period, British settlement crept steadily

westward from the coasts of south carolina and Georgia,
worrying Indians and Frenchmen alike.

Indians, growing ever

more dependent upon European goods,

especially quns and

ammunition, became increasingly concerned about ensuring a
steady and affordable supply of goods, while at the same time
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preserving their independence and their land.

With the

beginning of the seven Year's War, England's growing military
power, and the westward-moving zone of English settlement,
might have been expected to cause the Indians to ally
themselves with Louisiana.
kept

France

from

But an effGctive English blockade

supplying her Mississippi colony,

and

Louisiana went for years without supplies or even news from
France.

Louisiana was thus unable to supply disaffectad

Creeks, cherokees, and even Choctaws.
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Appendix
Divisions and Major Towns
of Three Major Nations of the Southeast 1
Choctaws
Western Division
Boucfouca
Nushkobo

Custusha
West Abeka

Eastern Division
Concha

Oulitacha

Six Towns Division
Yanabe
Tala

Toussana
Seneacha

Independent
Chickasawhay

Yowani

Couechitto
Caffetalaya

Okalousa

Creeks
Upper Creeks
Alabamas

Abihkas

Talapoosas

Lower Creeks
Coweta

cuss ita

Oconees

Cherokees
Lower Towns
Keowee
Tugaloo

Estatoe

Conasatchee

Middle/Valley Towns
Etchoe

stecoe

Hiwassee

overhill Towns
Chota
Chatuga

Great Tellico
Tomatly

Settico

1

The Chickasaw nation was too small to be divided into
significant divisions.
300
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